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INTRODUCTION
"[W]e had everything before us, we had nothing before us...

Michael Marnell Smith was electrocuted in August 1986,
perhaps because his lawyer mistakenly failed to raise the one
claim on appeal of Smith's state murder conviction that would
have entitled Smith to federal habeas relief. The Supreme
Court upheld denial of the writ of habeas corpus2 without ruling on the merits of Smith's constitutional claim.3 The Court
held that because Smith's lawyer failed to raise the claim prop1. C. DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CIrIEs 1 (London 1859).
2. There is an excellent body of habeas literature. Some of the most well
known and well regarded pieces include Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378 (1964); Bator, Finalityin Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441
(1963); Brennan, FederalHabeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in
Federalism,7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961); Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas
Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. 748 (1987); Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L.
REV. 142 (1970); Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term-Foreward The Time
Chartof the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959); Mayers, The Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31
(1965); Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA. L. REV. 286 (1966); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,90 HARV. L.
REV. 1105 (1977); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-HabeasCorpus, 64
MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966); Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982); Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus:
Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding,74 HARV. L. REV. 1315 (1961) [hereinafter Reitz, Abortive State Proceeding];Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners,108 U. PA. L. REV. 461 (1960) [hereinafter
Reitz, Postconviction Remedy]; Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1956); Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger
Court. An Examination of Continuity and Change in CriminalProcedure,80
COLUM. L. REv. 436 (1980); Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1973); Stolz, Federal Review of State Court
Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need for Additional Appellate Capacity,
64 CALIF. L. REV. 943 (1976); Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective
Representation of Counsek The Supreme Court Has Work To Do, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1978); Tushnet, JudicialRevision of the Habeas Corpus Statutes: A
Note on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975 WIs. L. REV. 484; Yackle, Explaining
Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1985) [hereinafter Yackle, Explaining
Habeas];Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to FirstPrinciples,44 OIo ST. L.J. 393 (1983) [hereinafter Yackle, Exhaustion Doctrine] Yackle, Book Review, 36 RUTGERS L. REV.
375 (1983) (reviewing I. ROBBINS, THE LAw AND PROCESSES OF POST-CONVICTION REmEDiEs (1982)) [hereinafter Yackle, Book Review]. There may be
nothing further to say about habeas after Judge Schaefer's incisive comment
that "prisoners whose energies are directed to getting out of the prison by judicial process are not so likely to be concentrating on other methods of getting
out which may be less socially acceptable." Schaefer, supra, at 22.
3. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 529 (1986).
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erly in state court, thereby forfeiting Smith's right to further
review under state law, the federal court could not hear the
claim either.4 Smith v. Murray5 and its companion case Murray v. Carrier6 stand for the proposition that, absent a showing
that a prisoner was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment, federal habeas petitioners must
7
suffer the consequences of the mistakes of their lawyers.
The Smith and Carrier cases were similar in many respects. In each case, a state prisoner sought federal habeas relief on the ground that a state trial court had violated his
constitutional rights.8 In each case, a claim of constitutional error at issue was defaulted in state court because the prisoner's
lawyer failed to raise the claim in conformity with state procedural requirements. 9 The procedural default in each case occurred in the course of appellate proceedings in state court:10
Smith's lawyer decided not to present to the state appellate
court a claim that was meritless under state law at the time of
appeal, but that a federal court subsequently found to have
merit;" Carrier's lawyer apparently simply forgot to include a
meritorious claim in the state appellate brief.12 In each case,
the state supreme court had ample knowledge of the claim despite the procedural default: in Smith an amicus raised the
claim in a brief filed on Smith's behalf;' 3 in Carrierthe claim
had been a serious point of contention at trial, the constitutional error was manifest, and the claim was raised in the notice of appeal, although omitted from the appellate brief.14 In
each case, the constitutional claim, had it been raised properly,
likely would have entitled the petitioner to federal habeas relief.' 5 Relief was denied in each case, however, because of the
4. Id5. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).

6. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
7. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537-39; Carrier,477 U.S. at 488, 495-97 ("we discern
no inequity in requiring [the client] to bear the risk of attorney error").
8. Smith, 477 U.S. at 532; Carrier,477 U.S. at 483.
9. Smith, 477 U.S at 529-33; Carrier,477 U.S. at 482-85.

10. Smith, 477 U.S. at 529-33; Carrier,477 U.S. at 482-85.
11. Smith, 477 U.S. at 530-33.

12. Carrier,477 U.S. at 482-85.
13. Smith, 477 U.S. at 531.

14. Carrier,477 U.S. at 482.
15. In Smith, the defendant was tried for murder connected with a rape.
477 U.S. at 529. At the sentencing phase, the court allowed the state to introduce the testimony of a psychiatrist who examined Smith at the request of defense counsel. I& at 530. The psychiatrist testified that Smith told him about
a previous incident in which Smith tore the clothing off a student on a school
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attorneys' procedural forfeiture.16 In each case, counsel was appointed, not retained.'7
Under such circumstances as these, in which denial of
habeas relief results in a prisoner's continued incarceration or
even execution, one might expect that the Court's decision
would contain a thorough discussion and sensitive weighing of
the interests at stake. For example, the Court appropriately
might consider why, on the facts stated above, the client should
bear the consequence of an attorney's error. On this point,
however, the Court simply concluded without explanation that
"we discern no inequity in requiring [the client] to bear the risk
of attorney error that results in a procedural default."' 8 One
likewise might expect a careful assessment of the strength of
the state's interests that justified failing to order a new trial
free from constitutional error. In Smith and Carrierthe petitioners argued that whatever the strength of the state's interests in enforcement of procedural rules that result in defaults
at trial, those interests are diminished substantially with regard
to appellate defaults. 19 Rather than address this argument on
bus. Id The court sentenced Smith to death. Id. Permitting the psychiatrist
to testify about Smith's statements probably violated Smith's fifth amendment
rights, see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981), and eighth amendment
rights, see Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 912-13 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); accord Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 539, 551, 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(asserting that violations of Smith's rights were "clear").
Carrier was tried for rape. 477 U.S. at 482. The issue in Carrier was
whether the defendant was entitled to discover the victim's statement to the
police. Id After examining the statement in camera the trial court denied
the discovery request on the ground that the statement contained no exculpatory evidence. Id Carrier's counsel included in the notice of appeal a claim
that denial of access to the report violated Carrier's rights, but failed to address the issue in the appellate brief. Id. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), the victim's statement should have been turned over to defense
counsel if the evidence was material to guilt, whether or not it was exculpatory. See id, at 87. A rape victim's statement generally is material to the defendant's guilt, so it is highly likely that the trial judge's denial of Carrier's
discovery request constituted reversible error. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 497
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("[the] trial judge may have erroneously denied respondent's counsel access to statements").
16. In both Smith and Carrier,the prisoners' attorneys were responsible
for the default of constitutional claims. Smith, 477 U.S. at 529-33; Carrier,477
U.S. at 482-85. Carrier's lawyer apparently did not even consult his client regarding claims to pursue on appeal. 477 U.S. at 481. If counsel had at least
furnished Carrier with a copy of the appellate brief in his case, the absence of
claims raised in the notice of appeal might have been spotted.
17. Smith, 477 U.S. at 529; Carrier,477 U.S. at 482.
18. Carrier,477 U.S. at 488.
19. Smith, 477 U.S. at 533; Carrier,477 U.S. at 489-90. Carrier argued, for
example, that appellate defaults implicate less weighty state interests than do
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the merits, however, the Court decided in conclusory fashion
that the standards for excusing a procedural default "should
not vary depending on the timing of [the default] or on the
strength of an uncertain and difficult assessment of the relative
magnitude of the benefits attributable to the state procedural
rules that attach at each successive stage of the judicial
'20
process.
In addition to expecting an accurate assessment of the competing interests, which the Court failed to provide in Smith and
Carrier,one also might expect the Court to explain how the
holding in each case was consistent with the purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus. If the petitioners' attorneys had raised their
constitutional claims in conformity with state procedure, and
the state courts had decided those claims adversely to the petitioners, the Court would have permitted the petitioners to raise
the claims anew in a federal court. 2 ' Because the petitioners'
attorneys failed to raise their claims in state court, however,
the Court barred federal habeas review.2 2 The Court should
have explained what it is about the writ of habeas corpus that
entitles some petitioners to both federal and state review of
constitutional claims, while other petitioners receive no adjudication of their claims on the merits.
Although the Court should have addressed these issues in
Smith and Carrier,it is not surprising that the Court was silent, because habeas corpus has lost its reference point. Smith
and Carrierare but two of a number of recent decisions that
2
changed, or suggested significant changes to, habeas doctrine.
trial defaults: they do not diminish the importance of the trial, inhibit the development of a trial record, or deprive the trial court of an opportunity to correct an error without a retrial. IHi at 490.
20. Carrier,477 U.S. at 491; accordSmith, 477 U.S. at 533.
21. See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing rule that federal court may rehear claims of constitutional error heard in state court); see
also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 108 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (decrying harsh rule that denies access to state or federal courts because of default; in absence of default both state and federal court would hear claim).
22. Smith, 477 U.S. at 538-39; Carrier,477 U.S. at 497.
23. See also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality opinion) (asserting that "ends of justice" never justify litigation of more than one
federal habeas petition unless petitioner advances a claim of actual innocence);
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-82 (1986) (permitting petitioner effectively to raise fourth amendment claim in habeas despite contrary general
rule of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), discussed infi notes 146-49 and
accompanying text, if claim not raised in state court because trial attorney
failed to provide effective assistance of counsel); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at
496-502 (concurring opinion) (suggesting such claims will not succeed on merits because attorney failure to raise fourth amendment claim does not create
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For all their innovation, these recent habeas opinions make little attempt to discuss the writ's purpose or relate that purpose
to the cases' holdings. The Court evidently has lost track of the
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Without an enunciated
purpose, habeas doctrine? has lost its way.
The divorce of the writ of habeas corpus from a satisfactory
rationale explaining the purpose of the writ can be traced back
to the Court's seminal decision in Brown v. Allen.25 In that
case the Court acknowledged an expansion of the scope of the
writ of habeas corpus from its traditionally narrow focus on jurisdictional errors to encompass any claim of constitutional error raised by a prisoner in state custody.2 6 The expansion of
the scope of the writ in Brown, however, took place in a most
peculiar fashion. Rather than explicitly discussing the expansion in the scope, and thus the nature, of the writ, the Brown
Court simply presumed the enlarged scope of the writ.27 Because the change in habeas corpus occurred sub silentio, the
Court never provided a rationale for the writ's expansion.
Since Brown, habeas corpus has been in search of a rationale.
For decades, the Brown Court's failure to explain and justify the expanded scope of the writ has plagued habeas corpus
doctrine, and confounded properly informed debate on the subject. 28 Without a rationale for the original decision, further
fundamentally unjust outcome needed to establish prejudice from ineffective
assistance).
24. This Article concerns federal courts' power to hear habeas petitions
filed by prisoners in state custody. Although both state and federal prisoners
may obtain postconviction relief in their respective court systems, current law
permits a state prisoner to seek further review in a federal court after exhausting state remedies. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 446-50 (1953). When
discussing "habeas doctrine," this Article refers solely to the rules governing
federal review of state criminal convictions.
25. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
26. Id at 500, 507-09, 513.
27. Brown must stand for the proposition that a habeas court can hear
claims of constitutional error adjudicated by state courts, because it has been
so cited countless times by the most eminent legal scholars. See in&fra note 73
and accompanying text. Yet one searches the Brown opinion in vain for a sentence, a paragraph, or even a page that states the holding. See Bator, supra
note 2, at 500 (noting that Brown Court simply assumed this critical rule without explanation); see also infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing
Brown Court's treatment of this issue).
28. See Wechsler, The Courts and The Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1001, 1012 (1965) ('The dialogue the Court initiates when it hands down a constitutional decision... concerns the adequacy of the reasons it advances for
the value choice that it decrees."). When the Court not only fails to give reasons, but fails to set out its course explicitly, "the dialogue" suffers
accordingly.
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doctrinal development has had no guiding principle. Not surprisingly, the rules governing access to habeas review have become hopelessly confusing and confused.2 9 Moreover, the
Brown Court's failure to explain the expansion of habeas has
obscured debate on the proper role of federal habeas corpus review. Since Brown the increase in the scope of habeas jurisdiction has created sharp controversy among courts and
commentators,3 0 and to this day, commentators observe that no
single satisfactory rationale exists for the broad scope of habeas
jurisdiction.3 1
This Article sets out the rationale for the expansion of the
scope of the writ that the Brown Court neglected to provide,
thereby permitting an untangling of confused habeas doctrine
and focusing debate on the pertinent questions concerning federal habeas review. The Article's thesis is that the Court expanded the scope of the writ of habeas corpus in Brown because
29. Even in 1960, when the rules governing habeas were far more clear
than they are today, Professor Reitz wrote "[o]f all the many dark corners of
the law, few are so dimly lit as is the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction."
Reitz, Postconviction Remedy, supra note 2, at 461; see also Bator, supra note
2, at 443 (describing habeas as an "often murky and technical field of law");
Hart, supra note 2, at 101, 122-25 (noting that in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174,
184 (1947), Justice Frankfurter termed habeas corpus "an untidy area of our
law," and that in Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959), the Supreme Court compounded its untidiness); Reitz, Postconviction Remedy, supra note 2, at 468
(noting "tangled formalities" of postconviction procedures and "technical confusion" among remedies); Yackle, Book Review, supra note 2, at 394 (noting
that "anyone who reads the advance sheets knows that the greater proportion
of judicial time in habeas cases is spent wrestling with threshold procedural
matters of extraordinary complexity").
30. For example, the 1952 Conference of Chief Justices resolved: "orderly
Federal procedure under our dual system of government should require that a
final judgment of a State's highest court... be subject to review or reversal
only by the Supreme Court of the United States." REPORT OF THE HABEAS
CORPUS COML OF THE CONF.OF CmEF JUSTICES, Chicago, Illinois, August 14,
1954, in H.R. REP. No. 1293, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7 (1958) [hereinafter STATE
JUSTICES' REPORT]; see also Bator, supra note 2, at 443, 526-28 (noting that

habeas is one of the areas of "acutest controversy" in criminal law and recommending limits on availability of writ); Yackle, Book Review, supra note 2, at
377 (noting that "[e]ven the casual observer knows that post-conviction habeas
has always been a controversial subject").
31. See, e.g., Bator, supranote 2, at 502 (noting that "basic reason why the
courts have had such difficulties in defining the scope of review on habeas is
that the Court in Brown did not provide a principled rationalization"); Reitz,
Abortive State Proceeding,supra note 2, at 1317 (stating that "there is no acceptable unifying rationalization for the present state of the law" of procedural default doctrine in habeas); Yackle, Explaining Habeas,supra note 2, at
991 (arguing controversy will continue until habeas is explained in conceptually satisfying manner); a at 1018-19 (noting failure of "conventional wisdom" to explain habeas plausibly).
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the Court recognized that it no longer could shoulder the burden on direct review of scrutinizing constitutional claims arising in state criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the federal
habeas courts were to act as surrogates for the United States
Supreme Court through habeas review, in effect exercising appellate jurisdiction over state criminal proceedings. In a sense,
then, after Brown there were two writs of habeas corpus: the
old common-law writ, narrow in scope and historically used to
free prisoners subject to fundamentally unlawful incarceration,3 2 and a new writ, which now serves in effect as a federal
appeal from every state conviction.
Identifying the Brown Court's rationale resolves the confusion created by the Court's failure to explain Brown's implicit
holding. First, acknowledging that after Brown habeas in effect
constitutes a new appellate writ permits enormous simplification of existing habeas doctrine. The less complicated and more
familiar rules governing direct review by the Supreme Court
may replace all of the confusing habeas rules. Second, acknowledging the new writ and the reason the Court created it
focuses debate on the Court's practical inability to provide adequate review in state criminal cases, and the concommitant
need for habeas review, rather than on inadequate post-Brown
justifications for broad habeas jurisdiction.
It is not entirely novel to argue that habeas was the Brown
Court's solution to the inadequacy of direct review. In the decades since Brown several courts and commentators have alluded to this idea, 33 but none pursued the insight. Yet this
rationale, better than any other, explains current habeas doctrine and provides a touchstone for habeas jurisdiction in the
years to come.
32. See infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (describing narrow scope
of original writ and its gradual evolution).
33. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 380 (arguing that reliance on
Supreme Court is unsatisfactory in view of volume of cases and inadequacy of
state procedures); Bator, supra note 2, at 514 (noting sense of inequality created by discretionary certiorari); Reitz, Postconviction Remedy, supra note 2,
at 467 (describing Supreme Court review as frustrated to extent state procedures are inadequate); Yackle, Explaining Habeas,supra note 2, at 1008 (characterizing superintendence of state supreme courts by direct review as
impossible); Yackle, Book Review, supra note 2, at 379 (noting that Supreme
Court cannot supervise scores of local courts); see also Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court does not, because it
cannot, dispute that institutional constraints totally preclude any possibility
that this Court can adequately oversee whether state courts have properly applied federal law.").
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The initial section of this Article addresses the general inadequacy of habeas jurisprudence. Part I(A) presents a hypothetical that graphically illustrates the doctrinal confusion
surrounding habeas. Part I(B) provides an overview of the history of habeas jurisprudence, explaining how the failure of the
Court to explain the expansion of habeas jurisdiction in Brown
v. Allen left habeas without a satisfactory rationale. The initial
section concludes, in part I(C), by setting out the thesis of this
Article-that the Brown Court intended expanded habeas jurisdiction to serve as a substitute for direct Supreme Court review
of state criminal cases-a thesis that, if accepted, would lead to
untangling, simplification, and better understanding of habeas
doctrine.
The second section examines in detail the key habeas doctrines of "scope of the writ," "res judicata," "procedural default," and "exhaustion." The section demonstrates that
commonly-offered justifications for the Brown decision cannot
account for these doctrines, which limit the reach of the Brown
decision, and that the law governing each doctrine is confusing
and internally inconsistent. This section argues, however, that
when viewed from the perspective of the "appellate" rationale
for Brown that is the thesis of this Article, these doctrines
make great sense and can be applied in an enormously simplified fashion. This section also examines the "actual innocence"
standard imposed by the Court's recent habeas decisions, explaining that this standard is completely at odds with common
justifications for Brown, but can be understood with reference
to the common-law function of the writ, which existed before,
and properly should survive, Brown. The second section concludes by articulating how the new "appellate" model for
habeas would operate, demonstrating that a proper understanding of Brown greatly simplifies habeas corpus procedure.
The final section of the Article evaluates the merits of the
appellate model, comparing it both to the model currently used
by the Court and to models preferred by other commentators.
This section evaluates the appellate model first as applied to
claims raised and adjudicated in state courts, and then as applied to claims not raised in state proceedings (and thereby "defaulted" under the Court's jurisprudence). The final section
concludes that the appellate model set forth in this Article is
the most satisfactory of all interpretations of Brown, and provides a sensible, coherent approach to the jurisprudence of
habeas corpus. Not only does the appellate model simplify
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habeas, but it strikes an appropriate balance between the need
to provide a federal forum for review of federal claims and the
commonly expressed concern for finality in criminal
proceedings.
I.

A.

DOCTRINAL CONFUSION IN HABEAS: AN
ILLUSTRATION, AN ANALYSIS, AND A
PROPOSED SOLUTION

AN ILLUSTRATION OF DoCTRINAL CONFUSION

Assume defendants Tom, Dick, and Mary are tried individually for participation in the same crime. Differences among
their cases result only from variations in the quality of their
representation at trial or on appeal and the related decision to
raise, or failure to raise, a claim of constitutional error committed in state court. This section will show that these differences
lead to widely differing, rationally inexplicable dispositions of
their habeas petitions by a federal court, despite the identical
merits of their underlying constitutional claims.
Accused Tom retains the very best of criminal defense attorneys. His attorney raises every conceivable constitutional
claim, but Tom is convicted nonetheless. Tom then files a federal habeas petition, seeking redetermination of any or all of
the constitutional claims raised in state court. Under prevailing
habeas doctrine, Tom is entitled to this broad review by the
federal habeas court, and if Tom proves his case, he may obtain
relief.34 If the habeas court finds constitutional error, the conviction will be reversed unless the state can bear the heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was
harmless.3 5
34. This results from a simple application of the rule of Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953). See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing
rule of Brown).
35. Under Brown, a habeas court simply evaluates the constitutional claim
and grants the writ under the standards governing appellate review. Brown,
344 U.S. at 485. When an appellate court finds constitutional error underlying
the conviction of a defendant, it generally will overturn the conviction unless

the state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967). The harmless error stan-

dard applies to most meritorious claims of constitutional error, see Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986), but not to every such claim. For example, if
the error consists of the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence to the defense, the conviction will stand unless the undisclosed evidence was favorable
to the defense and material to either guilt or innocence. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963). For a thought-provoking discussion of appellate review standards generally, and the significance of applying harmless error or an
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Compare Tom's situation with that of Dick, whose courtappointed counsel is fresh out of law school and unsure of what
he is doing.36 Dick's lawyer tries his best, but fails to raise in
state court a number of the constitutional claims that Tom's
lawyer raised. After Dick is convicted, he seeks habeas relief,
hoping to litigate the defaulted claims. Dick could face the burden of overcoming the default to obtain habeas review, under
unfavorable standards developed for this purpose, 37 but he need
not worry about that burden because his attorney's performance was so deficient that it failed even to meet sixth amendment standards for effective assistance of counsel. 38 Rather
than trying to overcome the default, Dick simply will assert a
sixth amendment claim in federal habeas court. Under the
guise of his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Dick now
may raise essentially the same issues as did Tom.3 9 For Dick to
obtain relief, however, the Court's sixth amendment jurisprudence requires that he prove he suffered "actual prejudice"
from his lawyer's failure to raise the claims raised by Tom's
lawyer. 40 Thus, even if Dick establishes the same state-court
alternative standard, in particular, see the recent article by Professors Stacy

and Dayton, Rethinking Harmless ConstitutionalError,88 COLUM. L. REV. 79,
126-42, 79-91 (1987).
36. Obviously attorneys other than those "just out of law school" may
render ineffective assistance, and some attorneys "just out of law school" may

provide competent representation. Thus, the illustration is purely hypotheti-

cal in this respect. In reality, members of the criminal defense bar often suffer from disabilities other than inexperience, such as excessively heavy case
loads, which result, in part, from relatively small fees or inadequate public
funding for representation of indigents. For a discussion of the importance of
providing criminal defendants with competent representation, see infra notes
431-36 and accompanying text.

37. A habeas court will not hear a claim that has been defaulted in state
court absent a showing of either "cause" to excuse the default and "prejudice"
resulting from it, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977), or actual innocence, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 497 (1986). See infra notes 186-264
and accompanying text (discussing standard for hearing defaulted claims).
38. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing
two-part test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also
Tague, supra note 2, at 56-57 (noting that restricting access to habeas for defendants whose counsel failed to make timely claims causes defendants to
transform claims into attacks on counsels' competence). For a critique of
Strickland, see infra notes 431-36 and accompanying text.

39. Dick either can press a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
under Strickland or can offer ineffective assistance as grounds for excusing a
procedural default under Sykes. See infra notes 227-40 and accompanying text
(discussing procedural default); notes 279-80 and accompanying text (discussing redundancy of treating sixth amendment violation as cause to excuse procedural default).
40. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-96.
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error that Tom established, Dick does not likewise shift to the
state the burden to prove the error was harmless, 41 but rather
must himself show that but for the error he might not have
been convicted. 42
In other words, Dick, under the rubric of a sixth amendment claim, in effect may raise any substantive claim Tom may
raise by asserting that his attorney was ineffective in failing to
raise that claim. But Dick is, in effect, penalized for having incompetent counsel in that he must bear the burden and prove a
higher degree of materiality with regard to the error in order
to have his conviction overturned.
Defendant Mary's plight is worse yet. Mary's lawyer is not
very good, but not very bad either. Mary's lawyer is mediocre.
Unfortunately, Mary's lawyer forgets to raise at least one of the
constitutional claims raised by Tom's lawyer in state court. The
neglected claim, however, is the claim Mary now believes to be
her strongest, so she raises the claim in her petition for federal
habeas review. Unlike Tom, Mary is not entitled automatically
to a determination on the merits of this claim, because her lawyer procedurally defaulted it by failing to raise it properly in
state court. 43 Unlike Dick, Mary cannot obtain review of the
constitutional claim through a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel because her lawyer's overall performance was not so
deficient as to qualify her for relief under prevailing sixth
amendment standards, despite the lawyer's failure to raise a
meritorious constitutional claim.44 Finally, the federal court
41. As previously noted, a standard other than "harmless error" applies to
some constitutional claims. See supra note 35 (describing appellate review
standards). The important point is that Dick's burden of proving ineffective
assistance of counsel does not vary according to the underlying claim, but remains at the actual prejudice level, a heavier burden to carry than the harmless error test. Cf Stacy & Dayton, supra note 35, at 118 n.157 (noting that
prejudice test requires greater impact on outcome than harmless error test).
42. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Tague, supra note 2, at 37
(stating habeas rules place "a dramatically higher" burden on defendant who
failed to raise claim at trial); cf United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69
(1982) (holding that for defaulted claim prisoner must show "actual
prejudice").
43. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-88 (1986); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
44. According to the Court in Carrier,counsel's default of a single claim
may be sufficiently serious to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.20
(1984)). The Court did not excuse the defaults in either Carrieror Smith,
however, even though both defaults were serious and in Smith the petitioner
faced execution. See supra note 15. Moreover, the unnecessarily complex
cause-and-prejudice standard for excusing a procedural default distracts courts
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will not excuse Mary's procedural default, because Smith and
Carrierhold that attorney error which does not rise to the
level of ineffective assistance of counsel is not "cause" to excuse
45
a default and permit habeas review of the defaulted claim.
Absent cause, Smith and Carrier allow Mary to litigate her
claim only if she can prove that she actually is innocent.46 In
other words, those with mediocre lawyers who fail to raise constitutional claims in conformity with state rules get no federal
habeas relief unless they satisfy the heretofore unheard of burden of proving their own innocence.
In sum, current habeas jurisprudence produces the following inexplicable result. Prisoners whose lawyers raise and lose
constitutional claims in state court may relitigate those claims
in federal court and obtain relief under a relatively low standard of materiality. Prisoners with claims defaulted by a lawyer whose performance was constitutionally deficient also may
obtain review on the merits of those claims in a federal court,
but despite the fact that such prisoners are not responsible for
counsels' failings, a higher materiality standard applies. Prisoners with defaulted claims who cannot establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, who also are not responsible for their defaults, must prove actual innocence to obtain habeas review of
their constitutional claims.
The seeming unfairness of this scenario is exacerbated
when the undefined constitutional claim involved in the hypothetical above is given a name. Assume, for example, Tom,
Dick, and Mary are trying to raise a fourth amendment claim
before the federal habeas court. It turns out that Tom cannot
raise the claim after all, because in Stone v. Powell 47 the Court
held that fourth amendment claims-alone among constitutional defects in state criminal proceedings-are barred from
relitigation in habeas.48 For the same reason, Mary cannot
from serious analysis of the constitutional sufficiency of attorney performance.
See intfra notes 497-98 and accompanying text. In fact, the Court has indicated
it prefers not to scrutinize closely counsel's performance for fear of chilling attorneys in the performance of their duties. See infra notes 431-36 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of Court's ineffective assistance of counsel
jurisprudence).

45. Smith, 477 U.S. at 538-39; Carrier,477 U.S. at 497.
46. Smith, 477 U.S. at 538; Carrier,477 U.S. at 497. There are exceptions
to the procedural default rule not applicable to this hypothetical. See infra
notes 274-91 and accompanying text.

47. 428 U.S. 465 (1975).
48. IL at 494; see infra notes 146-80 and accompanying text (discussing
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raise the claim either. 49 But Dick can raise the claim even
though fourth amendment claims generally are not cognizable
on habeas, because the rule changes if the claim was defaulted
due to counsel's constitutionally deficient performance at
trial. 50
Suppose, in contrast, the defendants are asserting that the
state discriminated blatantly in selecting the grand jury: for
example, the prosecutor intentionally excluded all blacks. Tom
can raise the claim; indeed, under governing precedent such
discrimination never can be harmless error.5 1 If he proves his
claim on habeas review, Tom will obtain relief no matter what
the state argues as to the materiality of the violation. 52 Mary,
however, will have her claim barred by the default holdings of
Smith and Carrier,unless she can establish her actual innocence, which possibly would make relief on the grand jury
claim appropriate. 5 3 Whether Dick, with the grossly incompeStone); notes 181-82 and accompanying text (arguing Stone should be
overruled).
49. If Mary can prove her innocence, however, the Court might excuse
the default under Carrierand permit reaching the merits. See Carrier,477
U.S. at 497 (showing of innocence will excuse default). Because Mary originally had a "full and fair" opportunity to raise the claim below, Stone apparently would nonetheless bar relief on the merits. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
Confusion in this area results from the Court's seeming adoption of two inconsistent standards for limiting the scope of the habeas writ. See infra notes 16769 and accompanying text.
50. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375-79 (1986) (holding that
if attorney fails to raise fourth amendment claim at trial, default of claim,
though barred from habeas review under Stone, may serve as basis for ineffective assistance claim); infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text (discussing
this aspect of Kimmelman).
51. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986) (plurality opinion).
52. See id
53. This result looks particularly absurd. After all, as with the Stone
claim, if Mary can establish her innocence, why must she do anything further
in order to obtain habeas relief? Nonetheless, under the habeas statute, a
court cannot grant the writ unless there has been a constitutional error. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982) (requiring writ to be granted to a person "in custody
in violation of the Constitution"); Stolz, supra note 2, at 965 n.76 (noting
"something odd" about system of postconviction relief that will not entertain
claim of innocence). Mary may be able to overcome default of her grand jury
claim by establishing her innocence, then establish the merits of the grand
jury claim, and obtain relief with no further showing regarding the materiality
of this particular violation. This would follow from the Court's decision in
Vasquez. 474 U.S. at 260-64. But see Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542
(1976) (requiring showing of actual prejudice to excuse default of grand jury
claim). As with the fourth amendment claim, this confusion results from the
Court's attempt to adopt two inconsistent standards for limiting the scope of
the habeas writ. See itkfra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
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tent lawyer, will obtain relief remains uncertain. 54
These illustrations paint a picture of habeas that is difficult
to fathom.
Nonetheless, current habeas jurisprudence
prescribes the results depicted. The thesis of this Article is
that, although the commonly-offered justifications for habeas
are inadequate, many aspects of this illustration may be explained by developing an entirely different perspective on the
problem of habeas jurisdiction. Habeas must be seen not as a
writ removed from ordinary criminal process, but as an appeal
to a federal forum available in every state criminal case.
Viewed from this perspective, much of the hypothetical begins
to make sense. Moreover, this perspective helps to identify the
aspects of habeas jurisprudence that must be modified to yield
acceptable results in the cases of Tom, Dick, and Mary. The remainder of this Article unravels habeas and then reconstructs
it to make sense of the writ and of the foregoing hypothetical.

B. CURRENT HABEAS LAW: A WRrr IN SEARCH
OF A RATIONALE
Although the writ of habeas corpus often is described in
exalted terms,5 5 historically the respect accorded the Great
Writ reflected more its procedural reach than its substantive
scope. A judge empowered to issue the common-law writ could
order the prompt release of a prisoner from custody.56 The
54. On the one hand, the Court's test for ineffective assistance of counsel
incorporates a standard for materiality of counsel error (prejudice) that cannot
be met by establishing that counsel failed to raise a claim of grand jury error.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984); infra notes 432-34
and accompanying text; see also infira notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing how grand jury error has no impact on verdict); cf Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 393-97 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting failure to raise fourth amendment claim does not constitute prejudice required to
sustain ineffective assistance claim on habeas, because fourth amendment
claims are not related to guilt and do not render conviction unreliable). On
the other hand, any showing of materiality might be excused, consistent with
Vasquez. 474 U.S. at 260-65; see supra note 51 and accompanying text. But see
Francis,425 U.S. at 542 (requiring showing of actual prejudice to excuse default of grand jury claim). As with the fourth amendment claim, confusion
surrounding grand jury error results from the Court's attempt to adopt two
inconsistent standards for limiting the scope of habeas. See infra notes 167-69
and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 56-57.
56. Oaks, supra note 2, at 459-60 (1966). In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), the Court explained that
[habeas's] function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints ....
[1]f
the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
73:247
[

writ thus cut through all legal forms and went right to the
heart of an unlawful incarceration.5 7 Yet the scope of the writ
at common law was relatively narrow. A court could appropriately issue the writ when the body responsible for committing a
prisoner to custody lacked legal power to do so. The commonlaw writ was limited to correcting such jurisdictional errors,
and other errors deemed equally "lawless" in scope.5 8
Although firmly rooted in its common-law history, current
habeas doctrine purports to be a construction of the Act of
1867, 9 by which Congress extended the habeas jurisdiction of
the federal courts to individuals in the custody of state officials.
The Reconstruction Congress passed the Act of 1867 as one part
of its broad program for reforming the secessionist states.6 0
The Act provides that a federal court shall issue a writ to any
person "incustody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.16 1 Despite its broad language, for
some sixty years after its enactment the Act of 1867 found almost no application to convicted prisoners held in state custody.
During that time, federal courts generally confined application
of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of state prisoners to its
requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release .... Vindication of due process is precisely its historic office
.... [It] was early used by the great common-law courts to effect the
release of persons detained by order of inferior courts.
I& at 401-03 (footnote omitted).
57. "[Habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of
the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry
whether they have been more than an empty shell." Frank v. Magnum, 237
U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Fay, 372 U.S. at 411 &
n.22, 421 (quoting Justice Holmes and stating that court adopted this view in
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1923)).
58. The history of the writ of habeas corpus is a matter of sharp controversy focusing on whether, to what extent, and in which cases the Court expanded the common-law scope of the writ. In Fay, Justice Brennan described
the writ's history in a manner that suggested the writ's scope had always been
as broad as that acknowledged in Brown. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 399-415. Commentators have vigorously attacked Justice Brennan's interpretation, casting
some doubt on its accuracy. See Bator, supra note 2, at 446; Mayers, supra
note 2, at 37-38 & nn.30-33, 42 & n.45. This Article's description of habeas
largely remains on firm and undisputed ground, avoiding conflicts over the
writ's history where possible.
59. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-87 (current version at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1982)).
60. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 415 (arguing Act passed to counter anticipated
Southern resistance to Reconstruction measures). But see Mayers, supra note
2, at 49-52 & nn.68-77 (disputing same).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1982).
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common-law scope.6 2 Thus, even under the Act of 1867, federal
courts generally would not review claims of state prisoners
challenging their incarceration unless they claimed that the
trial courts lacked jurisdiction or had committed an error so
fundamental that the habeas court found the trial court had
"lost" its jurisdiction.6 3 Even the exceptional case that strayed
outside this narrow stance reflected some effort, no matter how
implausible, to "kiss the jurisdictional book."''
State prisoners
rarely found a sympathetic audience in federal habeas courts.
By the time of Brown v. Allen,6 5 the Court was under pressure to expand the scope of the writ beyond its common-law
dimensions. Although the Court's decisions immediately prior
to Brown adhered to the jurisdiction rationale, 66 application of
this rationale increasingly stretched the concept of jurisdiction
beyond recognition.6 7 Moreover, by the time of Brown, the
62. See Bator, supra note 2, at 465-72, 474-84 (describing federal courts'
post-Act review of unlawful detention as limited to corrective process); Hill,
The Forfeiture of ConstitutionalRights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLuM. L. REv.
1050, 1053-54 (1978) (noting that federal courts stretched "lack of jurisdiction"
concept considerably but did not abandon limitation until well into twentieth
century); Mayers, supra note 2, at 54 n.89 (stating habeas during this period
limited to claims attacking jurisdiction); Teel, Federal Habeas Corpus: Relevance of the Guilt DeterminationProcess to Restriction of the Great Writ, 37
W.L.J. 519, 521-30 (1983) (describing federal courts' slow progress away from
lack of jurisdiction as determinant of habeas availability).
63. Cf. Bator, supra note 2, at 474-83 (stating that conviction under unconstitutional statute, racial exclusion in jury selection, and ineffective assistance
of counsel implicate jurisdiction and therefore warrant habeas review); see also
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (holding that court with initial jurisdiction can "lose" jurisdiction if proceedings infringe defendant's constitutional rights).
64. Friendly, supra note 2, at 151; see also Bator, supra note 2, at 471 (noting Court continued to pay "lipservice" to jurisdiction limitation in early period). But see Bator, supra note 2, at 464-68 (characterizing exceptions to
jurisdictional cases as "limitations" on principle that error made by court of
competent jurisdiction was not ground for relief under habeas).
65. 344 U.S. 433 (1953).
66. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 337 (1915) (acknowledging that interference of mob violence or disorder may strip court of jurisdiction); but see
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923) (holding habeas review proper where
state procedure does not adequately protect defendant's constitutional rights).
Contemporary commentators suggested that decisions such as Moore signaled
an expansion of the writ of habeas corpus, but, as Judge Friendly observed,
until Brown the Court scrupulously adhered to the narrow jurisdiction rationale. Friendly, supra note 2, at 151-52.
67. Early decisions stretching the jurisdiction rationale include Moore, 261
U.S. at 91 (holding federal habeas court may hear claim that threat of mob violence inhibited fair trial because state court system did not provide corrective
process for federal constitutional error) and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
286-87 (1936) (holding court that fails to provide counsel to capital defendant
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lower federal courts had begun to hear habeas claims that did
not challenge the jurisdiction of the committing courts.6 8 Without doing so explicitly, the Brown Court accepted a broadened
scope of the writ that included any claim of federal constitutional error arising in state criminal proceedings.
In Brown, a state prisoner sentenced to death challenged
the constitutionality of the state trial proceedings. 69 Brown
raised two claims. First, he alleged racial discrimination in the
selection of the grand jury.70 Second, he claimed that a confession admitted into evidence against him was not given voluntarily.71 Brown had raised these issues in state court, and had
applied to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. After the Court denied certiorari, 72 Brown sought habeas
relief.
What is significant about Brown is that the Court addressed Brown's claims on the merits. Neither the racial discrimination nor the confession claim related to the jurisdiction
of the committing court. Moreover, even if these errors arguably deprived the committing court of power to adjudicate the
case, the Brown Court made no attempt to rely on such an argument. Thus, under the traditional, common-law view of the
writ's scope, neither the lower federal habeas court nor the
Supreme Court should have addressed Brown's claims.
The fact that the Brown Court did address Brown's claims
on the merits, without any attempt to fit them into the jurisdictional framework, signalled a shift in the scope of the writ.
Brown has been cited frequently for the proposition that
habeas lies to correct any constitutional error addressed in
state-court proceedings.7" This represented a shift of tremenlacked jurisdiction to hear case because court not "complete" without counsel
for defendant). See Hart, supra note 2, at 104 (describing "long process" of expansion of concept of lack of jurisdiction).
68. Justice Jackson, concurring in Brown, alluded to this practice and
noted its potential as a source of friction between federal and state courts. 344
U.S. at 532-33 & n.4; see also Reitz, Postconviction Remedy, supra note 2, at
484, 526-32 (noting that only one out of 35 habeas cases decided during 10-year
period immediately preceding and following Brown was decided on traditional
jurisdictional grounds; all 11 pre-Brown cases were decided on constitutional
grounds: lack of counsel, coercion, suppressed evidence, or failure to give notice of applicability of state habitual criminal act).
69. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433, 466-67 (1953).
70. Id
71. Id
72. Brown v. North Carolina, 341 U.S. 943 (1951).
73. It is a fundamental principle... that constitutional issues arising
out of state criminal prosecutions should be presented first to state
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dous significance, yet the Brown Court not only failed to explain the shift but failed even to acknowledge it. Nowhere did
the majority opinion discuss which claims are properly cognizable in habeas.74 Nor did the Court discuss how the nature of
the writ justified its newly broadened scope. Indeed, the
Court's only nod in the direction of a holding on this point was
that, in discussing the role a prior state adjudication of constitutional claims would have in a federal habeas proceeding, the
Court simply asserted that "the state adjudication carries the
weight that federal practice gives to the conclusion of a court of
last resort of another jurisdiction on federal constitutional is'7 5
sues. It is not res judicata."
To the extent that the Brown Court relied on the Act of
courts. It is equally fundamental that the state courts cannot... have
the last word. This is the teaching of... Brown v. Allen. That decision ... explicitly enthroned the principle that all federal constitutional questions decided in state criminal cases may be redetermined
on the merits on federal habeas corpus.
Reitz, Postconviction Remedy, supra note 2, at 463 (footnotes omitted). See
Bator, supra note 2, at 462 (footnote omitted) ("[In Brown] it was held that
state prisoners could maintain proceedings in the federal courts to attack convictions for constitutional error after full and fair proceedings in the state
courts."); Friendly, supra note 2, at 155.
74. The Brown majority came closest to acknowledging the new scope of
habeas in its discussion of the defendant's right to a plenary hearing on habeas
review: "A way is left open to redress violations of the Constitution... Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86. Although they have the power, it is not necessary for
federal courts to hold hearings... when satisfied that federal constitutional
rights have been protected." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 464 (1953). The majority also referred to "the statutory development of 1867 that expanded
habeas corpus." I&. at 457.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson explicitly addressed modern
habeas's expansion beyond the traditional inquiry into jurisdiction, expressing
doubt that the language of the 1867 Act could justify this expansion. 344 U.S.
at 532-34 & n.4 (Jackson, J., concurring) (attributing both expansion and resulting controversy surrounding habeas to, among other things, Court's use of
fourteenth amendment to subject state courts to federal control).
In dissent, Justice Black agreed that district courts had jurisdiction and
power to release state prisoners held in violation of constitutional rights, apparently regarding this as a settled question after Moore v. Dempsey. Brown,
344 U.S. at 549 (Black, J., dissenting). Black asserted that courts in habeas
proceedings were to look through procedural screens to prevent forfeiture of
life or liberty in defiance of the Constitution. Id at 554.
Justice Frankfurter's dissent rejected the idea that habeas be used as a
"jejune abstraction," and quoted with approval the words of Judge Learned
Hand from 30 years before Brown: "'Tihe writ is available, not only to determine points of jurisdiction, stricti juris, and constitutional questions; but whenever else resort to it is necessary to prevent a complete miscarriageofjustice."'
Brown, 344 U.S. at 558 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting
United States ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813 (2d. Cir. 1946)).
75. 344 U.S. at 458 (footnote omitted).
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1867, its construction finds support in the Act's plain language, 76 but not in its history. Commentators have disagreed
sharply over the correct historical interpretation of the Act of
1867 with regard to state prisoners. Some commentators maintain that Congress intended that the Act be applied just as the
Brown Court applied it. 7 7 These commentators contend that
the Reconstruction Congress foresaw southern resistance to reform and enacted the habeas statute as a means of opposing
that resistance.78 Thus, the Act therefore should be given the
broadest interpretation, extending habeas to any claim of constitutional error. Others argue that the Act of 1867 had nothing
to do with state criminal prisoners, but was directed solely at
former slaves, ostensibly emancipated but nonetheless held "in
custody. '79 Under this interpretation the Act did not alter the
76. "[TMhe several courts of the United States . . . shall have power to
grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained
of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of
the United States ....." Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385
(current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1982)).
77. See Reitz, Postconviction Remedy, supra note 2, at 462 (arguing that
scope of habeas jurisdiction conferred by Congress extends to state prisoners
imprisoned in violation of Constitution); see also Bator, supra note 2, at 474
(acknowledging argument for broad scope of habeas based on language of 1867
Act). In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), Justice Brennan's majority opinion
characterized the Act as establishing clear congressional intent to provide a
federal forum for review of the federal claims of state criminal defendants. Id
at 415-19. In Justice Brennan's view, decisions limiting habeas review in any
fashion established a doctrine of abstention from interfering with the states
that derived from considerations of comity, not from want of power in the
lower federal courts. Fay, 372 U.S. at 415-20; see also Friendly, supra note 2, at
154-55 (suggesting that true motivation for Brown decision was Court's inability to perform its historic function of correcting constitutional error through
direct review of state criminal cases); Bator, supra note 2, at 474-77 (asserting
that habeas traditionally functioned as protection against detention without
court process, not as postconviction remedy; sparse legislative history does not
furnish overwhelming evidence needed to show that Congress intended to remove habeas from its historic context and convert it into ordinary writ of error). But see generally Mayers, supra note 2, at 58 (concluding that it is
"inherently implausible" that Congress intended in 1867 to make habeas into
procedure for review of state convictions).
78. At least one commentator has pointed out that this argument is not
entirely sound. Assuming the need for federal courts to combat southern
resistance, it is difficult to identify the writ's role in that struggle, because the
Supreme Court in 1867 had not yet interpreted the due process clause to incorporate selective rights from the Bill of Rights against the states. See Mayers,
supra note 2, at 54. Thus, the writ, which only is granted to redress federal
constitutional violations, would have had extremely limited application to prisoners in state custody.
79. See Mayers, supra note 2, at 43-48 (criticizing Supreme Court's interpretation and arguing that historical context as well as language of amend-
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common-law scope of the writ. Whichever view is correct, the
Brown Court's interpretation 0 ran contrary to sixty years of
experience with the Act and required some explanation.
Habeas decisions and commentary following Brown have
attempted to identify the rationale for broad habeas review that
the Brown Court failed to provide. Some would justify the
broad scope of habeas by reference to the nature of the claims
asserted: because constitutional rights are so important, extraordinary habeas review is essential to vindicate those
rights.8 1 This rights-based rationale arguably can be tied to the
common-law tradition on the grounds that habeas lies to correct fundamental injustices, and that any deprivation of a constitutional right is fundamental.8 2 Others explain the scope of
ment suggest habeas was to be ultimate protection of newly-emancipated
slaves', rather than ordinary state prisoners', right to freedom); id. at 39-40 &
n.39 (arguing that Act was directed to cases involving persons virtually enslaved through device of state laws).
80. Subsequent history indicates that the intent of the Reconstruction
Congress is somewhat irrelevant to modern interpretation of the Act. Congress has amended the 1867 habeas statute a number of times. Several amendments followed Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of the writ;
indeed, Congress on occasion has amended the habeas statute to incorporate
specific decisions. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 528-29 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2, 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (80 Stat.) 1105, by which Congress adopted
Court's decision in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 322 (1963), to establish federal courts' responsibility to conduct factfinding hearings for state prisoners in
habeas proceedings). Congress's apparent ratifications of the Court's decisions
render the intent of the 1867 Congress relatively unimportant. Construction
of the 1867 Act thus differs from typical statutory construction which involves
the determination of congressional intent followed by the application of statutory language to the specific case at hand with that congressional intent in
mind. In the habeas situation, the Court has followed Congress to a far lesser
extent than Congress has followed the Court. The Court consistently has felt
free to change its construction of the Act. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 79-81 (1977) (discussing Court's willingness to alter construction of Act).
81. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) ("Conventional
notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake
and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged."); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 416 (1963) (Act of 1867 was intended to provide additional review where
vindication of rights under postwar amendments is necessary); Reitz, Abortive
State Proceeding,supra note 2, at 1344,1349-51 (arguing that purpose of habeas
is vindication of federal rights). Often, concern for federal rights reflects a
sense thatfederal rights should be vindicated in a federal forum. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 380 ("[i]t makes good sense to give a state criminal defendant a federal judge to try the facts underlying his federal constitutional
claim"); Reitz, Abortive State Proceeding,supra note 2, at 1344, 1349; Yackle,
ExplainingHabeas,supra note 2, at 1022.
82. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 399-426. Justice Brennan's attempt to weave the
rights-based rationale for broad habeas review into the history of the common-
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habeas with reference to the liberty interest at stake: because
the deprivation of liberty is so serious, only extraordinary review can protect prisoners from wrongful deprivation of liberty.8 3 Neither rationale, however, explains the current set of
rules governing habeas.
The liberty-based theory is inadequate because the current
writ's scope is both under- and overinclusive when measured
against the liberty-based rationale. It is overinclusive because
federal habeas now is used to vindicate rights that have nothing
to do with the ultimate question of whether an individual ought
to be deprived of liberty. For example, under the liberty-based
rationale, a person claiming error in grand jury proceedings
who subsequently was lawfully convicted has a weak claim that
his interest in avoiding incarceration justifies collateral relief.84
This claim is nonetheless cognizable on habeas.a 5 The libertybased rationale also is underinclusive because if the sole purpose of federal habeas were to relieve unjust incarcerations,
habeas certainly should lie to address a claim that a state convicted an innocent person. Although the question of actual innocence plays a part in the rules that limit access to habeas
review, a habeas petition claiming only that a state has incarcerated an innocent person would be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under current
8 6
doctrine.
Nor can broad federa4 habeas jurisdiction be explained by
the special importance of the rights that petitioners claim were
infringed. The purpose of direct appellate review of criminal
87
convictions is to ensure that trials are free from legal error.
The rights-based habeas rationale does not explain why this
law writ has come under sharp attack. See supra note 58 (discussing debate
over history of common-law writ); see generally Oaks, supra note 2 (disputing
Brennan's historical analysis and conclusions); Mayers, supra note 2 (same).
83. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 8; Fay, 372 U.S. at 402 ("[habeas writ's] root principle is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to
the judiciary for a person's imprisonment"). But cf.Bator, supra note 2, at
441-53 (responding to, and disagreeing with, liberty-based rationale).
84. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 35, at 99-104 (noting that grand jury
claim is unrelated to propriety of conviction and proposing novel remedy for
such claims).
85. Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986).
86. See supra note 53.
87. At common law an appellate court could issue a "writ of error" to review a lower court's decision; the direct appeal now serves that purpose. See
BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 1443-44 (5th ed. 1979); see also Friendly, supra note
2, at 151-52 (questioning why collateral attack need be available to correct errors that may be raised on direct appeal).
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system of direct review is inadequate to redress constitutional
violations, making habeas review necessary. Moreover, if the
reason is that the rights at stake are so important that habeas
must be available as a backup system to vindicate those rights
not protected during direct review, the extensive rules limiting
access to habeas developed since Brown are inconsistent with
the rights-based explanation. As Part II demonstrates, those
rules bar habeas review in many cases that present meritorious
constitutional claims. 8 Finally, it is arguable whether habeas
relief actually "vindicates" rights: a new trial, excluding evidence unlawfully obtained, does not necessarily compensate the
petitioner for the harm caused by the initial violation-the injury resulting from coercion of a confession contrary to the
fifth amendment, for example.8 9
Moreover, in application both the liberty-based and the
rights-based rationales possess similar fundamental flaws.
Under the current formulation, in determining whether to apply a limiting rule that will bar access to the habeas court, the
Court applies a balancing test: explicitly or implicitly, the
Court balances the prisoner's interest in liberty or in having a
federal right vindicated against the state's interest in avoiding
review, generally a concern for finality or comity.9 0 Balancing
tests by their nature pose intractable difficulties. 91 When the
Court attempts to balance dissimilar or uncertain factors, as in
the habeas context, these difficulties are exacerbated.9 2 For example, it simply is impossible to discuss usefully the balance between a prisoner's interest in litigating a defaulted fifth
amendment claim and the state's interest in having its procedural rule respected and the prisoner's conviction upheld.9 3
88. See infra Part II (discussing limiting rules).
89. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 35, at 103.
90. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-92 (1986) (weighing petitioner's interest in having claim heard against state's interest in procedural
rule to determine whether attorney error constitutes cause to excuse procedural default); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-54 (1986) (plurality opinion) (weighing prisoner's interest in release against state's interest in finality
to determine whether petition should be heard).
91. For an excellent discussion of the problems associated generally with
balancing tests, see Tushnet, Anti-Formalismin Recent ConstitutionalTheory,
83 MicH. L. REv. 1502, 1508-09 (1985) [hereinafter Tushnet, Anti-Formalism].
For the same author's similar, though less well developed, discussion specifically addressed to habeas corpus, see Tushnet, supra note 2, at 496-502.
92. See generally Tushnet, Anti-Formalism,supra note 91, at 1509-12 (discussing problems with balancing incommensurable interests).
93. Thus, the Court has balanced the same factors at different times and
arrived at different results. Compare Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538-39
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Both sides of the balance have significant weight, but there is
no measure by which to compare them.9
Even if a balance could be struck, it would have to be
struck on a case-by-case basis, 95 and the current formulation
leaves no room for that. Instead, habeas doctrine relies on categorical balancing, increasing the difficulties inherent in balancing dissimilar interests. For example, the Court will not assess
the magnitude of a particular individual's liberty interest in a
case of procedural default; whether the individual is to serve
one week or fifty years is irrelevant.9 6 Similarly, in Smith and
Carrierthe Court declined to analyze whether particular defaults implicated more or less weighty state interests. For example, the Court refused to distinguish between defaults at
trial and defaults on appeal, although trial defaults arguably
are more serious because remedying a constitutional defect in
that context requires replaying the entire trial.97 Rather than
conducting the sensitive balancing needed to weigh dissimilar
factors, the Court applies categorical rules unlikely to strike
the appropriate balance in individual cases. 98
Thus, even supporters of broad federal postconviction review have failed to advance a rationale that adequately justifies
(1986) (granting no relief on merits of defaulted fifth amendment claim unless
petitioner can show actual innocence) with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438
(1963) (holding defaulted fifth amendment claim cognizable unless petitioner
"deliberately by-passed" state remedies). Clearly, the Smith and Fay Courts
had very different views of the balanced interests, but the opinions viewed the
interests at a level so general as to be virtually worthless. This is to be expected when the Court balances apples and oranges.
94. See Tushnet, Anti-Formalism, supra note 91, at 1509-16 (noting arbitrary characterizations made in attempts to balance incommensurable
interests).
95. I& at 1514-16 (critiquing possibility of doing this in meaningful
fashion).
96. See Smith, 477 U.S. at 538 ("We reject the suggestion that the principles of Wainwright v. Sykes apply differently depending on the nature of the
penalty a State imposes for the violation of its criminal laws."). Even an analysis sensitive to the duration of imprisonment would not tackle the complexity
of the problem, for the same penalty may affect different people differently.
A few days in prison might devastate one person; another might find it burdensome, but less serious than a large fine.
97. See, e.g., Smith, 477 U.S. at 533; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492
(1986).
98. See Carrier,477 U.S. at 491 ("We likewise believe that the standard
for cause should not vary depending on the timing of a procedural default or
on the strength of an uncertain and difficult assessment of the relative magnitude of the benefits attributable to the state procedural rules that attach at
each successive stage of the judicial process.").
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the Brown decision. 9 Not surprisingly, that Brown remains
unexplained has worked to the advantage of those seeking to
curtail broad habeas jurisdiction. Critics identify tensions
caused by federal review of state criminal decisions and present
those tensions as justification for cutting back the broad reach
of habeas.l ° °
Correctly or incorrectly, its critics perceive habeas corpus
review by federal courts as carrying heavy costs. First, federal
court review of state decision making has created friction between state and federal courts.'0 1 Second, habeas jurisdiction
undermines the finality of criminal convictions; habeas can result in the release of a prisoner years after the conclusion of
state proceedings in the case. 10 2 Finally, critics perceive expansion of the writ as increasing the work of both federal and state
courts, consuming limited judicial resources. 10 3 All of these
perceived costs may be justified, or at least required, by the special nature of the writ of habeas corpus,1° 4 but because the
Brown Court never offered an explanation of the purpose of
99. Professor Yackle points out that the scope of the writ continues to be
attacked precisely because the Court has yet to provide a satisfactory rationale:
'"he controversy surrounding federal habeas corpus has not abated. It will
continue until the federal courts' [habeas] authority.., is explained on some
conceptually satisfying basis." Yackle, Explaining Habeas, supra note 2, at
991.
100. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 2, at 444-62 (pointing to high "finality" costs
as grounds for limiting habeas to claims of insufficient "corrective process" in
state court); Friendly, supra note 2, at 148-49 (pointing to finality and resources costs to justify limiting habeas to claims of actual innocence); see also
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454-55 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting finality costs of multiple habeas proceedings will limit availability of habeas to
review a successive petition to cases raising a claim of "factual innocence");
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-96 (1976) (noting costs of overturning convictions on fourth amendment grounds and limiting opportunity to raise such
claims in habeas to cases in which there was no "full and fair opportunity" to
litigate claim in state court).
101. See STATE JUSTICES' REPORT, supra note 30, at 1 (recommending that
only United States Supreme Court have authority to overturn state court convictions); Bator, supra note 2, at 503-04 (noting that federalism counsels
against indiscriminate expansion of habeas); Brennan, supra note 2, at 439 (acknowledging he resented federal intrusion while member of New Jersey
Supreme Court).
102. Bator, supra note 2, at 441-53; Friendly, supra note 2, at 146-48. A related problem resulting from granting the writ years after conviction is that
the state's evidence may have disappeared, making retrial impossible. See Bator,supra note 2, at 517; Friendly, supra note 2, at 146-47.
103. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 532, 536 & n.3 (1953) (Jackson,
J., concurring in the result); Bator, supra note 2, at 506; Friendly, supranote 2,
at 148-49; Shapiro, supra note 2, at 321-25.
104. Cf.Bator, supra note 2, at 505 (stating that it is not unseemly for fed-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:247

the writ consistent with its expanded scope, there is no rationale with which to justify the costs of broad habeas review.
The perceived costs of habeas made it inevitable that courts
would develop rules limiting access to habeas, but a lack of understanding of the purpose of the writ has thwarted sound doctrinal development of those rules. Since Brown, the Court has
developed at least four sets of rules that limit the scope or
availability of the writ of habeas corpus. 0 5 These rules govern
(1) the scope of the writ; 0 6 (2) the extent to which prior state
or federal determinations bind a subsequent habeas court, often
referred to as principles of res judicata;10 7 (3) whether a federal
court can review an issue barred from review in state court
through procedural default; 0 8 and (4) the timing of federal
court review of state convictions. 0 9 As Part II explains in detail, this collection of rules governing the availability of habeas
is confusing and often internally inconsistent.
In its 1985-1986 term, the Court decided four important
habeas cases. In addition to the Smith and Carrierdecisions
discussed in the introduction, the Court decided Kuhlmann v.
Wilson," 0 a plurality decision that would restructure dranatically the application of res judicata rules to habeas, and Kimmelman v. Morrison,:"' a decision concerning the availability of
habeas for raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Rather than clearing up debate over the purpose of habeas,
these decisions complicated matters. Every decision included a
suggestion, either from the majority or in a concurring or dissenting opinion, that in some, although not all, instances,
habeas review should lie only for petitioners claiming actual innocence of the crimes for which they are incarcerated. 1 2 This
eral court to reverse highest state court, but it is unseemly to do so without
"principled justification").
105. In addition to the four sets of rules this Article discusses, the concept
of "custody" and limits on the factfinding authority of federal courts also restrict the scope of habeas review. See Yackle, ExplainingHabeas, supra note
2, at 998-1010 (discussing custody issue); infra note 416 (briefly discussing
factfinding in habeas).
106. See infra Section II(A).
107. See infra Section II(C).
108. See infra Section II(B).
109. See infra Section H(C).
110. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).

111. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
112. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 497 (1986); Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454 (plurality opinion); Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 394-98 (Powell, J., with Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (effectively disallowing ineffective assistance of counsel claims al-
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new twist not only complicates habeas doctrine, but further
confuses the rules governing availability of the writ.
Habeas doctrine, therefore, is in a state of widely acclaimed
muddle. 11 3 Between the broad scope of the writ acknowledged
in Brown and the harsh limiting rules developed subsequent to
Brown, the doctrine moves in two directions at once, satisfying
no one. This confusion suggests that Brown has yet to be explained properly.
C. EXPLAInNG BROWN V. ALLEN... AND HABEAS
The inadequacy of post-Brown rationales for broad habeas
review indicates that the Brown Court had some other concern
in mind when it accepted broad federal habeas review. Thus, a
return to Brown is required.
The Brown Court's motive for expanding habeas becomes
apparent on close examination of the issue that divided the
Brown Court most sharply. That issue was the effect a habeas
court should give to the prior denial of certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court.114 Under then-emerging practice, prisoners had to apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
in order to satisfy the requirement that state remedies be exhausted before seeking habeas relief.115 In Brown and its companion cases, the lower federal courts gave weight to the denial
of certiorari by the Supreme Court in resolving habeas cases on
the merits.1 16 In other words, one reason for denying habeas
relief was that the Supreme Court previously had denied relief-presumably on the same grounds-on direct review.
The Brown Court split on the certiorari issue, the majority
holding that denial of certiorari should have no effect in subsequent habeas proceedings,"17 and the dissenters arguing that
leging only failure to raise fourth amendment claim because fourth amendment claim does not implicate factfinding as to guilt).
113. See supra note 29.
114. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489-97 (1953) (writing for majority,
Justice Frankfurter held that denial of certiorari should not affect subsequent
habeas review). But see id. at 456-57 (Reed, J., dissenting) (arguing that denial
of certiorari should bar habeas action).
115. Id at 489 (citing Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 201, 214 (1950)).
116. Brown, 344 U.S. at 450-55.
117. Id at 489-97 ("[O]ur denial of certiorari in the ordinary run of cases
can be any number of things other than a decision on the merits .... []n
habeas corpus cases, as in others, denial of certiorari cannot be interpreted as
an 'expression of opinion on the merits.' ") (quoting Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S.
174, 181 (1947)); Brown, 344 U.S. at 513 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring)
("[D]enial of certiorari in a case should be given no legal significance when an
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such denial should have some weight." 8 What divided the
Court was the question of the efficacy of direct Supreme Court
review of criminal convictions. Both sides clearly believed it
important that state review criminal convictions receive federal
review." 9 But the majority was unwilling to pretend that the
certiorari process afforded meaningful review,120 and even the
dissent was unwilling to give the certiorari process full
say denial means
credit.-2 ' As Justice Jackson lamented, "some
1 22
much."'
nothing
means
it
say
others
nothing,
At the heart of the Brown Court's decision to expand the
scope of federal habeas, therefore, was its realization that direct
review alone no longer could provide adequate treatment of
federal questions arising in state criminal cases. Because the
Court could not perform this function, the lower federal courts
would act as surrogates through the writ of habeas corpus. The
Brown opinions support this rationale, without presenting it explicitly as the basis for the Court's implicit endorsement of
broad habeas jurisdiction.1 2 3
There were several reasons why, at the time of Brown, a
majority of the Court came to conclude that the Court could
not meaningfully review state criminal cases. Three of these
reasons were particularly significant.124 First, the Court no
longer heard every criminal case on direct appeal: as late as
application for a writ of habeas corpus in that case comes before a Federal District Court.").
118. Id. at 456-57 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("It seems proper for a district court
to give to these refusals of certiorari on adequate records the consideration the
district court may conclude these refusals merit."); cf.id at 488 (Burton and
Clark, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[W]hen the reasons for
a denial of certiorari are not stated, the denial should be disregarded in passing upon a subsequent application for relief... ."). Questioning the logic of
forcing the prisoner to apply for certiorari while insisting that a denial meant
nothing, Justice Jackson proposed a standard that was to apply whether the
Court denied certiorari or not. Under this standard, the petition either had to
raise a jurisdictional question involving federal law on which the state law allowed no access to the Court, or to allege that the prisoner was obstructed
from making a record upon which the question could be presented to the
Supreme Court. I&. at 542-45 (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
119. Id at 508-09 (Frankfurter, J., writing for the majority); id- at 541
(Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
120. See id at 491-97, 508-13.
121. See id. at 553 (Black, J., dissenting).
122. Id at 542 (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
123. See id. at 485-87; id at 510-13 (Frankfurter, J., writing for the majority); id at 545-48 (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
124. Justice Frankfurter's opinion details several lesser concerns this Article does not address, including inconsistencies in review resulting from Justices' disagreements over why certiorari should be denied, denials of certiorari
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1916, the Court reviewed state criminal convictions on appeal;
by the time of Brown, discretionary review had replaced appellate jurisdiction. 125 Therefore, the efficacy of review depended
on the Court's willingness and ability to closely scrutinize certiorari petitions.
Second, the Court decided Brown at the beginning of the
due process revolution. The Court increasingly was giving specific content to the fourteenth amendment's due process clause,
broadening and spelling out the scope of substantive federal
rights accorded state prisoners. 126 The consequences were twofold: the number of certiorari petitions claiming violations of
substantive rights was increasing; and the Court was more solicitous of such claims. 12 7 Both factors made it difficult for the
Court to provide the sort of review of criminal certiorari petitions that its members evidently believed necessary.
Finally, at the time of Brown, most criminal certiorari petitioners were unrepresented by counsel and their petitions were
often incomprehensible, making evaluation of the constitutional claims extremely difficult. 128 The decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright,29 granting counsel to most state criminal defendants, L30 still was a decade away, and even Gideon and its progeny do not entitle a prisoner to counsel to seek discretionary
review by the Supreme Court. 131 Thus, the form of many of
having nothing to do with the merits of cases, and poor records shaping the
issues. Brown, 344 U.S. at 491-94.
125. Judiciary Act ("Judges' Bill"), Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (1925)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see Reitz, Abortive
Proceeding,supra note 2, at 1328.
126. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (per curiam)
(holding use of emetic by police to obtain evidence swallowed by suspect violates due process); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938) (stating that
sixth amendment entitles criminal defendant to counsel at trial); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam) (holding that use of perjured
testimony by prosecuting authorities violates fourteenth amendment); see also
Friendly, supra note 2, at 153-54 & n.53 (discussing Supreme Court criminal
procedure decisions); Reitz, Abortive Proceeding,supra note 2, at 1329 (stating
that Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)) was "point of departure" for expansion of due process rights).
127. Brown, 344 U.S. at 500 (Frankfurter, J.). See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 446 n.2 (1963) (presenting table showing growth in filing of habeas applications from 1941-1962).
128. Brown, 344 U.S. at 493-94; cf Reitz, Postconviction Remedy, supra
note 2, at 465 (concluding that lack of counsel is factor contributing most to
collateral attack).
129. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
130. Id- at 342.
131. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (finding no constitutional right to counsel for collateral attacks on convictions).
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the growing number of certiorari petitions hindered the Court's
exercise of its supervisory role.
By the time of Brown, the Court therefore was ready to
concede that direct review of state criminal convictions did not
and could not constitute meaningful review. 132 If there were to
be any meaningful federal review, it would have to occur at another stage in the process. The question was not whether to
provide more review of state criminal cases, but whether to
provide any meaningful federal review.
Accordingly, the Court turned to the writ of habeas corpus
to ease the pressure on direct review. Although generally described in grandiose terms, the writ had little to do with state
prisoners before Brown.13 3 With a little revision, however, the
Court drafted habeas into service to provide the federal review
of state criminal cases the Court could not supply.
What the Court did, in effect, was split the old writ into
two. Presumably, the writ would continue to lie when a prisoner asserted a fundamental miscarriage, such as the absence of
jurisdiction in the committing court. But the writ also would
serve a new purpose as a surrogate for direct review by the
Supreme Court.
This explanation for the scope of the new writ is not altogether novel. Since Brown, several commentators have alluded
to the theory in passing' M and at least one member of the
Court has acknowledged the theory. 135 No commentator, court
or judge, however, has extended this theory to its logical
conclusion.
Recognizing habeas as an appeal suggests that procedural
rules governing habeas practice ought to resemble, or derive
from, the rules governing direct Supreme Court review. Instead, the Court has developed a separate and highly complicated set of doctrines for the lower federal courts to apply in
habeas cases. Yet the Court intuitively has understood that
habeas is a surrogate for direct review. As the next section
demonstrates in detail, the appellate rationale for the new
habeas explains the trend of post-Brown habeas decisions with
remarkable accuracy. While applying overcomplicated and
132. See generally Reitz, Postconviction Remedy, supra note 2, at 484-503
(surveying cases to demonstrate inadequacy of Supreme Court review). But
see Brown, 344 U.S. at 485 (majority not ready to concede on this issue).
133. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 33.
135. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 526 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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poorly justified rules, the Court in most cases is reaching results similar to the results of direct appeal.

II. UNRAVELING HABEAS: HOW AN APPELLATE
MODEL RESOLVES PERVASIVE DOCTRINAL
CONFUSION
A. THE SCOPE OF THE WRIT
1.

Current Doctrinal Confusion
Brown v. Allen stands for the proposition that the writ of

habeas corpus extends to any claim of constitutional error in
state criminal proceedings, so long as the petitioner raised the

claim in state court in conformity with state procedure. 136 Dissatisfaction with the broad scope of the writ since Brown, 3 7
and with post-Brown explanations for that scope, led to development of alternate theories of habeas jurisdiction that would
limit its scope considerably. The Court in its habeas decisions
has given two of these theories some recognition, but has
adopted neither theory as a governing principle. Rather, the
Court has applied these theories in piecemeal fashion, creating
serious inconsistency in habeas doctrine concerning the scope of
the writ.
The first theory is the "corrective process" theory, advanced most forcefully in an influential article by Professor Bator.13 8 Bator's argument was that a prisoner should obtain
access to a federal court to review a constitutional claim arising
in state court proceedings only if the state itself failed to provide adequate process to correct the constitutional violation. 3 9
If, for example, the entire course of state proceedings occurred
under the influence of mob violence, or the petitioner was tor136.

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

137. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 2, at 523-25 (arguing that habeas should be
limited to challenges to fairness of state procedures); Mayers, supra note 2, at
58 (arguing that habeas statute was not intended to expand scope of writ); see
also supra note 30 (noting state chief justices' resolution that only Supreme
Court should review final state decisions).
138. Bator, supra note 2, at 448, 455.
139. Id Professor Bator views "corrective process" as process "fairly and
rationally" suited to determining facts and applying law:
I have said that, presumptively, a process fairly and rationally adapted
to the task of finding the facts and applying the law should not be repeated. This suggests that it is always an appropriate inquiry whether
previous process was meaningful process, that is, whether the condi-

tions and tools were such as to assure a reasonedprobability that the

I&

facts were correctlyfound and the law correctly applied.
at 455 (emphasis in original).
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tured to plead guilty, federal jurisdiction should lie to adjudicate the claim. 140
The second theory is the "guilt-related" theory. According
to this theory, the purpose of the criminal process is to assess
accurately the defendant's guilt or innocence, and federal
habeas should lie only to redress guilt-related claims.' 41 Under
this theory a federal habeas court should not hear claims seeking exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence, for example, because such evidence is probative of guilt despite the unlawful
nature of the seizure, and thus federal adjudication of the claim
would not affect the accuracy of the guilt-innocence determination.'4 On the other hand, habeas should lie to hear a claim
that a conviction was obtained by the use of perjured testimony,
because such a conviction rests on unreliable evidence of
guilt.143 There are several versions of the guilt-related theory,
140. Id- at 457. In these two extreme examples, although the state has afforded the defendant some "process," such process is "meaningless" because
the state's procedures did not provide "rational conditions for inquiry" into the
facts and law. I& Under those circumstances, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction clearly is appropriate. Id
141. See generally Friendly, supra note 2, at 160-64 (arguing only prisoners
with colorable claims of innocence should be allowed to attack convictions
collaterally).
142. This principle came to life in the Supreme Court's 1976 decision, Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-95 (1976). The Stone Court, in an opinion written
by Justice Powell, held that habeas courts would no longer review fourth
amendment "illegal search and seizure" claims. Id at 494. One of the Court's
principal justifications for this drastic restriction of the writ was that reliable
evidence does not pollute determination of the prisoner's guilt or innocence by
virtue of being obtained unlawfully. Id. at 490. In Justice Powell's words:
"Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure that no
innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious
intrusions on values important to our system of government." Id. at 491 n.31
(emphasis added).
That courts should use habeas corpus primarily to protect innocent prisoners from unconstitutional incarceration was a principle Justice Powell had advocated several years before Stone. Concurring in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973), Justice Powell statech
That federal courts would actually redetermine constitutional claims
bearing no relation to the prisoner's innocence with the possibility of
releasing him from custody if [a] search is held unlawful not only
defeats our societal interest in a rational legal system but serves no
compensating ends of personal justice.
Id. at 258. Likewise, dissenting in Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975),
Justice Powell wrote that the "only justification" for habeas corpus "is to provide the added assurance to a free society that no innocent person will suffer
an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty." Id- at 303; see generally Tushnet,
supra note 2, at 496-500 (discussing Justice Powell's jurisprudence of
innocence).
143. Friendly, supra note 2, at 152.
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all in some way derived from a seminal piece on habeas corpus
by Judge Friendly. 1' Judge Friendly maintained that habeas
never should be available to a petitioner who fails to advance a
colorable claim of innocence. 145
Both of these limiting theories find some support in Stone
v. Powell,146 which is the Court's most significant decision concerning the scope of the writ after Brown. In Stone, the Court
held that habeas does not lie to hear a claim that evidence
should have been excluded from state proceedings because it
was seized in violation of the fourth amendment. 147 Stone is
consistent with the guilt-related theory because, as indicated
above, evidence seized unlawfully is nonetheless probative of
guilt.1 48

The Stone rule also is consistent with the corrective

144. See id- It is difficult to generalize regarding the Court's use of the innocence rationale, however, because the Court vacillates between two very different interpretations of this rationale. Under one interpretation, the writ of
habeas corpus would lie to address almost every constitutional claim; but to
get the petition heard at all, the prisoner would have to make a colorable
claim of factual innocence. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96
(1986). The second interpretation of the innocence rationale does not require
that petitioners make a colorable claim of innocence, but extends habeas jurisdiction only to those constitutional claims that plausibly could have affected
the trial court's determination of guilt. Fourth amendment claims, for example, generally would not be cognizable on habeas under this rationale, but coerced confession claims would be. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976),
discussed supra note 142 and infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text, is the
best example of the Court's application of the latter rationale. See Stone, 428
U.S. at 489-90. The former definition is finding its way into more recent cases.
See infra notes 410-12 and accompanying text; see generally Friendly, supra
note 2, at 160 (defining colorable showing of innocence); Cover & Aleinikoff,
supra note 2, at 1088-91 (discussing "categorical" and "individual" means of analyzing innocence problem).
145. No decision concerning the scope of the writ would limit habeas to the
extent recommended by Judge Friendly. Judge Friendly wrote that, with few
exceptions, "convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the
prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence." Friendly, supra note 2, at 142. Judge Friendly defined a colorable
showing of innocence as follows:
[Tihe petitioner ...must show a fair probability that, in light of all
the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted
(but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably
claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available
only after the trial, the trier of facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.
Id at 160. But cf Seidman, supra note 2, at 457 n.126 (criticizing Judge
Friendly's approach).
146. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
147. Id at 494-96.
148. Justice Powell wrote in Stone that "the physical evidence sought to be
excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.... Application of the [exclusion-
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process model, in that the Court created an exception permitting habeas litigation of fourth amendment claims if the state
allowed no "full and fair opportunity" to litigate those claims in
state court. 49
The first post-Stone case to address the scope of the writ
adhered to a guilt-related interpretation of Stone. In Jackson v.
Virginia,150 the Court held that a federal habeas court can review the sufficiency of the evidence in a state criminal case to
ensure that the evidence supports a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 151 Counsel for the state in Jackson sought to
rely on Stone to exclude such claims from the scope of the
writ.1 52 The Court rejected this argument because Jackson's
claim was guilt-related and therefore distinguishable from the
fourth amendment claim in Stone:
The constitutional issue presented in this case is far different from
the kind of issue that was the subject of the Court's decision in Stone
v. Powell. The question whether a defendant has been convicted upon

inadequate1 53evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or

innocence.

Just four days after its decision in Jackson, however, the
Court seriously undercut its evolving guilt-related rationale. In
Rose v. Mitchell,5 4 the Court held that a federal habeas court
could review a claim that the state discriminated in selecting
the nonvoting foreperson of a grand jury. 15 5 Because subsequent to indictment the petitioners in Rose were tried before a
constitutionally proper petit jury and were convicted, the grand
jury claim was not guilt-related.156 Nonetheless, the Court re157
jected the argument that the Stone doctrine ought to apply.
ary] rule thus deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty." Id.

at 490.
149. Id at 494.
150. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).

151. Id at 326.
152. I& at 321.
153. Id. at 323 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
154. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).

155. Id. at 554.
156. Id. at 449-50. Most claims of grand jury error bear no relationship to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. For example, even if a grand jury
hears nothing but inadmissible hearsay evidence before rendering an indictment, if the subsequent trial meets constitutional standards, guilt has been determined properly, a determination that arguably vitiates grand jury error.
See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956); see also Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1095 (predicting grand jury claims would be "subsumed under the rule of Stone"); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 35, at 101 (urging novel remedy for grand jury violations).

157. 443 U.S. at 560-64. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion distinguished
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The Court dealt a further blow to coherent development of
a guilt-related rationale for habeas through its recent decision
in Kimmelman v. Morrison.158 Kimmelman involved a claim
that a state denied the petitioner effective assistance of trial
counsel in violation of the sixth amendment. 159 On its face,
such a claim is consistent with the guilt-related rationale, for a
trial in which the defendant is not represented by constitutionally adequate counsel may well yield an inaccurate result. In
Kimmelman, however, counsel's inadequacy consisted merely
of failure to object to the introduction at trial of evidence seized
unlawfully from the petitioner's apartment. 160 Given that this
evidence was probative, its introduction did not lead to an inaccurate determination of guilt. Kimmelman therefore is further
Stone as "'not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally."' I& at 560 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 495, n.37). The Court stated that a claim
of discrimination in grand jury selection differs "so fundamentally" from the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule that Stone should not be read to prevent
review of such discrimination claims. Rose, 443 U.S. at 560-61.
The Court's many explanations for distinguishing Stone are unsatisfactory, however. For example, the Rose opinion states that the costs of excluding evidence on fourth amendment grounds are greater than the cost of
ordering retrial on grand jury grounds, because retrial after exclusion may be
impossible. Id at 564. If the trial court appropriately should have excluded
unlawfully seized evidence on fourth amendment grounds originally, and insufficient evidence remains to convict, however, the prisoner never should
have been convicted and there is no point in incurring the cost of retrial. But
grand jury error might have occurred despite a subsequent legitimate conviction. In that case retrial is perfectly appropriate, and the costs cannot be
avoided.
The Rose Court also justifies its holding on the ground that discrimination
claims are more important than fourth amendment claims, id at 560-61, but it
is unclear what rationale the Court relies upon to support this argument. It is
difficult to argue that discrimination claims are inherently more important
than fourth amendment claims; historically, the right to privacy has been as
fundamental as the right to be free from discrimination.
The Court's most extraordinary argument is that states have long been
bound by discrimination rules in jury selection, and so those rules should be
enforced in habeas, but fourth amendment claims are of more recent vintage
and deserve less vigorous enforcement. I& at 561-62. Arguably, just the opposite is true. Because the states have greater experience with discrimination
claims such claims require less federal supervision, while the relative inexperience of the states with fourth amendment claims necessitates greater federal
supervision.
At bottom, that the Court felt the need to advance some five separate arguments in favor of its Rose decision suggests that none of those arguments is,
in and of itself, very convincing.
158. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
159. Id at 371-72.
160. Id at 373-74.
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evidence that the Court has not adopted the guilt-related rationale, and that Stone cannot be fully explained using that
16 1
rationale.
The Court could have written an opinion in Kimmelman
that supported the guilt-related rationale by arguing that counsel's ineffectiveness threatened the accuracy of the entire proceeding. 162 Instead, buttressing the argument that Kimmelman
is inconsistent with Stone, the Kimmelman Court seemed to go
out of its way to make clear that the only impact of counsel's
error was admission of the probative, although unlawfully
163
seized, evidence.
Kimmelman could be construed as consistent with the corrective process theory, but other decisions demonstrate that
that theory also is not the Court's operative explanation for the
scope of the writ. Because a defendant with inadequate counsel
cannot hope to obtain fair adjudication of constitutional claims,
such as the fourth amendment claim there at issue, the decision
fits the corrective process rationale.1' The difficulty with relying on a corrective process interpretation of Kimmelman is that
although habeas certainly does lie any time state courts afford
no corrective process, 165 under Brown v. Allen, habeas also will
161. Justice Powell diverged from the majority on precisely this issue in
Kimmelman. Id at 390-97 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell pointed out that
failure to raise a fourth amendment claim never can constitute "prejudice"
within the meaning of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), because a defendant never
can be "prejudiced" by admission of probative evidence. See Kimmelman at
396-97. Whether or not Justice Powell is correct about the meaning of prejudice, it follows a fortiori that probative evidence cannot undermine a factual
finding of guilt. Justice Powell's argument is that admission of illegally seized
but reliable evidence cannot possibly prejudice the defendant in a constitutional sense because it does not affect the accuracy and, hence, the fairness of
the verdict: "As many of our cases indicate, the admission of illegally seized
but reliable evidence does not lead to an unjust or fundamentally unfair verdict. We have held repeatedly that such evidence ordinarily is excluded only
for deterrence reasons that have no relation to the fairness of the defendant's
trial." I& at 396.
162. Counsel in Kimmelman conducted no discovery. Id- at 369, 385. The
Court could have decided Kimmelman on this basis by holding that failure to
conduct any discovery constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in the case,
and left Stone v. Powell intact. The Court eschewed this obvious means to
avoid undercutting Stone, and addressed the claim as though the only objection to the counsel's performance was failure to raise the fourth amendment
violation. I& at 387-91.
163. Id at 382-87.
164. See Bator supra note 2, at 458.
165. See id at 485-86. In Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), the Court
stated that the lawfulness of detention for habeas corpus purposes may depend
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lie even when state corrective process is adequate. 1
Rather than settle on one limiting theory, the Court's decisions draw on both the guilt-related and the corrective process
theories, even though the theories are inconsistent not only
with Brown's scope and with post-Brown explanations for that
scope, but with each other.16 7 After Stone, for example, a federal habeas court may review a fourth amendment claim only if
the petitioner had no full and fair opportunity to litigate the
claim in state court.168 Under the guilt-related theory, however, whether the state provided such an opportunity should be
irrelevant; all fourth amendment claims should be barred from
habeas review because they do not call the prisoner's guilt into
question. Conversely, a coerced-confession claim relates to
guilt even if the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state court. Thus, the guilt-related rationale
for habeas would permit relitigation of such a claim even if the
corrective process model would not.
Stone thus excepts fourth amendment claims from the
scope of the writ without a satisfactory rationale. Subsequent
cases indicate that while the Stone rule cannot be explained by
a guilt-related rationale, the "full and fair opportunity" exception cannot be explained by a corrective process rationale.
Some commentators suggest that Stone best can be understood by treating it as a fourth amendment decision unrelated
to the general question of the scope of the writ of habeas
corpus. 69 Under this view of Stone, the Court excluded fourth
on whether the state has supplied "corrective process" regarding the constitutional question that has been alleged. "[I]f the State, supplying no corrective
process, carries into execution a judgment of death or imprisonment based
upon a verdict... produced by mob domination, the State deprives the accused
of his life or liberty without due process of law." Id. at 335. The Frank Court
added, however, that the state may supply such procedures "as to it seems
proper." Id
166. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-65 (1953) (stating that federal
court at its discretion may redetermine federal questions arising in state criminal cases).
167. See Peller, supra note 2, at 602 (discussing "fundamentally divergent
models"); Seidman, supra note 2, at 456 (stating Court "has attempted to respond with one stroke to two fundamentally inconsistent arguments").
168. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) ("we conclude that where the
State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial").

169. See Seidman, supra note 2, at 451-52; Tague, supra note 2, at 47; see
generally O'Brien, Federal Habeas Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims: A Conflict Between Strickland and Stone?, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 183
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amendment claims from habeas review simply because the
value of excluding unlawfully seized evidence in deterring police misconduct is so diminished by the time of collateral review that the Constitution no longer requires its exclusion. 170
Much of the Stone opinion speaks in these terms.17 1 Moreover,
in a footnote to the majority opinion, Justice Powell disavows
any broader statement on the scope of the writ. 7 2
For a number of reasons, however, Stone cannot be read
simply as a fourth amendment case. First, Stone offers no satisfactory explanation of why the fourth amendment compels consideration of the failure to exclude unlawfully seized evidence
on direct review, but does not compel consideration of such failure in habeas.'7 3 Second, although the Stone majority disclaimed any application of its rule beyond the context of the
fourth amendment, footnotes to the majority opinion explicitly
set out the guilt-related rationale for habeas. 7 4 Third, Justice
Powell, who wrote the Stone opinion, consistently has cited
Stone in subsequent decisions to support a guilt-related interpretation of habeas jurisdiction. 7 5 Finally, although the guiltrelated theory has served to bar only fourth amendment claims
(1986) (demonstrating that Stone does not bar federal habeas review of sixth
amendment claim arising from counsel's failure to raise a fourth amendment
claim).
170. See Seidman, supra note 2, at 595.
171. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 482-95.
172. See id at 482 n.17.
173. See id.at 506-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Cover & Aleinikoff,
supra note 2, at 1076 n.195 ("it was probably the guilt/innocence perspective,
rather than disdain for the exclusionary rule, that lies at the base of [Stone v.
Powell]"). Professor Seidman argues that application of the exclusionary rule
is constitutionally compelled only when its deterrent application would be effective. -Seidman, supra note 2, at 453. Thus, the exclusionary rule is required
on direct review, but not on collateral attack, when it would not serve its deterrent or educative purposes. I& Accepting Professor Seidman's argument,
Stone can be construed as limiting the scope of habeas with respect to the exclusionary rule and as not disturbing the rule of Brown v. Allen.
174. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31 ("Resort to habeas corpus, especially for
purposes other than to assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our
system of government.").
175. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 44648 (1986) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 579-88 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). In his Rose concurrence, Powell downplayed the differences between
fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims and claims of discrimination in
the selection of a grand jury. Neither claim, according to Justice Powell, bears
on the incarceration of innocent persons. Id at 588. As a result, to maintain
consistency with Stone, Powell suggests that grand jury discrimination claims
also should not be cognizable on federal habeas review. Id at 587-88, n.10. See
also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., majority
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from habeas review, and although Rose and Kimmeman partially repudiated the theory, the Court has not banished the
guilt-related theory from subsequent habeas jurisprudence. Innocence does not serve as a rationale for the general scope of
the writ, but the concept of actual innocence recently has reappeared in the rules limiting access to habeas adjudication of
claims that fall within that scope.' 7 6
Not only is the Court's decision in Stone unsupported by a
coherent view of the scope of the writ, but its decisions on the
scope of the writ yield a quite peculiar result after Kimmelman. Suppose that two codefendants are arrested for the
same crime and tried separately. One defendant's lawyer raises
a fourth amendment claim; the claim has merit but the state
courts reject it. Under Stone, this defendant has no access to a
federal habeas court to redetermine the merits of the fourth
amendment claim. 177 The second defendant's lawyer never objects to admission of the evidence, although the same fourth
amendment claim exists. Subsequently, the second defendant
brings a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel based on the lawyer's failure to raise the fourth
amendment objection. The habeas court reviews this claim,
and in doing so necessarily touches on the merits of the fourth
amendment claim. 178 The effect of this review may well be exclusion of the evidence on fourth amendment grounds and a
new trial. The defendant whose lawyer raised the fourth
amendment claim never can have the claim heard by a federal
opinion, joined by Powell, J.) (hinting that Miranda claims might fall within
rubric of Stone if veracity of confession is not at issue).
176. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-39 (1986) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494-95 (1986) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 446-48 (1986) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 391-93 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
177. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
178. Under the Court's ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence, a
habeas court must determine both whether counsel's performance was so ineffective as to violate constitutional standards and whether prejudice resulted
from counsel's ineffective performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). Determining whether counsel was ineffective in failing to
raise a claim necessarily includes assessing the validity of that claim. Of
course, the Court could avoid such an assessment by finding that even if counsel's performance was ineffective, no prejudice could result from failing to
raise a fourth amendment claim because the evidence unlawfully seized was
probative of the defendant's guilt. Under this construction, guilty defendants
cannot be prejudiced by ineffective counsel. Justice Powell made this argument in his Kimmerman concurrence, but the Court rejected it, further undercutting the innocence rationale. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 373-75.
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habeas court, but the defendant whose lawyer did not raise the
claim in state court obtains relief, through the vehicle of a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 179
The Court has said nothing that explains why, if evidence
is unlawfully seized, a defendant with an incompetent lawyer
should reap the benefit of exclusion of the evidence, but a defendant with a competent lawyer should not. 80 It might be
perfectly defensible to allow both of them to reap the benefit,
but as Stone makes clear, this is not the law. Similarly, it might
be defensible to allow neither of them to obtain relief, consistent with Stone, but as Kimmelman makes clear, this is not the
law either.
Brown, Stone, Jackson, Rose, and Kimmelman present important statements by the Court on the scope of the writ of
habeas corpus. Although each decision includes or excludes
specific claims from the scope of the writ, the cases do not provide a governing principle coherently explaining the purpose of
the writ. Instead, four separate theories now affect the scope of
habeas: the rights-based theory, the liberty-based theory, the
guilt-related theory, and the corrective process theory. None of
the theories by itself offers a satisfactory explanation for the
current scope of the writ.
2.

The Scope of the Writ Explained
The appellate model provides a simple and satisfying rationale for the broad habeas jurisdiction acknowledged in
Brown, succeeding where the other rationales have failed. Because any federal claim preserved in state court proceedings
may be raised on direct review, any such claim should also be
179. In his dissenting opinion in Stone, Justice White points out another incongruity resulting from the Court's elimination of fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims from federal habeas review. Stone, 428 U.S. at 536-37. Two
defendants, Smith and Jones, are tried separately for the same crime and are
convicted with the same evidence. Both file petitions of certiorari with the
Supreme Court, but only Jones's petition is heard. Based on a factual finding
that the arrests were made without probable cause, Jones gets relief, while
Smith, whose certiorari petition was denied, does not. Id180. Under current habeas doctrine there is an intermediate choice: a
court could determine that the failure to object on fourth amendment grounds
did not render counsel's performance actually ineffective. If this is so, the resulting procedural default will not be excused. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 485-88 (1986). This line of argument rests upon the premise that counsel
could fail to raise a valid constitutional claim, and yet render effective assistance within the meaning of the sixth amendment. See infra notes 431-36 and
accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of Court's sixth amendment
jurisprudence).
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subject to federal habeas review. This, more comprehensively
than the rights-based or liberty-based rationales, explains why
habeas review is available for almost all federal claims. It also
suggests that the guilt-related and corrective process models
ought to play no role in determining the writ's scope.
What the appellate model simply cannot account for is the
exception to habeas jurisdiction for fourth amendment claims
created by Stone v. Powell. To retain the Stone rule, consistent
with the appellate model, one could argue that Stone's fourth
amendment "diminishing return" rationale fits direct appeal as
well as it fits habeas. The fourth amendment rationale for
Stone rests on the premise that by the time of collateral review
through habeas the deterrent effect of excluding unlawfully
seized evidence no longer is strong enough to justify exclusion
on constitutional grounds.' 8 ' It simply is implausible that the
Court would likewise hold that although the Constitution requires exclusion if a state court upholds a fourth amendment
claim, a state court's failure to so exclude cannot be raised on
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. But Brown and the entire
course of habeas cases establish that the Supreme Court cannot
82
review adequately claims of error in state court proceedings.
If the appellate rationale explains habeas, state prisoners therefore should be allowed to raise fourth amendment claims in
habeas petitions, because habeas is a surrogate for direct
Supreme Court review. The new model therefore suggests that
Stone simply is incorrectly decided.
Moreover, the difficulty with the Stone decision is compounded by the decision in Kimmelman. Kimmelman's holding is consistent with the appellate model for habeas because it
preserves an appeal through habeas for claims of sixth amendment error. 8 3 Kimmelman combines with Stone, however, to
create the curious result that defendants who raise fourth
amendment claims in state court effectively get no federal review because of the inadequacy of direct Supreme Court review
of state criminal cases, while defendants whose lawyers fail to
raise those claims may well get federal review by alleging that
such failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel on
habeas.'8 4 Rather than supporting Stone on its tenuous fourth
amendment rationale, the appellate model suggests that Stone
181.
182.
183.
184.

See
See
See
See

Stone, 428 U.S. at 482-95.
supra notes 114-35 and accompanying text.
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1986).
supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
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should be overruled. The Court should acknowledge that if direct review is appropriate for any constitutional claim it is appropriate for all of them, and that the habeas courts simply are
surrogates for this task.
B. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
1. Current Doctrinal Confusion
In a companion case to Brown, Daniels v. Allen, s5 the
Court held that although a federal habeas court will hear constitutional claims litigated previously in state court, it will not
hear claims denied review in state court due to a procedural default. 8 6 A procedural default consists of the failure of a de-

fendant to comply with a state's procedural rule governing the
timing or manner for asserting errors in criminal proceedings. 8 7 The rule in habeas, subject to the exceptions discussed
below, is that a federal court will not hear a claim that a state
88
court refused to hear because of a procedural default.
The very harshness of the procedural default rule makes it
controversial. In contrast to some of its counterparts, such as
exhaustion or res judicata rules, which affect only timing or relitigation, the procedural default rule deprives the petitioner of
any review in state or federal court. Critics maintain that such
an "airtight forfeiture"'1 9 is inappropriate when federal constitutional questions are involved. 190
185. Daniels v. Allen, decided sub nom Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953).
186. Brown, 344 U.S. at 482-87.
187. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82-85 (1977). See also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1986) (finding procedural default in defendant's failure to raise allegedly erroneous ruling by trial judge on appeal); Carrier,477
U.S. at 482 (same); Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 368-69 (finding procedural default
in defendant's failure to move within 30 days of indictment to suppress evidence at trial).
188. Carrier,477 U.S. at 485; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87. The procedural default
rule originated in a companion case to Brown. In Daniels v. Allen, decided sub
nom Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1952), the Court refused to address the
merits of the petitioner's claims because the state supreme court had refused
to entertain those claims. Id. at 483. The petitioner's lawyers had failed to
comply with a state rule requiring that an appeal be timely filed, subjecting
the claim to procedural default. Id. at 483. Even though Daniels's lawyers
were only a day late, good reason existed for the untimely filing, Daniels's
claims had merit, and the case was a capital one, the Court held the procedural
default was an absolute bar to federal habeas review of the merits. Id. at 48287.
189. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 432, 438-40 (1963).
190. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 115 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing rule is
most unfair solution for tension between justice and efficiency); Reitz, Abor-
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The harshness of the procedural default rule has led the
Court to vacillate regarding its scope. In Daniels v. Allen,' 91

the Court treated the rule as a jurisdictional matter: a procedural default in state court prevented a prisoner from exhausting state remedies and so completely barred relief in federal
court. 1 92 Roughly ten years later, Fay v. Noia193 modified Daniels in holding that although a procedural default presented no
jurisdictional bar, as a matter of comity the federal court in its
discretion could refuse to hear a claim that a prisoner had defaulted through "deliberate bypass" of state remedies.19
The Court changed direction again a little more than a decade later in Wainwright v. Sykes.195 Sykes held that although a
procedural default posed no jurisdictional bar, comity ordinarily barred a federal habeas court from hearing a defaulted
claim, except in the limited circumstances in which a prisoner
could establish both "cause" for not having raised the claim
properly in state court, and "actual prejudice" resulting from
being barred from habeas relief. 96 The Sykes opinion came
complete with assurances that the new cause-and-prejudice test
would not exclude the claims of a prisoner who had suffered a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. 197
In Murray v. Carrier198 and Smith v. Murray,'9 decided
roughly another decade later, the Court modified Sykes. These
cases, discussed in the introduction, held that a lawyer's mistake does not constitute "cause" to excuse a procedural default. 2°° By the time of Carrierand Smith, however, the Court
tive State Proceeding, supra note 2, at 1316 (noting "drastic" difference between federal habeas treatment of claims defaulted in state court and of those
addressed on merits); Tague, supra note 2, at 47 (noting that defendant who
complies with procedural rules gets review in both state and federal courts
while defendant who fails to comply gets no review).
191. Decided sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
192. Id at 487.
193. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

194. Id at 438.
195.

433 U.S. 72 (1977).

196. Id at 90-91.
197. Id. According to the Court:
The 'cause'-and-'prejudice' exception... will afford an adequate guarantee, we think, that the rule will not prevent a federal habeas court
from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of
a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be the
victim of a miscarriage of justice.
Id.
198. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
199. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
200. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537-39; Carrier,477 U.S. at 495-97.
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no longer was confident that the Sykes test always would protect the victim of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The
Court therefore created another basis for habeas review of a defaulted claim, holding that a prisoner with a defaulted claim
could obtain habeas relief if he was prepared to show he actu201
ally was innocent.
a.

The Problem with ProceduralDefault

The uncertainty of the basis for the procedural default rule
presents serious doctrinal difficulty. The rule finds no support
in the federal habeas statute.20 2 Moreover, in Carrierthe Court
finally admitted, more than a decade after Sykes, that the rule
lacks a "perfect historical pedigree." 20 3 Without congressional
authorization or precedential support, the rule has no firm
foundation.
20 4
The procedural default rule created by Daniels v. Allen
could be seen as an extension of the "independent and adequate
state ground" rule, 20 5 which holds that the Supreme Court may
not review directly a case presenting a federal question if the
judgment rests on a state-law ground independent from the
federal claim and adequate to sustain the judgment.2° 6 The explanation for this rule is that if the Supreme Court were to review the federal ground, its decision would constitute an
impermissible advisory opinion because the state-court judgment rested on an adequate state law ground. Even reversal on
20 7
federal grounds would not change the judgment in the case.
Early cases applied similar reasoning, in the habeas context,
suggesting that a petitioner's failure to raise a constitutional
claim in accordance with state procedural rules barred habeas
relief.208.
201. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537-39; Carrier,477 U.S. at 497.
202. The habeas statute merely provides that a federal court shall issue a
writ to any person "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or trea-

ties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)(3), 2254(a) (1982).
203. Carrier,477 U.S. at 2650.
204. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
205. Cf.Daniels v. Allen, decided sub nom.Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
485-87 (1953) (habeas statute authorizes issuance of writ only if prisoner is
held "in custody in violation of the Constitution"; state's refusal to hear claim
based on valid procedural rule bars habeas relief); Reitz, Abortive State Proceeding, supra note 2, at 1334 n.78 (noting that the "exact rationale of the
[Daniels] Court is far from clear in the opinion" and that "the Court referred

to at least four doctrinal bases for its result").
206. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446 (1965).
207. See id at 443; Brennan, supra note 2, at'434-35.
208. See supra note 204.
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The Fay v. Noia 20 9 Court, however, divorced the concept of
procedural default from the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine. Writing for the majority in Fay, Justice Brennan asserted that the adequate and independent state ground
doctrine, strictly applied, has no place in habeas jurisprudence.2 10 Because a habeas court, in theory, does not review a
state-court judgment, but issues a writ acting directly on the
body of the prisoner, there can be no advisory opinion problem;
even if a state-court judgment rests on a default, a habeas court
could order release of the prisoner if there were constitutional
2 11
error.
During the thirty years since Brown and Daniels, and particularly since.Fay divorced the rule from its original rationale,
the Court has developed a variety of alternative rationales for
the procedural default rule. Proponents of the rule rely on
considerations of comity and federalism, 2' 2 sound judicial administration,2 1 3 and concerns about trial lawyers "sandbagging"
state courts 214 to justify the habeas courts' refusals to hear
claims defaulted in state court. The difficulty is not that any of
these explanations necessarily is wrong. It is that none of them
is necessarily right, either.
For example, one argument in favor of the default rule is
that it is necessary to foster respect for state procedural
rules. 215 If federal courts refuse to hear defaulted claims, in
theory lawyers will be more likely to comply with those procedural rules.2 1 6 But critics offer at least three responses to this
argument. First, a habeas system that ignores a state procedural default would not be invalidating the rule per se. State
courts would remain free to enforce their own rules and deny
209. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
210. Fay, 372 U.S. at 440-41.
211. Id- at 430-31; Brennan, supra note 2, at 436.

212. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 (1977) (stating that contemporaneous objection rule deserves more respect than Fay accords it because it
serves many interests and "it is employed by a coordinate jurisdiction within
the federal system").
213. See id- (noting that contemporaneous objection rule advances finality,
making trial "main event").
214. See i& (stating that rule of Fay v. Noia "may encourage 'sandbagging'
on the part of defense lawyers, who may take their chances on a verdict of not
guilty in a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims
in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off").
215. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1986); Sykes, 433 U.S. at
87-91.
216. Carrier,477 U.S. at 486-87.
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all state remedies to the defendant who fails to comply.217 Sec-

ond, the strong state interest in having its rules obeyed will not
be furthered by denying federal habeas corpus review when
failure to obey a rule is the result of inadvertence. When failure to follow a rule is accidental rather than intentional, the
procedural default rule cannot specifically deter noncompliance
with procedural default rules.2 1 8 Third, the threat of losing the
right to raise a claim in state courts is sufficient to encourage
compliance with procedural rules. A defendant loses nothing
by raising all claims in state court because a state court judgment has no res judicata effect on habeas review.2 19 There simply are no strong reasons not to try to win in state court before
going through the time and expense of a habeas appeal.
Ultimately, arguments such as these on both sides of the
procedural default question are unpersuasive. 220 They involve a
balancing of dissimilar factors in which it is impossible to
demonstrate that one factor actually outweighs another.221 It is
impossible to know, particularly without case-by-case analysis,
whether the right at stake in a given default
is more important
222
than fostering respect for state procedures.
More fundamentally, resting the procedural default rule on
considerations such as the need to foster respect for procedures
seems at odds with post-Brown explanations for the scope of
the writ. Brown instructs a habeas court to reach the merits of
to
a nondefaulted claim without according res judicata effect 223
the prior determination of that question by the state court.
Although Brown did not provide a rationale, the rule has been
justified in part on the ground that the importance of the interests or rights at stake necessitates federal intrusion. 22 4 Under
the procedural default scheme, a habeas court generally will re217. See Carrier,477 U.S. at 491-92; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-89.
218.

Carrier,477 U.S. at 512 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fay v.

Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 433-34 (1963)).
219. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 102-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
220.

Cf. Reitz, Abortive State Proceeding,supra note 2, at 1317 (referring to

"confusing babble of reasons" given to explain procedural default rule).

221. See Tushnet, Anti-Formalism, supra note 91, at 1508-09 (discussing

"balancing" in light of constitutional theory).

222. I& Professor Tushnet criticizes the prevalent judicial reliance on "balancing tests" because courts applying such tests necessarily give subjective de-

grees of importance to competing interests, such as a state's interest in
implementing its safety regulations and a defendant's interest in having depri-

vations of constitutional rights vindicated. Id.; see supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (discussing weaknesses of balancing tests in habeas context).
223. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).
224. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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fuse nonetheless to consider a claim not fully litigated in state
court.22 5 If the justification for habeas review is the importance
of the rights involved or the liberty interest of the accused,
however, it is hard to see why hearing a defaulted claim is not
justified. Arguably just the opposite is true, for the prisoner
whose claim was defaulted gets no review in any court, while a
2 26
nondefaulted claim is reviewed twice.
b.

The Problem with Cause and Prejudice

One might respond to the argument above by asserting that
a prisoner who fails to present a claim to state court should be
barred from presenting that claim to a federal court, because a
petitioner who is, or whose lawyer is, responsible for the default must bear the consequences. This argument suggests that
barring a defaulted claim is a punishment. Fay v. Noia took
this position and would have barred from federal court only the
claims of those defendants who deliberately withheld claims
227
from state courts.
On its face, the cause-and-prejudice test presented by
Wainwright v. Sykes 228 is not inconsistent with this fault-based
notion of procedural default. "Cause" seems to require only
that a prisoner explain why a constitutional claim was not
raised in conformity with state procedure, and "prejudice" superficially requires only that the prisoner show that injury resulted from being unable to raise the claim. Even proponents
of the most liberal standards for access to habeas review might
be content to bar a defaulted claim if a prisoner intentionally
withheld the claim at the state level or if there was no conceivable way in which failure to fully adjudicate the claim affected
the fairness of the proceedings.
The Court's opinion in Sykes, however, makes clear that
notions of fault or responsibility have little to do with the
cause-and-prejudice test as applied. In Sykes, the defendant
225. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489-90 (1986).
226. See Tague, supra note 2, at 47.
227. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963). In a sense Fay is to blame for
much subsequent confusion in this area. Although the Fay Court could have
grounded its decision in the prisoner's "fault" in failing to follow state procedures, or at least the prisoner's responsibility for a considered choice not to
follow such procedures, the Fay Court held that a federal court could abstain

from hearing the claim as a matter of "comity." 372 U.S. at 418-20. The concern for comity that Fay introduced ultimately became the basis for the Sykes
"cause and prejudice" formulation. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying

text.
228. 433 U.S. 72 (1977); see supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
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was convicted of murder.229 The state's evidence included several confessions arguably obtained in violation of Sykes's Miranda rights,230 but Sykes's trial counsel did not seek to
exclude these confessions.2 s ' Sykes sought to raise the Miranda issue for the first time in postconviction proceedings, at
which point the state opposed Sykes's claim on the ground of
2
procedural default.
Consistent with a fault-based theory of procedural default,
the Sykes Court could have resolved Sykes's case either in
favor of the state or in favor of Sykes. The Court could have
held that although Sykes's attorney erred in failing to raise the
claim, Sykes was not personally responsible for the error, and
thus cause existed to excuse the default and allow Sykes to
raise the claim in habeas. 233 Alternatively, the Court could
have held, given the other evidence against Sykes and that the
confessions arguably supported his intoxication defense, that
his attorney had made a sound strategic decision not to raise
the Miranda claim. A client should be bound by his attorney's
reasonable strategic decisions whether or not he actually is consulted, and therefore no cause existed to excuse Sykes's default
and make habeas review available.2
Instead of approaching the question from the perspective of
whether the defendant (or the defendant's lawyer) was responsible for the default, however, the Sykes Court focused on
whether permitting adjudication of the defaulted claim would
show sufficient respect for the state's contemporaneous objection rule. 23 5 According to the Court, state procedural rules
such as the contemporaneous objection rule serve vital purposes that would be undermined by hearing claims not raised in
compliance with such rules.2 6 Moreover, the Court concluded
that principles of comity and federalism require federal court
229. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 74.
230. I& at 75.
231. I&
232. IHL at 74-75.
233. See id at 74-75 (summarizing procedural history); ic at 99-118 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing rationale for attorney competence standards).
234. See iti at 90-91; see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)
(stating that so long as defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective, there is no inequity in requiring defendant to bear the penalty of an attorney error that results in procedural

default).
235. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88.

236. I&
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deference to a state's application of its procedural rules.2 37
Thus, respect for state procedural rules, not any concept of
fault or responsibility for failure to comply with those rules,
underlies the cause prong of the Sykes test.
The prejudice prong also is inconsistent with a fault-based
rationale. Assuming cause exists to adjudicate a defaulted
claim, prejudice is the standard by which the Court weighs the
consequence of failure to adjudicate the claim. Although the
Court has not precisely defined prejudice, it applies a seemingly
outcome-determinative test: whether, but for the alleged error,
the outcome might have been different. 238 This prejudice standard punishes prisoners-even those who can show cause, thus
establishing their lack of fault-for defaults. If a defendant
raises a claim in state court and loses on the merits, the claim
can be raised in federal habeas court. If the federal court determines that the claim has merit, it will decide whether to reverse or uphold the conviction by applying the same standard
that was used on appeal, most likely the "harmless error" standard.2 39 If a defendant fails to raise a claim in state court, however, the defendant will be required to meet the heavier burden
of showing prejudice before a habeas court even will hear the
claim. 240 If a petitioner has shown cause and is thus blameless
for the default of a constitutional claim, it is unclear why the
prisoner should face a stricter standard of materiality in order
to have the conviction overturned.
Nowhere is the divorce of the concept of fault from the
concept of procedural default more obvious than in the Court's
recent decision in Smith v. Murray. 241 Smith claimed that the
testimony of a psychiatrist who examined him on behalf of the
defense should not have been used against him at the sentenc237. Ia at 88-91.
238. The leading case on prejudice is United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152
(1982). In Frady, the Court declined to define prejudice precisely. Id. at 16975. The outcome-determinative test for prejudice is consistent with other tests
for prejudice in similar circumstances. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694-96 (1984) (defining prejudice standard as defendant's burden to show
reasonable likelihood of different result but for the error). Lower courts have
construed the prejudice prong of the Sykes test as requiring that the defendant
prove that the error was outcome-determinative. See, e.g., Cook v. Lynaugh,

821 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 1987); Bates v. Blackburn, 805 F.2d 569, 573, 577-78
(5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Preston v. Maggio, 705 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1983)).
But see Williams v. Lane, 826 F.2d 654, 666 (7th Cir. 1987).
239. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.

240. See supra note 46.
241.

477 U.S. 522 (1986).
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ing phase of his death penalty trial.2 4 Smith's court-appointed
lawyer objected to introduction of the evidence at trial, but
failed to appeal on this ground,2 3 concluding that under applicable state law the state appellate courts would not be sympathetic.2" An amicus raised the claim in its brief on behalf of
Smith, but the state supreme court declined to hear the claim
on the ground that it would hear only claims raised by the parties.2 5 After Smith was denied relief on direct review, a federal court in another case overturned the state law.2 4 As a
result, the claim omitted from Smith's appeal now clearly had
merit.2 7
Smith raised his claim in a federal habeas petition, and the
state argued that the claim was barred due to procedural default.2 8 In response, Smith offered two "causes" for default.
First, Smith argued that failure to raise the claim in state court
should be excused because the claim clearly was barred by state
law at the time of his appeal, so that Smith could not be faulted
for failing to raise the claim at that time.? 9 Second, Smith argued that, even if his attorney erred in deciding not to raise the
claim on appeal, Smith should not be considered at fault for his
lawyer's erroneous decision.? 0
The Court denied relief on both grounds. First, the Court
found that if Smith's attorney had been constitutionally ineffective, the resulting sixth amendment violation would constitute
cause, 251 because it would be fair to require the state to bear
"responsibility for the default" in that situation. 2 Relying on
Carrier,however, the Court held that attorney error that did
not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel could
not constitute cause. 253 Smith's lawyer had, in the Court's opinion, done a good job overall; the lawyer's failure to raise this
one claim did not show ineffective assistance because the process of winnowing out better from less good claims, such as
those barred by current state law, is the very essence of effec242. Id. at 522.
243. Id at 530-31.

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id
Id.
Id at 534.
IdId at 535.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id
I&
I at 535-36.
See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
Smith, 477 U.S. at 535-36.
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tive advocacy.2 - 4 In this situation it was not inequitable to re5
quire Smith to bear the risk of loss.2
Second, the fact that state law barred Smith's claim at the
time of his appeal did not excuse his failure to raise the claim.
According to a branch of the rules governing cause, if a claim
was sufficiently "novel" at the time it was defaulted the default
may be excused.2 6 Novelty did not excuse Smith's failure to
raise his claim, however. Although state law did bar the claim,
challenges to the state law had been "percolating" in the lower
state and federal courts.2 57 Moreover, that an amicus thought
enough of the claim to raise it demonstrated that the "tools"
were available to fashion the argument.5 8 Thus, the claim was
not so novel as to warrant excusing the default.2 9
Whatever the value of the Smith opinion as an intellectual
exercise, its application of the Carrierstandard for cause and
prejudice is entirely removed from any sensible discussion of
whether a federal court should hear Smith's claim.2 60 If any
party could be considered responsible for the default, it is the
state, which adhered to an unconstitutional rule. Yet, the
Court held not only that the state could choose not to hear
Smith's claim, but that application of the Sykes test compelled
the federal court to do the same.261 Rather than focusing on
fault, the Smith opinion dwelt on the need to respect state procedures. 262 The majority commenced with a discussion of Virginia's procedural rule2 6 3 and ended with the observation that
Smith had not "carried his burden of showing cause for noncompliance with Virginia's rules of procedure. '26 4 Although
Smith demonstrated he was not responsible for failure to comply, and although the state arguably was responsible, the procedural rule served to deny Smith relief.
Once "fault" is divorced from procedural default, the concept of "default" becomes inconsistent with any post-Brown explanation of the scope of the writ of habeas corpus. The
254. I&
255. I
256. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 131

(1982).

257. Smith, 477 U.S. at 536.
258. Id.; see infra note 283 and accompanying text.
259. Smith, 477 U.S. at 535-37.
260. See id (applying the Carrierstandard).

261. Id-at 533-39.
262. See id
263. Id. at 533.

264. Id. at 537.
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constitutional right at stake in Smith-the right to counsel-is
an important one. Moreover, life, not merely liberty, was at
stake. Smith was executed just weeks after the Court's decision. Neither the strength of the right asserted nor the life or
liberty interest at stake can explain the broad scope of habeas if
a defendant, blameless for default of a valid constitutional
claim, can be executed under the circumstances described in
Smith.
2.

Procedural Default Explained

The most significant benefit of the appellate model is that
treating habeas as an appeal explains the procedural default
principle, yet eliminates completely the need for special rules
governing procedural default in habeas. Under this model,
habeas courts would not hear defaulted claims unless they
could be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. Application
of the appellate model effects little change in results, but
makes the governing rules clearer and easier to apply.
The first rule of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is
that the Court may review any claim of federal error that actually was adjudicated below.2 65 Therefore, if the parties litigated
a constitutional issue in state criminal proceedings, the federal
habeas court should reach the issue. This rule is completely
habeas practice, excepting the decision
consistent with current
26 6
in Stone v. Powell.
The second rule of Supreme Court appellate practice is
that, in general, the Court will not hear a claim that was not
26 7
raised and adjudicated below and thus preserved on appeal.
Accordingly, if a petitioner did not raise a claim of constitutional error below, and the highest state court did not or would
not hear the claim because of a procedural default, a federal
habeas court should not hear the claim.
An exception to this rule is that the Supreme Court will
review a claim of error, even if the highest state court treats
the claim as defaulted, if the state is manipulating its procedural rules to avoid federal review.2 68 In such a case, the state
procedural rule is not an "adequate and independent" ground
265. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 619-20 (1875);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 352-53 (1816).
266.

See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.

267. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 630-35.
268. See id.; see also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-49 (1965) (stating that federal court may hear claim procedurally defaulted in state court unless state has legitimate interest in requiring compliance).
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to bar federal relief. The reason for this exception is that if the
Court refused to hear defaulted claims under any circumstances, state courts could thwart review of a federal question
simply by refusing to hear a claim and treating it as defaulted.26 9 Further, in Henry v. Missisippi27 the Court held
that it would not honor a default if the state's procedural rule
served no legitimate purpose. 27 1 The rule in habeas therefore
ought to be that although federal habeas courts generally will
not hear a claim not heard below, if the state court refused to
hear the claim because of some hostility to, or interference
with, the federal claim, the habeas court can proceed.
The appellate model abandons the cause-and-prejudice test
in favor of the test of Henry v. Mississippi27 2 and the "adequate state procedural ground" cases. 273 Although the Court
continues to maintain that it has not fully defined "cause" for a
habeas court to excuse a procedural default, 27 4 after Smith and
Carriercause exists in only three situations, two of which are
meaningless under close scrutiny, and a third that is completely
consistent with direct review cases concerning state procedural
grounds. First, constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
constitutes cause. 27 5 Second, the "novelty" of a defaulted
claim-that the claim was not asserted because it had not
achieved widespread acceptance by the courts-may establish
269. See NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 297 (1964);
NAACP v. Alabama ez reL. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958).

270. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
271. Id at 447. In Henry, a state prisoner sought direct review of a claim of
constitutional error that state courts refused to hear due to procedural default.
Id at 444-45. The Court explained that in general it would not review defaulted federal claims, because convictions in such cases rest on adequate and
independent state grounds. Id at 446-47; see supra notes 204-11 and accompa-

nying text. The Court recognized the difference between procedural grounds
and substantive grounds, 379 U.S. at 446-47, however, and held that only those
procedural grounds that served legitimate state interests were "adequate and
independent" enough to foreclose federal review. I& The only evident purpose of a procedural rule not justified by such interests would be to thwart
federal court review of a federal question. Id. The Henry Court also suggested that habeas review would be broader than review on direct appeal, i&,

but this aspect of Henry has not stood the test of time. Compare Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 429-32 (1963) (defining lenient requirements for federal habeas
jurisdiction) with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977) (criticizing

Fay rule permitting prisoners to raise issues in habeas court not raised in state
court).
272.

See Henry, 379 U.S. at 446-50.

273. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
274. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487-93 (1986).
275. Carrier,477 U.S. at 488-92.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[
[Vol.
73:247

cause. 276 Third, a showing of "state interference"-that some
action by state officials prevented timely assertion of legal er277
ror-may establish cause.
Defining ineffective assistance of counsel as a form of cause
is simply redundant. The determination of whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the
sixth amendment subsumes cause-and-prejudice analysis.
Under Stricklandv. Washington,278 the test for assessing counsel's performance by sixth amendment standards asks both
whether the attorney justifiably failed to assert a meritorious
constitutional claim ("cause") and whether the defendant was
279
prejudiced by the failure to raise the claim ("prejudice").
Moreover, ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes a legal
claim separate from the defaulted claim; if established, this separate claim entitles the petitioner to relief.28 0 Therefore, the

same proof used to excuse a default based on counsel's performance, making habeas review of the defaulted claim available, also establishes a substantive constitutional violation.
Thus, this ground for cause to excuse default of another constitutional claim simply is unnecessary.
Defining novelty as a form of cause also is meaningless.
Novelty is a question of the extent to which a defaulted claim
rested on law accepted at the time of default.2 8' If the claim
276. Id at 489; see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (holding that
counsel's failure to raise novel issue may establish cause); Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107, 131 (1982) (stating, in dicta, that novelty of constitutional claim may
establish cause for failure to object).
277. Carrier,477 U.S. at 488-89. This past term, in Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S.
Ct. 1771 (1988), the Court for the first time decided a case in which state interference provided the grounds to excuse the default of a federal claim. Id. at
1780. The petitioner in Amadeo had failed to raise a claim of grand jury discrimination in state trial proceedings, but raised the claim in federal habeas
court. Id at 1774. Relying on evidence adduced in an unrelated civil case concerning grand jury discrimination, the district court excused the state court
default. Id at 1775. That evidence showed that state officials had conspired to
hold black and female participation in grand and traverse juries at levels just
below those necessary to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination
under Swain v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 202 (1965). The Court upheld the district
court's decision in a unanimous opinion. Id at 1780. The only remarkable aspect of Amadeo was that the en banc court of appeals had split on the issue of
whether such conduct constituted "state interference." Id at 1776.
278. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
279. Id.; see Carrier,477 U.S. at 488-89.
280. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-96 (outlining standards for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims).
281. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 13031 (1982).
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was unknown and unaccepted, it was "novel," and its novelty
establishes cause to excuse failure to raise the claim.2 2 If the
claim was known or available, that is, if "tools" existed to fashion the claim, it is not novel and does not establish cause for
3
having not raised the claim.2
The problem with novelty as cause is that it establishes an
incoherent rule when combined with the principles of retroactive application of constitutional rules. Although retroactivity
law has been in great flux lately, under the emerging trend a
constitutional rule always will apply retroactively to cases on
direct appeal at the time of the Supreme Court decision establishing the new rule, but can rarely, if ever, apply retroactively
on collateral attack.2s 4
This being so, if a habeas petitioner could establish that a
defaulted claim was sufficiently novel to establish cause to excuse the default, retroactivity rules would bar relief on the
merits. The essence of a novelty claim, as defined strictly by
the Smith Court,2 is that a new rule has emerged subsequent
to the petitioner's default. New rules rarely are retroactive on
collateral review. Thus, novelty as cause is a Catch-22286 that
excuses failure to raise a claim in state court only in situations
where the federal habeas court will be unable to adjudicate the
7
merits of the claim.28
All that is left of the Court's list of causes to excuse a procedural default then, is state interference. The Court has said
that some action on the part of state officials that prevented a
prisoner from raising a constitutional claim will establish cause
282. Engle, 456 U.S. at 130-31.
283. Id- at 109, 130-34.
284. See Yates v. Aiken, 108 S. Ct. 534, 535-38 (1988) (intimating that "new
constitutional rules" may not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral
attack); Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987) (stating that new rule
for conduct of criminal prosecutions should be applied to all cases not yet final
or on direct review).
285. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
286. My colleague Sue Kay suggests the appropriate phrase is Catch-2254.
287. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984), is the Court's only decision applying
the novelty exception to excuse a default, id- at 16-20, and thus appears to be
the appropriate test for the assertion in the text. If the constitutional claim
asserted by petitioner Ross was sufficiently novel to excuse his default, Ross
should not have been able to rely on its retroactive application to obtain relief
on the merits. A careful reading of Ross discloses that the Court failed to
reach this issue, however, only because "[tihe State ... has not challenged the
retroactive application of [the new rule] in this case." I& at 20 (Powell, J., concurring). Ross thus hints at the Catch-22 that makes novelty meaningless as a
cause, but the Court sidestepped the question.
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to excuse the resulting default. 28 8 For example, a prosecutor
might hide evidence that would establish a constitutional claim
until it was too late to raise the claim in timely fashion. Another example might be a state court's application of a procedural rule in a bizarre manner that caused a default in one case
although no default would result in other cases. 289
It is misleading, however, to refer to state interference as a
cause to excuse a procedural default. A criminal defendant's
failure to raise a claim due to some state conduct or misconduct
is hardly a default by the prisoner. The Court's description of
this situation as a default simply emphasizes the divorce of default from the concept of fault. More precisely, state interference does not constitute default by the petitioner, but a state's
failure to permit a defendant to adjudicate a federal question.
Viewed from either the perspective of default or that of
state interference, the appellate model easily accommodates the
situation under the adequate state procedural rule rationale of
direct review. It long has been the rule that a state procedural
ground will not be deemed adequate to sustain a judgment, and
so bar review of a federal question, if the state courts applied
the procedural rule in a peculiar fashion to thwart review of a
federal question or if state officials interfered with rule compliance. 29° Indeed, even when the Court deemed procedural default an absolute bar to habeas review under the adequate and
independent state ground doctrine, it recognized an exception
for this situation.2 91
In sum, default rules applied by the Supreme Court on direct review reach precisely the same result as the more complicated habeas corpus default rules. Adoption of the appellate
model, therefore, eliminates the confusing cause-and-prejudice
inquiry without changing results in actual cases.
288. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986).
289. For an extensive collection of cases in which state law or the actions
of state agents caused defendants to fail to raise claims in accordance with
state procedural rules, see Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 385 n.34.
290. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1965); Brennan, supra
note 2, at 430; supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13-20 (1956); Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1951); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 472-79 (1945).
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C.

RES JUDICATA AND EXHAUSTION

1.

Current Doctrinal Confusion

a. Res Judicata: What Deference to PriorAdjudication?
Brown established that a federal habeas court is free to relitigate constitutional issues previously litigated in state proceedings. 2 92 A related issue is whether a federal habeas court is
bound by another federal habeas court's prior adjudication. If a
state prisoner presents a claim in one habeas petition and a federal court denies relief on the merits, may the prisoner raise
293
the claim in a successive petition?
The common-law rule was that the principles of res judicata 29 4 found no application in habeas.2 95 A prisoner seeking
release could go from judge to judge with his habeas application, and no court was bound by any other court's prior determination.296 Although the reasoning is somewhat formalistic,
the common-law rule made sense in light of the traditional
scope of the writ, which was limited to attacking the jurisdiction of the committing court.2 97 Thus:
if the petition discloses facts that amount to a loss of jurisdiction in
the trial court, jurisdiction could not be restored by any decision
above. It is of the historical essence of habeas corpus that it lies to
test proceedings so fundamentally lawless that imprisonment pursuant to them is not merely erroneous, but is void. Hence the familiar
298
principle that res judicata is inapplicable in habeas proceedings.

As the scope of habeas expanded, the Court continued to
292. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 446-50 (1953).
293. Another related question is whether a petitioner may raise a claim
omitted from a first habeas petition in a successive petition. In other words,
must a petitioner raise every claim of which the petitioner is or should be
aware in a first habeas petition? See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 2-23
(1962); cf Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510-22 (1982) (holding claims not exhausted in state court are barred from federal habeas review). Failure to do so
may constitute abuse of the writ. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes
368-71 and accompanying text.
294. According to the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a final judgment rendered on the merits of a claim absolutely bars a later action
between the same parties regarding the same claim, and estops litigation of issues previously litigated, even in subsequent actions not the same in substance.
See lB J. MOORE, J. LucAs & T. CURRIER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.40511] (2d ed. 1988).
295. See Sanders, 373 U.S. at 8; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1962).
296. See Sanders, 373 U.S. at 7; see also Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230
(1924) (stating that "[a]t common law the doctrine of res judicata did not extend to a decision on habeas corpus refusing to discharge the prisoner").
297. See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
298. Fay, 372 U.S. at 423.
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apply the common-law rule. In Brown, which addressed the
question of whether federal courts could relitigate claims adjudicated in state courts, the Court held: "[On habeas] the state
adjudication carries the weight that federal practice gives to the
conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on
federal constitutional issues. It is not res judicata.''2 99
In Sanders v. United States,3 °° the Court addressed the specific question of successive federal petitions, holding, consistent
with Brown, that res judicata principles would not bar litigation
of successive habeas petitions in federal court. 30 1 Perhaps realizing that the expanded scope of the writ strained the traditional explanation for why res judicata did not apply, the
Sanders Court set out a modern rationale for the old rule. According to the Court, and consistent with commonly offered
post-Brown explanations for the scope of the writ, res judicata
does not apply in habeas because the government must be accountable for deprivations of liberty and because such important interests are at stake when a petitioner asserts a violation
30 2
of constitutional rights.
Although the Sanders Court held that habeas courts
should not apply principles of res judicata, the Court did not go
so far as to require that a federal habeas court adjudicate repeated petitions. Rather, if the petition presented a ground already adjudicated by a previous habeas court, the second court
could refrain from readjudicating the claim unless the "ends of
justice" required otherwise.3 03 According to the Sanders Court,
299. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).

300. 373 U.S. 1 (1962).
301. Id. at 14-15.
302. Id. at 8. The Sanders Court explained: "Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement
of constitutional rights is alleged. If 'government .. . [is] always [to] be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment,' access to the courts on
habeas must not be thus impeded." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Fay v. Noia,

372 U.S. 391, 402 (1962)).
303. Id at 12. In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), the state argued

that 1966 amendments to the habeas corpus statutes (particularly 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) (1982)) that make no reference to "ends of justice" relieved a court
of the duty to consider the "ends of justice" before dismissing a successive petition. Id. at 451. According to the state, once a habeas court had reviewed a
claim on the merits, a subsequent court should dismiss any subsequent petition
not alleging facts absent from the prior petition, regardless of the "ends of justice." Ida The Court agreed that Congress intended that federal courts give a
prior petition's denial on the merits some preclusive effect, recognizing Congress's desire for more finality in habeas corpus proceedings. Id The language
granting district courts the power to refuse to hear successive petitions is permissive, however. ("A subsequent application... need not be entertained." 28
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evaluating the "ends of justice" was an inquiry that could not
be finely particularized and would rest in the sound discretion
however, that relitof the habeas court. 3° 4 Sanders made clear,
30 5
igation frequently would be permitted.
The difficulty with Sanders, the keystone of all modern
habeas res judicata rules,3 06 is that it too hastily concludes that
traditional notions of finality have "no place" in habeas. Such
notions of finality, embodied in res judicata and collateral estoppel rules, always have left room for courts to reconsider a
judgment in the face of a grievous wrong. 30 7 Absent such a
wrong, however, finality must play some role in criminal
law.308 Indeed, some respected commentators' sharpest attacks
on the entire expansion of habeas rests on the notion that the
Court too easily has abandoned principles of finality.30 9 These
commentators argue forcefully that principles of finality are at
least as important in criminal law as in civil law.310
U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1982)). A district court therefore still can entertain successive petitions in certain instances. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 451. Because the
statute does not identify the instances in which courts should entertain successive petitions, the Court in Kuhlman relied on the Sanders "ends of justice"
language. See id.
304. 373 U.S. at 18-19.
305. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 470-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
Sanders construed "ends of justice" to require habeas courts to hear petitions
advancing potentially meritorious claims).
306. The Sanders Court, also addressing the question of "abuse of the
writ," see supra note 293, reached a conclusion somewhat parallel to its holding with regard to successive petitions: a petitioner who failed to raise an issue
in a first petition could raise the issue in a second petition. 373 U.S. at 17. Relying on principles of equity, however, a habeas court could refuse to treat the
question raised in the second petition if it had been deliberately withheld from
the first petition. Id. at 18.
307. The Supreme Court has warned:
Because res judicatamay govern grounds and defenses not previously
litigated, however, it blockades unexplored paths that may lead to
truth. For the sake of repose, res judicata shields the fraud and the
cheat as well as the honest person. It therefore is to be invoked only
after careful inquiry.
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979).
308. According to Professor Amsterdam, supra note 2, no reason exists not
to adhere to finality principles within a single judicial system. Id. at 381 n.19.
The question in habeas, therefore, is the extent to which the interest in providing a federal forum for federal claims justifies review of state criminal convictions. Cf id. at 383-84 (setting out finality concerns); Friendly, supra note 2,
at 149-50 (that "'conventional notions of finality' should not have as much
place in criminal as in civil litigation [does not mean] that they should have
none") (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
309. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 2, at 443-44; Friendly, supra note 2, at 14950.
310. See Friendly, supra note 2, at 149-50.
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Apparently aware of this weakness in the Sanders rule, a
plurality of the Court recently backed away from Sanders in
the case of Kuhlmann v. Wilson,a31 taking the position that
greater finality with regard to successive federal petitions is
necessary.3' 2 Kuhlmann involved a prisoner's challenge to the
use against him at trial of evidence obtained by a jailhouse informant on the ground that the state obtained the evidence in
violation of the rule in Massiah v. United States,3 13 which generally prohibits post-indictment questioning of criminal suspects by government informants.3 14 The prisoner's conviction
was upheld on direct review; he then filed a federal habeas petition raising the Massiah claim and was denied relief.3 15 Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Henry,3 16 which elaborated on the Massiah rule in the jailhouse
context and involved facts very similar to those in Wilson's
31 8
case.3 17 Wilson again petitioned the federal courts for relief.
311. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
312. Id. at 450 (stating that "[tihe legislative history demonstrates that
Congress intended the 1966 amendments... to introduce 'a greater degree of
finality of judgments in habeas corpus proceedings' ") (quoting S. REP. No.
1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966)). A plurality has suggested the same approach to the question of abuse of the writ. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520-21
(1982) (strongly suggesting that dropping a claim from a habeas petition, only
to raise it in a subsequent petition, would constitute "abuse of the writ," barring habeas review of the claim). In light of Kuhlmann, it is open to question
whether the Rose plurality would permit review of such a claim if the petitioner argued that he or she were actually innocent. See infra notes 371-74
and accompanying text.
313. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
314. I& at 206. In Massiah, federal agents had listened to petitioner's incriminating statements through use of a transmitter placed in petitioner's automobile while he was free on bail pending trial for narcotics violations. Id at
202-03. Petitioner made the statements to a former confederate who had
agreed to cooperate with the agents. Id The Court held that the state's acquisition of such statements in the absence of petitioner's attorney deprived him
of his sixth amendment right to counsel and that the statements could not be
used against him at trial. I& at 206-07. The Court later applied Massiah in
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980). See infra note 317 and accompanying text.
315. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 441.
316. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
317. 1& at 265-69. In Henry, government agents paid an informant who
shared a cell block with the respondent to furnish information obtained from
conversations with the respondent. I& at 266. The agents told the informants
not to question the respondent or initiate conversations regarding the charges
against him. Id The Court held that the government's actions violated respondent's sixth amendment right to counsel by placing him in a situation
likely to induce incriminating statements in the absence of counsel. Id- at 274.
The Court found that the informant "deliberately elicited" the incriminating
information within the meaning of Massiah. Id, at 274-75.
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Ultimately, the Court denied relief on the ground that even
under Henry, Wilson's claim did not succeed on the merits.3 19
A plurality of the Court would have gone a step further, however, and barred relitigation of the successive petition. 320
The Kuhlmann plurality reached its decision by relying on
a perverse application of the "ends of justice" inquiry set out in
Sanders.321 Arguing that the broad discretion accorded habeas
courts by Sanders was inappropriate, 322 the plurality took the
position that the ends of justice require relitigation of a claim
in a successive federal habeas court only when the petitioner
advances a colorable claim of innocence. 323 In this variant of
the guilt-related rationale for habeas, only those petitioners
who maintain their factual innocence can obtain a hearing on a
successive petition. The Kuhlmann plurality reached this position by balancing the interest of the petitioner in relitigation
against the interest of the state in avoiding relitigation. 324 According to the plurality, the only legitimate interest of a successive petitioner is to avoid incarceration if he or she is not
guilty.325

Otherwise

326

the

state's

interest

in

finality

is

paramount.
The Kuhlmann plurality opinion presents at least three
significant difficulties. First, Kuhlmann completely eviscerates
318. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 442-43. Wilson filed a motion in state trial
court to vacate his conviction, but the motion was denied on two grounds. The
judge held that Henry was distinguishable from Wilson's case, and that state
precedent precluded giving Henry retroactive effect. Id. Denied leave to appeal, Wilson thereafter returned to federal habeas court. Id
319. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 456. The Kuhlzmann Court distinguished Wilson's case from Henry because in Wilson's case the informant made no effort
to stimulate conversations about the crime with which the defendant was
charged. Id. at 460-61. The question whether such conduct violates the sixth
amendment was left open in Henry, but the Court in Kuhlzmann decided that
the state does not violate the sixth amendment by positioning a passive informant in a jail cell. Id. at 459; see also id. at 461 (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("[There is a vast difference between placing an 'ear' in the suspect's cell and
placing a voice in the cell to encourage conversation for the 'ear' to record.").
320. I& at 444-55.
321. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
322. The Kuhlmann plurality argued that habeas courts used the broad discretion accorded them by Sanders in a whimsical and capricious manner, 477
U.S. at 451, but offered no evidence that this was the case. If a danger of
abuse of discretion in fact exists, the proper course would be to define or narrow that discretion rather than eliminating it completely, absent some other
competing interest.
323. Id. at 454.
324. Id. at 452-54.
325. Id. at 452.
326. Id. at 452-53.
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Sanders,which it purports to construe. Sanders fashioned a liberal test that committed the decision to allow relitigation to the
discretion of the court. 32 Kuhlmann forecloses that discretion,
replacing the broad ends of justice inquiry with the narrow innocence test.
Second, the Kuhlmann plurality ignored important interests in applying its balancing test. In the thirty-odd years since
Brown, the Court has identified several interests at stake in
habeas proceedings other than an innocent petitioner's interest
in obtaining relief.328 For example, one theory of Brown asserts that habeas exists to vindicate federal rights, whether or
not a petitioner is innocent. 329 Yet the Kuhlmann plurality
simply ignored the rights-based rationale for habeas in its
weighing of competing considerations.
Most important, however, the reasoning of the Kuhlmann
330
plurality is squarely at odds with the rule of Brown v. Allen.

The Kuhlmann reasoning concerning successive petitions
would be applicable to afirst federal habeas petition. If a prisoner's only legitimate interest is in avoiding incarceration if he
is innocent, that should be as true on an initial federal habeas
petition as on a successive one. Brown contains no such limitation of habeas to cases of asserted innocence, and the Court's
repudiation of Stone v. Powell's guilt-related rationale in later
decisions 331 suggests this limitation will not be the rule.
Under the governing framework, therefore, decisions regarding successive habeas petitions cannot be reconciled with
decisions governing the scope of the writ. Respected commentators favor one approach or the other. Some commentators argue that principles of finality are extremely important in the
criminal area and that both initial state and federal determinations should have res judicata effect.33 2 Other commentators,
327. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1962); see also text accompanying note 304 (discussing "ends of justice" test).
328. For example, the Court alludes to the importance of vindicating federal rights through habeas and engendering respect for the criminal justice
system by not convicting defendants in unfair trials. Although this Article argues that these other considerations do not necessarily justify broad habeas jurisdiction, the Court has in fact relied on the arguments in its habeas decisions,
something the Kuhlmann plurality simply ignored.
329. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
330. Cf. supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing Brown's
holding).
331. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
332. See Bator, supra note 2, at 453-62 (arguing that relitigation should not
be available absent lack of corrective process in state court); Friendly, supra
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relying on one or more of the various rationales offered to explain Brown, argue that habeas is extraordinary and that res
judicata should not apply in either situation.333 A plurality of
the Court has taken an intermediate, and apparently inconsistent, position with regard to the res judicata impact of prior
state and federal adjudication of constitutional claims. Prior
state adjudication deserves no res judicata effect, 3 34 but prior
federal adjudication bars relitigation absent a showing of
3 35
innocence.
Although the Court's res judicata decisions cannot be
squared with any one theory of habeas jurisdiction offered to
date, the appellate model provides a coherent explanation. Because the exhaustion and res judicata doctrines are intimately
related under the appellate model, a single explanation of both
follows the discussion of current confusion concerning the exhaustion doctrine.
b.

Exhaustion: When Is Review Appropriate?

From the standpoint of the prisoner, the exhaustion doctrine is ostensibly the least objectionable of the four doctrines
limiting access to habeas review, because it purports to affect
only the timing of federal review, not whether the prisoner can
obtain federal review.33 6 Under the exhaustion doctrine, a federal court may reject a habeas petition even though it has jurisdiction over the petitioner's claim, on the ground that
presentation of that claim to a federal court is premature. The
habeas statute itself requires that a federal court dismiss any
claims for which the prisoner has not exhausted state remedies. 337 The prisoner must present the claim in orderly fashion
to the highest state court that will hear the claim, but need
note 2, at 152, 157 (same, but also making habeas available to prisoners with
colorable claims of innocence).
333. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 425 & n.4; cf Yackle, Book Review,
supra note 2, at 376 (noting that judiciary treasures respect for constitutional
safeguards and "resists the notion that it is ever 'too late' to worry about the
violation of constitutional rights").
334. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).

335. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986).
336. See Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944) (per curiam) (federal court
will not review a state prisoner's habeas petition until all state remedies have
been exhausted); see also Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 677 (1948) (approving
district court's award of habeas relief to state prisoner who had first been denied relief by highest state court).

337. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1966); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520
(1982) (plurality opinion) (holding habeas court must dismiss petition containing both exhausted and nonexhausted claims).
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present the claim only once, even if repeated channels of review are available.33 8 Moreover, the prisoner need not make a
futile attempt to exhaust state remedies. 3 39
According to the Court, the exhaustion doctrine serves
comity interests, s 40 preventing disruption of state court proceedings.3 4 - Moreover, it allows state courts, also charged with
protection of federal rights, an opportunity to address and correct constitutional violations before a prisoner resorts to federal
review.342 By requiring initial review in state court,3 3 the exhaustion doctrine "serves to minimize friction between our federal and state systems of justice."' "
Exhaustion is at best a nuisance and a wasted effort, and at5
worst offends comity interests rather than advancing them.3
A nonexhausted claim is one that the prisoner has failed to
present to a state court for determination.4 6 By the time the
prisoner presents a federal habeas court with an issue that the
state has not heard, however, it is likely to be not only
nonexhausted, but procedurally defaulted. If so, the federal
court will refuse to hear the claim and bounce it back to state
court as defaulted.3 7 A federal court, however, is capable of
determining whether a claim is subject to procedural default
under state law and proceeding accordingly, without forcing the
338. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 448 n.3 ("We do not believe Congress intended
to require repetitious applications to state courts.").
339. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434-35 (1963).
340. See Granberry v. Greer, 107 S. Ct. 1671, 1675 (1987); Rose, 455 U.S. at
515; Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886); rf Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. at
117-18 (stating federal courts should not interfere with states' administration
of justice except in cases of peculiar urgency).
341. Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19.
342. I&
343. In theory, the exhaustion doctrine is discretionary; the habeas court
has the power to hear nonexhausted claims, but abstains from doing so to promote comity interests. See, e.g., Fay, 372 U.S. at 438-39; Royall, 117 U.S. at 251.
The Court speaks of the doctrine as virtually mandating exhaustion, however,
referring to the doctrine as the exhaustion "requirement." See Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). Yet the Court considers itself free to disregard the
doctrine at will. See infra notes 358-61 and accompanying text.
344. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 2 (1981) (per curiam).
345. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 525 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing complete
exhaustion rule is destructive of comity because state courts are forced to consider frivolous claims before federal court may entertain serious, exhausted
grounds for relief).
346. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982) (stating that applicant has not exhausted
remedies if he has right to raise question in state court).
347. Procedural default occurs when a defendant fails to comply with a
state's procedures for raising a claim of error in the proceedings against him.
See supra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
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petitioner to waste the effort of a round trip to state court and
back.148
Even if the state courts reached the merits on remand, it is
anything but clear that comity is served by requiring exhaustion. After a state court hears and rejects the merits of a constitutional claim, a federal habeas court will review the same
merits and independently determine whether the state court
was correct and whether state actors violated the Constitution,3 49 because Brown v. Allen holds that a state court decision
is not res judicata on habeas review.350 Remand to state court
for exhaustion is thus, in the words of Professor Bator, a
"meaningless gesture," as likely to offend as to aid comitya 51
A possible response is that state court review is not meaningless because, although state court determinations on questions of law are not res judicata, federal habeas courts accord
state court determinations of fact a presumption of correctness-indeed, the federal habeas statute requires that federal
courts give some respect to state court factual determinations.35 2 This argument merely emphasizes the incoherence of
348. That, after all, is the premise of Erie. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding federal courts must apply state law in diversity
cases); see also Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 711
(1982) (stating that federal district courts do not possess a warrant to create
jurisdictional law of their own but must apply state law); Schering Corp. v.
Home Ins. Co., 544 F. Supp. 613, 61819 (1982) (stating that where no state
court determination exists, federal courts must apply what they find to be
state law).
349. See Yackle, Exhaustion Doctrine, supra note 2, at 423 ("A doctrine
that puts the state courts to meaningless litigation can claim precious little basis in the notion of comity. Orderly state procedures are not so much disrupted as abused, the state courts' participation in the enforcement of federal
law not so much frustrated as coerced.").
350. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953) (noting that state adjudication
carries same weight as determination of highest court of another jurisdiction,
but is not res judicata); see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text; see also
Jackson v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that state court determination on merits may be desirable because it may make federal review
unnecessary, but does not bind federal courts).
351. Bator, supra note 2, at 483 (also stating "it would make little sense to
encourage the use of state remedial processes through a requirement of exhaustion only in order to ignore these processes on collateral attack"); see also
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 525 (1982) (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Remitting a habeas petitioner to state court, to exhaust a patently
frivolous claim... hardly demonstrates respect for state courts.").
352. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) (setting forth general presumption in
favor of state courts' factual findings); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539,
547 (1980) (noting that Congress's interest in federalism requires that federal
courts defer to state courts' factfinding); Reardon v. Manson, 644 F.2d 122, 129
(2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Sumner); Sher v. Stoughton, 516 F. Supp. 534, 541
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the exhaustion doctrine, for as Professor Bator observed, no
good explanation exists for why state factfinding should deserve great respect on habeas while state law determinations
receive little or none. 35
A second, more frequently offered defense of the exhaustion doctrine is that the requirement encourages full review of
constitutional claims in state courts, thereby fostering greater
competence among the state courts in handling federal constitutional claims.5 The state courts have been addressing fed(N.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that state courts' factual determinations are presumptively correct). The statute sets forth exceptions to the general presumption,
that permit federal courts to review and determine facts when state factfinding is either inadequate to allow review of the federal claim or clearly erroneous. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982); Sumner, 449 U.S. at 550. The exceptions
are quite broad, but the Court has adamantly required that the rule be followed when no exception applies. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S.
422, 432 (1982) (criticizing Sixth Circuit for redetermining facts based on
court's mere disagreement rather than lack of "fair support" for state findings); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 598 (1982) (vacating court of appeals' judgment second time for failure to defer to state court factfindings as called for by
§ 2254(d)); Sumner, 449 U.S. at 547-52, 591, 598 (noting habeas court should
provide reasoning tying generalities of statutory exceptions to particular facts
of case).
Although factfinding might seem inappropriate for a habeas court acting
as a surrogate for the Supreme Court in reviewing cases, this is not so. On
direct review the Court may remand for proper factfinding. See Bator, supra
note 2, at 515; Hill, The InadequateState Ground, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 943, 953
(1965). And, the Supreme Court even has made its own factual determinations
on direct review contrary to those of the state courts. See H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 665 (2d ed. 1973).
Sitting at nisi prius, then, the habeas court simply operates with an efficiency
not readily available to the Supreme Court, finding its own facts rather than
remanding when the record is inadequate and also when the habeas court suspects the state court will not do an adequate job. See Bator, supra note 2, at
492 (noting habeas has "added convenience" over Supreme Court review because federal trial court can conduct hearing into adequacy of state corrective
processes). The factfinding ability of habeas courts therefore provides additional support for allowing habeas courts to serve as surrogates for the
Supreme Court, and need not be seen as an inconsistency in the new model.
But see Stolz, supra note 2, at 965-66 (arguing that intermediate federal appellate court should serve "appellate" function of habeas, and that factfinding by
habeas courts is not important given current practice of providing lawyers to
criminal defendants and keeping written records).
353. See Bator, supra note 2, at 502 ("[I]f meaningful process serves as an
adequate guarantee of the probability of the correctness of factfindings, we are
entitled to some explanation why it does not satisfy us with respect to legal
conclusions.").
354. In Rose, a plurality of the Court noted that the exhaustion requirement will
encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts,
thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of
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eral constitutional issues for a long time, however, and it is
condescending at best to suggest that with more practice they
might improve their ability to recognize and respect federal
rights.35 5 Such a paternalistic attitude toward state courts can
hardly promote comity interests:a 6 the Court foists constitutional claims on state courts so those courts will get some practice while the federal courts remain free to overrule state court
57
3
determinations on questions of law.

The Court itself appears uncomfortable with the exhaustion doctrine, having eroded the doctrine by holding that it is
not "jurisdictional 3 58 and by overlooking the exhaustion requirement when it seems bothersome.3 59 Moreover, the Court
is drifting toward the rule that a state may waive the exhaustion requirement. 360 Permitting waiver seems at first blush to
make sense: if it is comity that requires exhaustion, the state
constitutional error. As the number of prisoners who exhaust all of
their federal claims increases, state courts may become increasingly
familiar with and hospitable toward federal constitutional issues.
455 U.S. at 518-19.
355. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976) (discussing familiarity of state judges with search and seizure cases and denying that state
judges are any less adept than federal judges). Interestingly, Justice Harlan
attacked, as destructive of federalism, precisely this kind of argument-that
practice will improve state court adherence to federal rules-when the argument appeared in Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U.S. 443 (1965). Henry, 379 U.S. at 464-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In
Henry, the Court (per Justice Brennan) established a scheme for direct review
designed to encourage state courts to develop their own collateral review procedures and expertise at deciding constitutional claims. See i& at 453.
356. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 525 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting
that exhaustion requirement "appears more destructive than solicitous of federal-state comity"); see also Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 43 (1967) (questioning why state court would want to burden itself with narrow issue
predetermined by established federal principles).
357. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 519 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court,
410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973)) (stating that state courts may become increasingly familiar with and hospitable toward federal constitutional issues as number of
prisoners exhausting remedies increases).
358. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
359. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 141 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing claim is nonexhausted and court should not hear on merits).
360. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 167 (1987) (holding appellate
court not required to dismiss for nonexhaustion based on state's failure to
raise issue below); see also Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th
Cir. 1983) (holding that Florida common law allows attorney general to waive
exhaustion); Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1982) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (arguing state decision that immediate review of habeas
petition by federal court best serves its sovereign interests cannot be overturned in name of comity); Comment, State Waiver and Forfeitureof the Ex-

haustion Requirement in Habeas Corpus Actions, 50 U. Clu. L. REV. 354, 356
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should be able to waive the requirement. Waiver does not
square, however, with the Court's own explanation for exhaustion: the need for state courts to gain necessary experience
with federal claims. 361
If the exhaustion requirement were merely a rule of timing, these objections would carry less force. The recent decision
in Rose v. Lundy,362 however, suggests that a plurality of the
Court intends to convert this rule of timing into one of forfeiture. Rose addressed the problem of how a federal court should
treat a "mixed bag" habeas petition, that is, that contains both
3 63
exhausted and nonexhausted claims.
To understand the significance of the Rose Court's decision,
it is important to consider the possible ways the Court could
have decided the case. The Court could have permitted the
lower federal court to hear the entire petition, both exhausted
and nonexhausted claims, but this would have undermined the
exhaustion requirement. 3 64 Alternatively, the Court could have
(1983) (discussing different approaches taken by courts and concluding waiver
should be allowed).
In Granberry,the Court held that a court of appeals may, in its discretion,
treat the state's failure to raise exhaustion until a habeas case reaches the federal court of appeals as a waiver. 481 U.S. at 167.
The waiver cases usually discuss whether the state attorney general's office is the appropriate body to waive exhaustion given the comity interests of
the state courts. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d
86, 96 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978) (holding state prosecutors
cannot waive exhaustion). The appropriate question should be whether waiver
furthers comity interests. The answer to this question ought to be no.
Waiver has become a bizarre game that has little to do with the interests
underlying exhaustion. In noncapital cases, states will not waive exhaustion,
but in capital cases states frequently do. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d
1137, 1141 (11th Cir. 1987) (state waived exhaustion on habeas petition of defendant convicted of capital murder). But see Pennington v. Spears, 779 F.2d
1505, 1506 (11th Cir. 1986) (state waived exhaustion for defendant sentenced to
life imprisonment). Evidently, the state is anxious to bring capital cases to resolution so that prisoners can be executed. In noncapital cases, however, state
interests are better served by letting prisoners languish in prison while their
claims wind their way through state courts. See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973); see also Comment, supra, at 365-66
(1983) (noting state's attorneys may not heed federal policy of fostering development of state law on federal issues).
361. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
362. 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (plurality opinion).
363. Id. at 510.
364. Id. at 518-22. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, reasoned that
the policies behind exhaustion, in general, "protect[ing] the state court's role
in the enforcement of federal law and prevent[ing] disruption of state judicial
proceedings," could best be accomplished by requiring exhaustion of all claims.
Id. at 518.
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given district courts discretion to dismiss the petition entirely,
or dismiss only the nonexhausted claims while proceeding to
hear the exhausted claims. Instead, the Court held that a
habeas court must dismiss in its entirety "mixed bag" petition.365 The prisoner could then choose whether to return to
state court to exhaust the nonexhausted claims, or to drop
them and proceed in federal court with only the exhausted
claims.36s
Little practical difference would separate these latter two
positions, but for the view of a plurality of the Court regarding
the prisoner's choice. Initially, it appears irrelevant whether a
prisoner withdraws entirely a petition containing nonexhausted
claims or proceeds to litigate the exhausted claims in the
habeas court and returns later with the other claims, if necessary, after having presented those claims to the highest state
court. In either event, the purposes of the exhaustion rule
36 7
would be satisfied.
The Rose plurality suggested, however, that if the prisoner
opted to present the exhausted claims in a first habeas petition
and save the nonexhausted claims for a later effort, a federal
court might deem the later petition an abuse of the writ, 6s and
therefore bar adjudication of the remaining claims. This is significant because the standard governing abuse of the writ is
similar to the standard governing successive petitions set forth
in Sanders v. United States.36 9 Just as the Kuhlmann plurality

would limit review of successive petitions to cases in which the
365. I& at 522.

366. I& at 520.
367. Concurring in Rose, Justice Blackmun suggested that allowing the pe-

titioner to drop nonexhausted claims leads to the same result as letting the
district court dismiss the nonexhausted claims, the Court of Appeals's approach. In either case, the district court will proceed to review only the exhausted claims. See id.at 530.
368. Ic& at 520-21. Justice O'Connor cautioned that "[b]y [deleting the
nonexhausted claims] the prisoner would risk forfeiting consideration of his
nonexhausted claims in federal court," because failure to assert these grounds
could be considered an "abuse of the writ." Id.
369. In explaining abuse of the writ, Justice O'Connor in Rose quoted from
Sanders:
[I]f a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal
collateral relief at the time of filing his first application, in the hope
of being granted two hearings rather than one or for some other such
reason, he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a
second application presenting the withheld ground.. . . Nothing in
the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate
needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings
whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.
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prisoner could show actual innocence, 3 70 the Rose plurality suggested that taking a second bite at habeas would constitute
abuse of the writ per se and thus would be grounds to deny relief.37 1 In other words, a prisoner who proceeds forthwith with
potentially meritorious exhausted claims runs the risk of waiving for all time the right to raise nonexhausted claims in federal court.
The plurality positions in Rose and Kuhlmann are somewhat congruous. The Rose plurality's standard for abuse of the
writ could, in time, be mitigated by an actual innocence exception, making the plurality's proposed standard governing successive petitions parallel with the plurality's abuse of the writ
standard. In addition, because most nonexhausted claims are
defaulted claims, they are barred not only by the doctrine of
exhaustion but by that of procedural default.3 7 2 In any event
the rules for successive petitions and abuse of the writ suggested by the Kuhlmann and Rose pluralities offer a new view
of the writ of habeas corpus: without a showing of actual innocence, each state prisoner gets one shot, and one shot only, at
the writ of habeas corpus.
The Kuhlmann and Rose pluralities' views of habeas are at
odds, however, with the commonly offered justifications for
Brown.3 7 3 These explanations, although offered with regard to
the scope of the writ, adhere to the common-law procedural
functioning of the writ: Explanations of broad habeas that focus on the right or interest at stake characterize the writ as a
device to "cut through all forms" and go to the heart of the
matter of custody.3 74 Under these theories, if a prisoner can
show a violation of constitutional right and unlawful incarceration, it should not matter whether the prisoner raises the claim
in a first petition or a later one. In fact, if the articulated justifications for Brown are sound, the proper course might be to
hear exhausted claims immediately rather than delay adjudication to await "total" exhaustion.
Thus, as with res judicata, the exhaustion doctrine cannot
Id at 521 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963)); see supra
notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
370. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986).
371. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521.
372. See supra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
374. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 411 (1963) (quoting Frank v. Magnum,
237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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be squared with commonly offered justifications for Brown.
The appellate model, however, explains both doctrines quite
well.
2.

Res Judicata and Exhaustion Explained

The appellate model for habeas offers a simple rule for application of res judicata principles. If habeas is treated as a
form of appeal, there would be no question of whether res judicata would bar federal courts from reconsidering state court decisions. The federal habeas court would be part of the appellate
chain and res judicata would not apply until review was complete. On the other hand, once a federal habeas court examined an issue, further review by another habeas court would
be precluded. Thus, federal habeas courts should not give res
judicata effect to state court proceedings, but should be bound
by previous federal review.
Likewise, treating modern habeas as an appeal simplifies
the exhaustion doctrine by eliminating the need for special
rules to implement it. Exhaustion for habeas purposes is subsumed by ordinary appellate rules. Claims that were raised and
treated at each level of state proceedings below can be adjudicated. Claims that were not raised in state court cannot be
37 5
adjudicated.
Current law strays from this simplicity in two respects.
First, rules governing adjudication of successive habeas petitions fail to accord full res judicata effect to federal habeas
courts' decisions. 376 Second, rules governing preclusion of
habeas claims due to abuse of the writ fail to accord res judicata
effect to a federal court's determination of a prisoner's first
habeas petition when a second petition raises issues not raised
377
in the previous petition.
Under the appellate model, the appropriate question is
whether a given habeas petition represents an appeal from a
state court decision. When a habeas petition follows state court
proceedings, the petitioner may appeal everything raised in
those proceedings. Thus, res judicata ought not to bar bringing
such claims to federal court, and the rule in Brown is correct.
When the prisoner files a successive petition concerning
the same claims, however, that petition is not an appeal from
375. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
376. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 450 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1963).
377. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 514 (1981) (plurality opinion).
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anything. The matter has been appealed once, and the appeal
rejected. Thus, under the appellate model a federal habeas
court should not hear a successive petition, unless the previous
federal habeas court remanded the case to state court and the
state court heard the merits. In such a case the federal court
appropriately could hear the case anew, just as on direct review.3 78 Without further state proceedings, however, repeated
federal review is inconsistent with the appellate model.
Treating habeas as an appeal has similar consequences for
the rules governing abuse of the writ. In filing a first habeas
petition, a state prisoner may address any claims heard in state
court. If the petitioner fails to raise any such claims, however,
they are forfeited, just as they would be if dropped from any
state appeal. A habeas petition seeking to raise a claim omitted
from an earlier petition would be an appeal from no proceeding, and thus would be inconsistent with the appellate model.
Without using these terms, a plurality of the Court has intuitively reached this result.3 79 The plurality opinions in
Kuhlmann and Rose, which discuss respectively the successive
petition and abuse of the writ situations, 380 are consistent with
the new habeas model. The Kuhlmann and Rose plurality positions regarding successive petitions and abuse of the writ therefore should be adopted.
On the other hand, the majority holding of Rose, which requires dismissing mixed petitions of exhausted and
nonexhausted claims, 38 ' should be overruled. Under an operative model that treats habeas as a surrogate direct appeal, the
habeas court should treat nonexhausted claims in a "mixed
bag" petition as state law treated them, refusing to hear any
claim defaulted in state court, but entertaining the rare
378. The rule of Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 44649 (1965), also
would apply here to bar manipulation of state rules to thwart federal review.
See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
379. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 451-55 (plurality opinion); Rose, 455 U.S. at
520-22 (plurality opinion). Moreover, treating habeas as an appeal explains
why the Court has declined to rule that a prisoner must exhaust every possible state remedy. The current rule is that a prisoner need bring a claim to the
highest state court only once. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 449 n.3 (1953).
Even if state collateral remedies are available, they need not be exhausted.
See Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42-43 (1967) (per curiam). Once courts
treat habeas as appellate review of federal questions decided by the state's
highest courts in criminal cases, rather than as a collateral remedy available at
the end of the road, habeas policy will comport with current practice.
380. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454; Rose, 455 U.S. at 510.
381. Rose, 455 U.S. at 522.
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nonexhausted claim that is not defaulted. Rose's requirement
of total exhaustion ought to play no part in habeas jurisdiction,
and should be overruled.
D.

THE ROLE OF INNOCENCE

The discussion has not yet addressed one aspect of recent
habeas jurisprudence for which the appellate model does not
easily account, however: the actual innocence test. Although
rejected as a basis for the scope of the writ, this test found new
life in the Court's recent decisions limiting availability of the
writ.3

2

Actual innocence may also have a role to play along-

side the appellate model.
1. Current Doctrinal Confusion
In the series of cases beginning with Stone v. Powell and
culminating recently in Kimmelman v. Morrison, the Court rejected innocence as a limitation on the scope of the writ.38 3 It is

impossible to write off Stone as an anomalous result 3s 4 with significance only in the fourth amendment area, however, because
the innocence concept recently has reemerged in both majority
and plurality decisions developing other limiting rules, such as
those governing procedural default and successive petitions.3 8 5
Giving significance to innocence in determining which petitioners should have access to habeas review, however, raises serious
questions about the role of federal courts and is inconsistent
with articulated reasons for the broad scope of the writ acknowledged by the Court in Brown.
A comparison of innocence as a standard for granting relief
to its more traditional harmless error counterpart reveals difficulties with the innocence test and, to a lesser degree, with
Wainwright v. Sykes's prejudice test for granting review of a
claim defaulted for cause.3 8 6 Under the harmless error standard, if the state, defending a conviction, can show that an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt-that is, that the
result would have been the same had there been no error-the
conviction stands despite the error.3 8 7 Harmless error theoreti382. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 146-80 and accompanying text.
384. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-96 (1976); supra notes 147-49 and
accompanying text.

385. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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cally permits a reviewing court to excuse only the most trivial
and insignificant errors. Under the harmless error standard
the state has the burden of proof.388
Asking a reviewing court to apply an outcome-determinative test such as prejudice, or innocence, differs fundamentally
from the harmless error test, and presents at least three conceptual difficulties. First, the prejudice and innocence approaches implicitly establish a hierarchy of constitutional
rights, according some rights greater importance than others. 38 9
When innocence or prejudice is the issue, the focus of the
habeas court shifts from whether a prisoner's constitutional
rights were violated to whether the prisoner's trial reached an
accurate result. But if accuracy is the issue, then some constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury that reflects a crosssection of the community, take a back seat to rights that help
assure accuracy in criminal trials, such as the fifth amendment
right to be free of state coercion to confess to a crime. This
ranking of constitutional rights finds no basis in the habeas
390
statute or the Constitution itself.
Second, the inquiry by a habeas court as to innocence or
prejudice is profoundly at odds with any concept of habeas
since its inception.3 91 One of the best supported and least controverted principles of habeas is that it is not to serve as a retrial of the prisoner. 392 Yet, a new trial, with a shifted burden
of proof, is precisely what Smith v. Murray,Murray v. Carrier,
and Wainwright v. Sykes require: a sustainable claim of innocence proven to the habeas court sitting at nisi prius.393 Indeed,
388. I&
389. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 514-15 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 35, at 81.
390. Stone, 428 U.S. at 514-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stacy & Dayton,
supra note 35, at 90. The federal statute granting habeas corpus jurisdiction to
district courts does not distinguish between rights based on the various constitutional amendments; it merely provides for federal jurisdiction to hear petitions brought by persons held "in violation of the Constitution." See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a) (1982).
391. See supra notes 81-83, 167 and accompanying text. But see supra notes
141-45 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Friendly's theory that habeas
should be available only where prisoners advance colorable claims of

innocence).
392. See Reitz, Abortive State Proceeding, supra note 2, at 1355 (stating
that "no one would challenge the conclusion that the federal writ cannot be
used to retry the merits of every federal criminal prosecution").
393. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-39 (1986); Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 497 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977); supra
note 238. Sykes held that procedurally defaulted constitutional claims could be
heard by habeas courts only if defendants could show both "cause" and "preju-
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this requirement is all the more remarkable because it represents the first time federal courts have placed the burden of
proving innocence on the prisoner.394
Finally, and most important, if innocence were the appropriate basis for habeas relief, there is no reason why the innocence test should not apply to all habeas claims, as Judge
Friendly suggested, rather than being limited to procedurally
defaulted claims and successive petitions.3 95 Judge Friendly expressly denied giving any weight to procedural default, successive petitions, and the like. 39 6 He argued that the innocence
inquiry should always be pertinent in habeas cases, particularly
when state courts have reached the merits of the petitioner's
constitutional claims. 397 Adopting Judge Friendly's premises,
therefore, innocence should always be a prerequisite for habeas
relief, a view of the scope of the writ completely contrary to
that adopted in Brown.
The idea of innocence simply is at odds with the explanations generally offered to support Brown's expansion of the
writ's scope. Those explanations invariably rely, at least in
part, on the sanctity of the constitutional rights at stake and
the need to ensure that conviction did not occur in derogation
of constitutional mandates.3 9 8 Innocence never has played a
part in these rationales for habeas. If the innocence inquiry
were to play a part, it is unclear why it does not apply to habeas
review generally, as Judge Friendly suggested, not as an excepdice." 433 U.S. at 90-91. The Sykes Court did not adequately define either
term, but nevertheless expected federal habeas courts to engage in such a factual inquiry each time "cause" is alleged. I&. Likewise, Smith and Carriercre-

ated an exception to Sykes's general rule when the prisoner can make a

"colorable showing of innocence," thus requiring yet another factual inquiry
by the habeas court. 477 U.S. at 537-39; 477 U.S. at 497.
Note that the federal appellate courts are less competent than the district
courts to resolve the inquiry demanded by Smith, Carrier,and Sykes. A district court accustomed to conducting trials sitting at nisi prius in a habeas case

at least has the tools to redetermine guilt if necessary according to the Court's
directives. Cf.Stacy & Dayton, supra note 35, at 92-93 (arguing that appellate

courts lack critical information because trial record does not contain evidence

and legal arguments defense attorney could have made). Yet the cases increasingly reflect a tendency for the federal appellate courts to resolve questions of actual innocence or prejudice, a task to which they are ill-suited. I&. at

93-94.
394. Normally, of course, it is the prosecution's responsibility to prove
"guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
395. See Friendly, supra note 2, at 142.

396. Id at 146.
397. Id at 157, 160.
398. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:247

tion to the limiting doctrines of procedural default, successive
petition, and abuse of the writ. Despite the inconsistency of innocence with the commonly offered post-Brown justifications
for the broad scope of the writ, however, the appellate model
can make way for the idea of innocence.
2.

Innocence Explained: Old Habeas

The previous subsections have addressed a new writ of
habeas corpus-the essentially appellate writ that evolved from
Brown v. Allen. But this Article does not argue that the appellate habeas acknowledged in Brown displaced the common-law
writ of habeas corpus. Rather, Brown fashioned a new habeas
to address the inadequacy of direct review. Brown left the old
habeas untouched, and the innocence inquiry can be explained
as a vital part of the old writ.
For present purposes, the old, common-law writ of habeas
corpus had two significant aspects, its scope and the process
that accompanied it. As a matter of process, the common-law
writ cut through all forms to go right to the heart of a contested incarceration without unnecessary procedural wrangling.3 99 As a matter of scope, the common-law writ was
reserved for the most fundamental errors.4° ° At the time the
writ developed, long before the growth of procedural due process protections, this scope primarily encompassed jurisdictional errors.401 It simply was intolerable for a person to be
detained by a body without jurisdiction to order the detention:
' '40 2
such detention was "lawless.
The expansion of procedural protections that occurred during subsequent years largely has subsumed the scope of the
common-law writ: the Constitution now requires elaborate protections for the criminal defendant. 40 3 This expansion presents
a choice with regard to the scope of the old writ.
The common-law writ, existing side-by-side with the appel399. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text; cf Reitz, Abortive State
Proceeding,supra note 2, at 134 (arguing that habeas statute expanded availability of common-law procedural remedy to all substantive rights secured by
fourteenth amendment).
401. See Bator, supra note 2, at 474-83.
402. See id, at 466 & n.51; Oaks, supra note 2, at 459-60; supra notes 58-64
and accompanying text.
403. See infra note 451 and accompanying text.
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late writ, could encompass all procedural due process errors.4 °4
Consistent with the procedural aspect of the common-law writ,
however, that would mean most of the rules limiting access to
habeas should be stripped away, so that a state prisoner claiming a due process violation could get an immediate hearing
before a federal court in every instance. If this were the case,
the new writ, and direct review, would be meaningless, along
with concepts of default, abuse of the writ, and successive
petitions.
The alternative is to acknowledge that orderly appellate
procedure-including the new habeas-is sufficient to address
due process concerns, and to ask whether there nonetheless exist other errors so fundamental that the old writ-which cuts
through all forms-still should address them. When the question is posed in this way, the conviction of a person who is actually innocent nicely fits the bill of "fundamental error."
Although the concept of "actual innocence" has not explicitly
played a part in federal post-conviction jurisprudence until recently, it is obvious that an enlightened system of justice should
not tolerate continued incarceration of one who is demonstrably innocent. By treating a claim of actual innocence as equally
as fundamental as a claim that a prisoner is committed to custody by a court without power to do so, federal courts could review such claims under the extraordinary procedure of the old
writ of habeas corpus.
Making actual innocence the focus of the old writ is consistent with the Court's emerging habeas doctrine, particularly
with the quartet of cases-Smith v. Murray,40 5 Murray v. Car°6 Kimmelman
rier,4
v. Morrison,40 7 and Kuhlmann v. Wil4
0
8
son -recently decided by the Court. 40 9 Under this emerging
doctrine, actual innocence arguably comes into play in three
possible situations: defaulted claims, 410 successive petitions,41 1
and abuse of the writ.4 12 Stated differently, although the right
to the new writ might be barred by procedural formality, if
404.

See Hart, supra note 2, at 106 (arguing that Brown stands for just this

rule).
405. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
406. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
407. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
408. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
409.

See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.

410. See Carrier,477 U.S. at 497.
411.
412.

See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454 (plurality opinion).
See supra notes 371-72 and accompanying text.
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there is a claim of actual innocence the federal habeas court
will look beyond the formality and examine the legitimacy of
detention. Defining the scope of the old writ as actual innocence, therefore, is consistent both with the procedural reach of
that writ, and with the Court's recent decisions.
E. THE NEW HABEAS AS AN APPEAL

Once the new habeas is separated from its traditional twin
and seen primarily as a surrogate for Supreme Court review,
habeas can be seen for what it is: an appellate remedy. The
new habeas provides an appeal from every state criminal case,
permitting federal courts to review state courts' resolution of
federal questions. In Brown v. Allen the Supreme Court recognized it no longer could serve this function. 413 The habeas
therefore would serve as surrogates for the Supreme
courts 414
Court.
Having put all the pieces in place, it is possible to
redescribe habeas practice as an appeal. A prisoner is tried and
convicted in state court, and then appeals the conviction
through the state appellate courts to the highest state court.
The prisoner has preserved some federal constitutional claims,
prisoner then files a petibut has failed to preserve others. The
41 5
tion seeking federal habeas relief.
The federal court will reach the merits of any claims raised
in and adjudicated by the state courts.416 The federal habeas
court also will hear claims raised in state courts but not reviewed, if the habeas court determines that the state court's
failure to hear the claim serves no purpose but to thwart re413. See supranotes 114-33 and accompanying text (discussing Brown).

414. See supra Part I(C) (setting out appellate model of habeas).
415. The prisoner also may file a petition for certiorari. Although such a
petition once was a prerequisite for habeas relief, Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200, 214-17 (1950), Fay v. Noia eliminated this requirement. 372 U.S. 391, 43538 (1963). Denial of certiorari carries no weight in later habeas proceedings.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489-97 (1953). If the Court were to adopt the appellate model for habeas, it appropriately could direct all state prisoners to
habeas, with no possibility of Supreme Court review until after habeas proceedings ended. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 494 (seeking habeas corpus
without petitioning for Supreme Court review is "sensible allocation of federal
judicial resources"). Such a rule would diverge little from actual current practice. Cf. Meador, supra note 2, at 289 (noting Court generally denies certiorari

to state prisoners, who then seek federal habeas).
416. Habeas courts would possess the same limited authority to make factual-as well as legal-findings that they do now. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
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view of a federal constitutional question.4' 7 As a general rule,
however, the habeas court will simply refuse to hear any claim
defaulted in state proceedings. 418
That is not the end of the story, for two other situations
might arise in state court. The situation of lesser significance,
because it is unlikely to occur often, is that a state court in collateral proceedings might reach a federal issue that was defaulted in the original state proceedings. If it does, the federal
habeas court, again in an appellate
capacity, will hear that
4 19
claim after review by state courts.
More important, there is one claim state courts generally
do not consider defaulted if not raised in the original proceeding, and which most states permit to be raised on collateral attack: a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.4 0 The reason
for this deviation from the general rule of default is that most
prisoners are represented by the same counsel all the way
through original proceedings. Because few attorneys will attack their own competence, a prisoner has no opportunity to
raise this claim until after original counsel has withdrawn, usually at the termination of original proceedings. 421
Once the state courts do hear an ineffective assistance
claim on state collateral attack, a federal habeas court may also
hear the claim. This rule has special significance, for one issue
that arises frequently in ineffective assistance cases is whether
counsel was incompetent in failing properly to preserve another federal constitutional claim.42 In other words, procedur417.
418.

See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 267 and accompanying text.

419. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 326-28 (1985) (stating that if
state will hear claim subsequent to default federal court also will reach merits); see also Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 152-54 (1979) (upholding district court's issuance of writ of habeas corpus on grounds that state
court's rejection of constitutional claim was not based on procedural default).

420. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 271 Ark. 825, 832, 611 S.W.2d 182, 188 (1981)
(holding ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised on collateral attack if
there was no prior opportunity to raise); Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862, 864

n.4 (Fla. 1982) (stating that "[generally, ineffective assistance of counsel is a
collateral matter which should be addressed through a motion for postconvic-

tion relief"); State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App. 545, 550, 271 A.2d 752, 755 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (holding prisoner not precluded from raising ineffective

assistance of counsel claim in post-conviction proceeding simply because issue
was not raised at trial or on appeal); see also Tague, supra note 2, at 59-60 (explaining why ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be waived and how
defaulted claims become ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
421. See Tague, supra note 2, at 59-60.
422. I& at 59-62.
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ally defaulted claims become, in effect, a challenge to the
effective assistance of counsel.4
By focusing on ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
default situations, the new model would encourage evolution of
attorney performance standards, a process the Court has been
all too reluctant to promote.424 In Stricklandv. Washington,4ss
which first established a test to govern ineffective assistance
claims, the Court stated a hope that courts would not be drawn
into analyzing lawyer performance, for fear that this would
chill effective advocacy.F 6 Indeed, the Strickland test itself offers only the most vague guidance as to what constitutes effective assistance of counsel.4
In Murray v. Carrier,the Court
423. Id.; see Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1080 (discussing relationship of ineffective assistance of counsel claims and procedural default); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 349 (noting that petitioner will allege ineffective
assistance of counsel to escape procedural default).
424. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1080, 1083; Tague, supra note
2, at 61-62 & n.297. Perhaps the Court has avoided close scrutiny of attorney
performance, not for fear of chilling attorney performance (as the Court suggested in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-90 (1984)), but because it
may reveal that all too often attorney performance is lacking. See Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1080-85. Concern is widespread that indigent criminal defendants receive inadequate representation as a class, largely because
limited resources are available for their representation. See id at 1081 (citing
studies on inadequacy of representation for indigents); Bazelon, The Realities
of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811, 81216 (1976) (same); 22 JUDGES'
J. 21 (1983); see also A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, THE QUALITY OF ADVOCACY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: A REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR
ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 35 (1978) (noting "as a seri-

ous problem" that surveys consistently rank performance of appointed criminal counsel higher than that of most other counsel); cf.Burger, Some Further
Reflections on the Problem ofAdequacy of Trial Counsel, 49 FORDHAM L. REV.
1, 19 (1980) (noting general inadequacies of trial lawyers); see generally Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179
(1975) (presenting incisive study of reasons for inadequate performance of defense counsel, including dishonesty, heavy caseload, and inadequate resources).
If this is the case, resources must be found to overcome the problem. The
Court evidently does not care to be the harbinger of this news.
Characterizing an attorney's performance as "ineffective assistance of
counsel" all too easily can be equated with calling the attorney incompetent.
Although this Article is not the place for detailed discussion of the subject,
perhaps to the extent that inadequate performance reflects shortage of resources rather than lack of competence, "ineffective assistance of counsel"
needs a name change to divert attention from a particular attorney and focus
on whether the defendant received a fair trial.
425. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
426. Id. at 689-91 ("[jludicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential" to give counsel latitude and discourage proliferation of ineffectiveness claims).
427. The Strickland test requires that a court determine both whether
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repeated its concern about chilling attorney performance, indicating that this type of analysis should be rejected unless a prisoner establishes that the attorney incompetence was egregious
enough to satisfy the high standard for an ineffective assistance
claim.42s According to the Court, one reason that attorney error short of constitutional ineffectiveness cannot constitute
"cause" to excuse a habeas petitioner's procedural default is
that it would be too difficult to identify when such error has
occurred. 429

That a question is difficult, however, is not a ground to
avoid trying to answer it. The question of attorney error, in the
context of a default of a constitutional claim due to counsel's

failure to raise an issue, is one that demands an answer.430 The
new model would force the Court to focus on this question; the
old model permits the Court to avoid it.
The appellate model suggests other necessary changes in
the Court's sixth amendment jurisprudence. An analysis of attorney performance within the context of a habeas appeal suggests that the Strickland Court established an inadequate
standard for assessing the impact of attorney error. Effective
assistance of counsel is a constitutional right like any other; indeed, if the Court's statements on the subject are accepted, the
Court properly regards effective counsel as one of the defendant's most important rights. 431 Strickland dictates that a court
counsel's performance was "actually ineffective" and whether the defendant
was "prejudiced" by the performance. Id at 693. The Court declined to provide a "checklist" for defense counsel, but insisted that a court must "indulge a
strong presumption" of counsel's adequacy, noting that "there are countless
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case." I& at 688-89. This
strong presumption of competence contradicts prevailing opinion concerning
the adequacy of trial counsel, see supranote 424, including statements made in
speeches by former Chief Justice Burger. See Burger, supra note 424, at 19.
The Strickland test has been criticized severely, partly because it fails to
provide standards for adequate attorney performance. Dissenting in Strickland, Justice Marshall cited extensively the works of others who have developed guidelines to assess performance of criminal defense counsel. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 707-10.
428. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
429. See id,("Does counsel act out of 'ignorance,' for example, by failing to
raise a claim for tactical reasons after mistakenly assessing its strength on the
basis of an incomplete acquaintance with the relevant precedent?").
430. But cf Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1080-84 (discussing difficulty of close analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
431. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85 (stating that "right to counsel
exists . . . in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial");

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963).
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evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel ask two
questions: whether the attorney erred so seriously as to deprive a defendant of "counsel," and whether this error
"prejudiced" the defense, that is, whether the outcome would
likely have been different absent the error.4 32 This approach is
inconsistent with the manner in which courts of appeal treat
most claims of constitutional error. Ordinarily, if the appellant
shows a constitutional error, which is the first step of the
Stricklandtest, the burden shifts to the state to prove the error
harmless.4 33 If the right to counsel is among the criminal defendant's most important rights, it is unclear why a petitioner
who succeeds in proving the merits of a claim that the state violated this right must also carry the heavy burden of proving
prejudice. The proper test should require only a showing of actual error consisting of constitutionally defective representation
by counsel, after which the burden should shift to the state to
prove that the error was harmless, as it does in other cases of
4
constitutional error. 3
Finally, the Court arguably has incorrectly determined
when the sixth amendment requires that a state provide counsel to an indigent defendant. A defendant must be afforded
counsel at trial and on appeals as of right.435 There is no right
to counsel, however, for discretionary appeals, applications to
the Court for a writ of certiorari, state postconviction relief, or
federal habeas proceedings.4 36 Under the appellate model for
habeas, this scheme is insufficient in two respects. First, if federal habeas review is in effect part of direct appeal, and if it is
432. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 691-92.
433. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967); supra notes 34-35
and accompanying text (discussing harmless error standard); see also Gabriel,
The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsek
Emasculatingthe Sixth Amendment in the Guise ofDue Process, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 1259, 1276-79 (1986) (criticizing prejudice prong of Sykes test for reasons
discussed in text).
434. But see Gabriel, supra note 433, at 1281-86 (arguing denial of effective
assistance never can be harmless error).
435. See Argersinger,407 U.S. at 36 (holding indigent defendant has right
to counsel if imprisonment is possibility); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
357 (1963) (same on appeal as of right); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (same at felony
trial).
436. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987) (holding no
constitutional right to counsel to mount collateral attacks on a conviction);
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610, 612 (1974) (holding no right to counsel for
discretionary state appeals and no right to counsel for certiorari application to
United States Supreme Court); cf. Yackle, Book Review, supra note 2, at 392
n.88 (stating that counsel is generally unavailable in federal habeas).
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to be meaningful, counsel should be provided for federal
habeas. Second, state postconviction and federal habeas proceedings may be the first and only time to raise a most important claim, that trial counsel was ineffective. It therefore seems
particularly important to accord a right to counsel at this stage.
In sum, the appellate model properly places new emphasis
on the sixth amendment claims of prisoners with defaulted
claims. If a claim is defaulted due to counsel's error, the appropriate question is whether the error was sufficiently serious to
offend sixth amendment standards for effective representation.
Because defaulted claims will clearly and unequivocally be
barred in habeas, except when brought under the umbrella of a
sixth amendment claim, the Court will be forced to treat seriously, and expound upon, the obligations of criminal defense
counsel.
III.

THE MERITS OF THE NEW HABEAS

The model of a new habeas-in which the habeas court is a
surrogate for Supreme Court review, and in which procedural
rules governing access to habeas mirror those governing access
to Supreme Court review-describes the emerging trend of
Court decisions with some accuracy. This Article does not present the new model in the terms the Court uses, or even in
terms the Court necessarily would accept. Indeed, the habeas
cases and literature are replete with assertions that habeas
should not serve as an appeal, 437 although there are hints to the
contrary as well. 438 The new model, however, provides an oper-

ative principle that explains the trend of habeas decisions more
4 39
completely than any description offered by the Court.
437. See, e.g., Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947); cf.Hart, supra note 2,
at 118 (stating that Brown stands for the principle that "habeas corpus now
can be made 'to do service for an appeal,'" despite "time-worn shibboleth" to
contrary (emphasis in original)); Mayers, supra note 2, at 56 (noting that idea
that "habeas could not be used as a substitute for appeal was, until recently,
hornbook learning").
438. Mayers, supra note 2, at 56; see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 511-12
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that habeas courts sit in role of "surrogate Supreme Courts").
439. Concededly, the model does not perfectly explain the Court's cases.
Stone does not fit the model, nor does Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1981). See
supra notes 181 and 365 and accompanying text. The pluralities in Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), see supra note 311 and accompanying text, and
Rose, see supra note 312 and accompanying text, are consistent with the new
model but do not represent the positions of a majority of the Court. The new
model nonetheless explains habeas practice more thoroughly and consistently
than any theory offered by the Court.
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The new model has as an obvious advantage over the
Court's traditional approach to habeas in that it streamlines
habeas procedure. As noted at the outset, the rules governing
habeas corpus have become so complex that experts suggest
more time is spent in litigation over procedural rules than in
litigating the merits of constitutional claims.'" 0 Once the appellate model is in place, however, the rules become remarkably
straightforward and easy to apply. The new model greatly simplifies a habeas court's threshold step of separating those claims
it will hear on the merits from those it will not.
Streamlined procedure alone does not justify adoption of
the new model, but the model's simplicity provides another advantage by focusing the debate over habeas review. Under existing habeas jurisprudence debate about the scope and nature
of habeas review arises in every case. Each Supreme Court
habeas decision contains the inevitable balancing of individual
interests against state and systemic interests, causing the result
and its justification to shift with current thinking and the current membership of the Court."
Rather than requiring an assessment of the propriety of
habeas review on a case-by-case basis, adoption of the new
model resolves this balance at the outset. Having made the
critical decision to adopt the new model, questions regarding
the scope of habeas review are resolved simply by applying appellate rules. Under the new model, federal habeas is an appeal and lies to review every claim of constitutional error
adjudicated in state criminal cases. Claims not raised and preserved below will be barred from federal habeas review. Application of the new model thus raises two clear questions that
really should be asked about the current scope of federal
habeas corpus: (1) whether appeal to a federal forum should be
440. See, e.g., Yackle, Book Review, supra note 2, at 394-96.
441. Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-26 (1963) (holding that state interest in orderly administration of justice permits denial of habeas review of
defaulted claim if petitioner has deliberately bypassed state remedy, although
"conventional notions of finality" ordinarily have no place when personal liberty is at stake) and Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8-19 (1963) (holding
liberty interest at stake justifies hearing successive petitions on same claim if
"ends of justice" will be served thereby) with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 90-92 (1977) (holding that state interest in procedural rules justifies denial
of habeas review of defaulted claim unless petitioner can show both "cause"
and "prejudice") and Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 451 (plurality opinion) (balancing
state's important interest in finality against petitioner's interest in adjudication and concluding that "ends of justice" require hearing successive petitions
only when petitioner advances a colorable claim of innocence).
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available in every state criminal case; and (2) the extent to
which prisoners should suffer the consequences of defaults
caused by their attorneys. These questions are addressed in
turn.
A. HABEAS AS AN APPEAL
No matter what model one applies, Brown v. Allen permit-

ted a great expansion of federal review of state criminal convictions.442 The new model recognizes this review for what it is: a
surrogate for the direct review that the Supreme Court could
no longer meaningfully provide for every criminal case. The
question remains whether such review should exist.

A useful, though perhaps obvious, first question is whether
the Court ought to review state criminal cases directly. Most

answer this question in the affirmative, considering the matter
settled long ago by Murdock v. City of Memphis44 3 and Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee.4 " Direct Supreme Court review serves the
twin goals of assuring the supremacy and the uniformity of federal law,44 5 and no obvious reason exists for making federal review less available in criminal cases than in other cases arising
in state courts.
The next question, then, is whether direct review ought
properly to occur in the lower federal courts, sitting as habeas
courts. This question is more difficult. Habeas review by lower
federal courts arouses passions not raised by direct Supreme
Court review." 6 Because the Supreme Court has delegated its
functions to the lower federal courts only in criminal cases, one
must ask what distinguishes criminal cases from other cases
arising in the state courts.
Three possible justifications exist for assuring fuller review
of criminal cases by shifting responsibility away from an
overburdened Supreme Court. First, the federal rights at stake
in criminal cases may be particularly important. Second, the
442. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
443. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). Murdock held that the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction over state court judgments extended to federal questions raised in
and decided by the highest state court. I&.at 635-37.
444. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Martin held that the Supreme Court
has authority to review judgments of state courts. Id. at 351-52.
445. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 347-50; Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at
631-33.
446.

See STATE JUSTIcES' REPORT, supra note 30, at 7 ("a final judgment of

a State's highest court [should] be subject to review or reversal only by the
Supreme Court of the United States").
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liberty interest at stake in criminal cases may be particularly
important. These two arguments parallel the old model's justifications for broad habeas review and are unpersuasive. 44 7 If
liberty or rights are the operative values in habeas cases, the
Court's decisions do a poor job of honoring them, as previous
sections have explained.4 48 Moreover, it is not apparent why,
for example, a criminal suspect's right to confront adverse witnesses necessarily is more important than a citizen's right to be
free from an unlawful taking by the state so as to justify an additional tier of review for cases involving the former. Further,
a jail sentence of only a few days cannot neccesarily be described as raising greater concerns than a civil judgment that
would bankrupt a defendant. Yet a criminal suspect sentenced
to prison gets federal habeas review while a holder of federal
rights adjudicated by the state in civil proceedings must settle
for a chance at Supreme Court review.
A third justification focuses not on the individual interest
at stake but on structural concerns peculiar to criminal cases.
This justification requires a brief return to the Court's decision
in Brown v. Allen. Brown did not rest on the premise that
criminal defendants should get more review than civil litigants,
but rather on the belief that habeas would provide the only
meaningful review.44 9 The proper inquiry therefore is whether
the Brown Court's central premise was correct.
The Brown decision itself provides some justification for
the argument that the only meaningful review of criminal cases
must be habeas review. The Justices writing in Brown, primarily but not exclusively Justice Frankfurter, identified a number
of structural inadequacies peculiar to direct Supreme Court
review in criminal cases. The Court was expanding the rights
of criminal suspects and further expansion would require additional Court scrutiny of criminal cases. In fact, the number of
criminal cases reaching the Court was increasing, along with
particularly inadequate records and petitions often drafted by
pro se petitioners. Thus, the Brown Court rightly worried
about its ability to provide adequate review of state prisoners'
450
claims.
Events since Brown strengthen the case for maintaining
447. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing rights-based
and liberty-based rationales for habeas).
448. See supra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 114-32 (discussing this interpretation of Brown).

450. Id.
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habeas review. The Court decided Brown at the beginning of
the due process revolution, before the Court had incorporated
the process rights contained in the Bill of Rights against the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Now, states are bound by the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, and federal standards provide a minimum requirement
for state compliance. 451 Incorporation increases the number of
cases requiring federal review if state and federal standards of
4 52
criminal procedure are to remain the same.

Moreover, although the Brown Court did not suggest this,
one significant difference between constitutional claims arising
in criminal cases and those adjudicated by state courts in noncriminal cases is that in criminal cases the state is both a party
and an adjudicator. When a state court adjudicates the constitutional claims of a criminal defendant it therefore faces an inherent conflict of interest. The state has a strong interest in
respecting its citizens' constitutional rights, but also has a
451. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 424; see generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 422-40 (1th ed. 1985) (discussing cases and providing commentary on process of incorporating federal rights).
452. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 410 (1963) (noting that incorporation has
increased number of cases in which habeas is appropriate). This Article assumes that, because of the crowded and limited Supreme Court docket, the
lower federal courts can assure the uniformity or supremacy of federal rights
better than could the Supreme Court and that these courts are more sensitive
to federal rights than are state courts. Much of the Court's expansion of federal jurisdiction during the 1960s and 1970s rested on the assumption that federal courts are more familiar with and sensitive to federal rights than are state
courts. See, e.g., Fay, 372 U.S. at 424 (discussing federal policy that constitutional rights shall not be denied without federal review); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 181-83 (1961) (holding federal remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 supplements any remedy available under state law, on grounds that § 1983 was enacted because of concern about state hostility to federal civil rights).
Sentiment on this issue seems to have changed, at least among some members
of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446 (1977)
(requiring that federal court stay its hand when pending state litigation raises
federal claim, partly because parallel proceeding in federal court creates "negative reflection on the State's ability to adjudicate federal claims"); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94, n.35 (1976) (claiming that state courts now are
sensitive to federal rights).
On the question of parity between state and federal courts, see generally
Bator, supra note 2, at 504-14; Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1115 (discussing factors resulting in litigators' preference for federal forum). Further, uniformity
seems more likely to flow from federal district court decisions subject to review by only 12 courts of appeals than from decisions by 50 state supreme
courts that must await the review of the United States Supreme Court. At
any rate, if Brown implied that the Court cannot adequately review state criminal convictions directly, and if there is to be adequate federal review of federal claims, habeas seems to be the solution.
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strong interest in convicting and sentencing criminal defendants, particularly guilty ones.45 3 Thus, criminal cases present a
4 54
particularly strong need for meaningful federal review.

Arguments remain, however, against this special treatment
for criminal cases. That the protection provided by direct
Supreme Court review is less meaningful in criminal cases than
in civil cases does not imply that review in civil cases is meaningful. 45 5 Even members of the Supreme Court have complained that, given the size of the Court's current docket, it
cannot adequately assure uniformity where appropriate, let6
45
alone vindicate all federal rights arising in noncriminal cases.
This is a better argument for providing additional review of
some sort in those other cases, however, than for limiting review in criminal cases.4 5 7
A more common objection to habeas review focuses on a
host of systemic costs that detractors perceive to result from
lower federal court review of state criminal cases. These costs
453. See Yackle, Explaining Habeas,supra note 2, at 1031-32; rf Schaefer,
supra note 2, at 13 (stating "fj]udges are trained to look at criminal cases in
terms of guilt or innocence").
The state faces a similar conflict in fifth amendment takings cases and
noncriminal enforcement matters, though passions generally run higher in the
criminal arena. The federal government faces the same conflict when it prosecutes, but federal judges are at least insulated by life tenure. See U.S. CoNsT.
art. III, § 1. Moreover, federal habeas is available for federal prisoners under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982). Cf Bator, supra note 2, at 510-12 (acknowledging
value of independent federal judge, but arguing federal system rests on assumption that state courts are responsible for and sensitive to federal claims).
454. Even Professor Bator acknowledges that in some criminal cases, such
as fifth amendment "confession" cases, Supreme Court review functions not
only to secure the uniformity and supremacy of federal law but to scrutinize
state procedures carefully. See Bator, supra note 2, at 516-17 (acknowledging
legitimacy of habeas if Supreme Court believes this careful review is appropriate). But see Yackle, Explaining Habeas,supra note 2, at 1022 n.137 (arguing
Supreme Court is not an ordinary court of error).
455. See Bator, supra note 2, at 518-19.
456. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that institutional constraints preclude adequate oversight by
Court of states' application of federal law); see generally Estreicher & Sexton,
A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical
Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681 (1984) (discussing docket problems).
457. Some commentators have called for an intermediate court of appeals
to ease Supreme Court docket pressure. See, e.g., Yackle, ExplainingHabeas,
supra note 2, at 1022 n.137 (collecting commentary on proposals). Others have
proposed such a court as an alternative to habeas. See Friendly, supra note 2,
at 166; Stolz, supranote 2, at 965-66. See generallyHaynsworth, Improving the
Handlingof Criminal Cases in the FederalAppellate System, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 597 (1974); Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve the Administration of
Justice, 59 A.B.A. J. 841 (1973).
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include the perceived affront to comity and federalism, increased workloads for federal district courts, and undermined
finality interests. Defining habeas with reference to the new
model helps to eliminate, or at least change perceptions of,
these costs.
Federalism and comity concerns derive generally from the
awkward prospect of a "lower" federal court, particularly a district court, reviewing the work of a state's highest court. Comity concerns the respect that judges in coordinate judicial
systems accord each other's work and the need to avoid one
court system's interference in the work of another.458 State
judges maintain that they, like their federal counterparts, are
charged with adjudicating constitutional claims, and therefore
perceive readjudication of those rights by a federal court as an
insult.459 Federalism concerns the notion that state and federal
court systems each are a part of a separate and independent
sovereign.4 ° It arguably is demeaning to allow the lower
courts of one sovereign to supervise the work of another sovereign's highest courts.4 1
Viewing the lower federal courts as surrogates for the
Supreme Court could alter the perception of these comity and
federalism costs. Although Supreme Court review of state decisions imposes some of these same costs, the costs of Supreme
Court review to comity and federalism generally are accepted
as part of our constitutional system. Under the new model,
habeas courts serve not merely as "lower" federal courts, but as
surrogates doing the overburdened Supreme Court's work. In a
sense then, habeas review can be equated with Supreme Court
review, and the comity and federalism costs can be seen as no
458. In Fay v. No/a, for example, Justice Brennan relied on considerations
of comity-the relations between coordinate judicial systems-in holding that
federal review must await orderly completion of state court proceedings. 372

U.S. 391, 416-20 (1963); see also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443 (1977)
(discussing interests of comity and federalism); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
45 (1971) (stating federal courts should not interfere with state proceedings
unless protections are inadequate).

459. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 & n.35 (1976); Bator, supra
note 2, at 505-06, 509; O'Connor, Trends in the RelationshipBetween the Federal and State Courtsfrom the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 801, 802-06 (1981); Schaefer, supra note 2, at 17.
460. See Bator, supra note 2, at 443.
461. See Bator, supra note 2, at 505-06; supra note 30 and accompanying
text (discussing widespread criticism of habeas).
These definitions are intended only as convenient working definitions.
The terms "comity" and "federalism" often are used interchangeably; it is important to address the values that both terms represent.
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different from those associated with direct Supreme Court
review.
An inevitable response is that whether acting as surrogates
or not, the habeas courts still are inferior courts reviewing state
court work. The answer to this concern rests in the realization
that district courts sitting as habeas courts do not completely
substitute for Supreme Court review, nor will they often be the
only court to grant relief when they decide to do so. First,
although federal review may be a nuisance to states, it is of less
concern when the federal courts deny relief to habeas petitioners than when relief is granted. In most habeas cases the state
need only file a response, probably one requiring less work
than if the Supreme Court were reviewing a claim on direct review.46 2 Second, to the extent habeas courts do grant relief, it

is misleading to focus on the federal district courts as acting
alone to overturn state court judgments. The state retains access to the circuit courts as of right whenever a district court
grants the writ and orders a prisoner released. 463 Thus, to the
action is
extent that a "lower" federal court awards relief, its
464
supplemented by a panel of federal appellate judges.
The new model also provides a more satisfactory manner of
viewing the costs of an increased federal court workload. Critics perceive habeas as giving rise to a "flood" of prisoner peti465
tions and adding extra work to an already crowded docket,
work that is a particular nuisance because so few habeas peti462. Cf Shapiro, supra note 2, at 332 (noting most habeas petitions in Massachusetts study disposed of in rather short period of time); id. at 337 (noting
habeas hearings tend to be short); id. at 338 (discussing several judges' summary disposal techniques).
463. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982) requires a certificate of probable cause to appeal a habeas case, but the FederalRules of Appellate Procedureexempt states
from this requirement when a state or its representative brings the appeal.
See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b).
464. I had hoped to show that in cases where the court of appeals grants
the writ or upholds the grant of the writ, the state was likely to get review by
the Supreme Court. This appears unsupportable See Reitz, Postconviction
Remedy, supra note 2, at 502-03 (stating that Supreme Court denied all certiorari applications by state in cases in study where certiorari sought by state). If
Supreme Court review was more readily available, then it would be possible to
argue that the lower federal courts, consistent with the theory of Brown v. Allen, served merely as a "sorting mechanism" for Supreme Court review.
465. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search."); Friendly, supra note 2, at 14344 (quantifying increase in habeas petitions); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 321-22
(same).
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tions have merit.466 Under the appellate model, these petitions
effectively fulfill the right to petition the Supreme Court for
review. Habeas petitions are not, then, "new" work at all, but
the work diverted from the Supreme Court's crowded docket.
Indeed, a sensible change would be to require state prisoners to
pursue habeas relief before filing for Supreme Court review,
rather than petitioning
the Supreme Court both before and af46 7
ter habeas review.
Finally, and most important, the new model for habeas
helps resolve concerns about the finality of criminal proceedings. The concern for finality is that under any system of justice, review of a judgment must eventually reach an end. If our
system of justice is to retain legitimacy, a point must exist at
which, by general agreement, the system has done the best job
realistically possible of deciding who shall and who shall not be
incarcerated. 468 This concern is the most frequent basis for
criticism of federal habeas review. Under existing habeas jurisprudence, although results are inconsistent, the rhetoric is of
unending review. 469 Under the new model, habeas does not

pretend to offer unlimited review. Unless a case falls within
466. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 339 (stating that 96% of petitioners are
unsuccessful).
467. See supra note 415 (discussing petition procedure). The Court has
noted that denial of certiorari carries no weight in subsequent habeas proceedings, so the petitioner may file a habeas petition raising the same issues without prejudice. See Carmichael v. Alabama, 434 U.S. 879, 879 (1977) (statement
of Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting denial will not prejudice filing of habeas petition); Jurek v. Estelle, 430 U.S. 951,
951 (1977) (denying certiorari petition "[w]ithout intimating any views on the
merits of ... petitioner's pending application for a writ of habeas corpus"); see
also Reitz, Postconviction Remedy, supra note 2, at 503-07 (discussing "puzzling" Supreme Court practice of dismissing certiorari petitions "without prejudice" to habeas petitions). Perhaps the higher success rate of habeas
petitions or the comparative ease of filing a habeas petition leads to more
habeas than certiorari petitions, but this merely indicates that habeas provides
a more meaningful appeal than does direct appeal.
468. Cf. supra note 102 and accompanying text (linking habeas and lack of
finality in criminal procedure). One particularly unpersuasive finality argument, however, asserts that the availability of collateral attack through habeas
thwarts efforts to rehabilitate criminals. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477
U.S. 436, 452-53 (1986) (plurality opinion) (arguing that people "contemplating
criminal activity" are less likely to be deterred if they believe repeated collateral attack is available); Bator, supra note 2, at 452 (stating that finality is essential to deterrence); Friendly, supra note 2, at 146 (arguing that
"unbounded" collateral attacks interfere with rehabilitation). To support this
rather remarkable sociological observation would require more evidence than
conjecture by lawyers, judges, or law professors.
469. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963) (stating that "government
must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment") (em-
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the scope of the old common-law writ, each prisoner may obtain habeas review only once.470 Thus, petitioners receive
meaningful, final, federal review.
On balance, the need for meaningful federal review of federal questions arising in criminal cases adequately justifies the
new appellate writ of habeas corpus. In an ideal system, the
Supreme Court could itself handle the load of state prisoners'
appeals, but by the Court's own admission it cannot.
The question remains, however, whether habeas under the
appellate model provides too little federal review. After all, the
new model arises from the concern that what the Court actually is doing is not consistent with loftier explanations for the
writ, such as the rights-based or liberty-based theories.471
Before accepting the appellate model as a new theory to explain existing doctrine, it is appropriate to ask whether there
should not be increased access to habeas, in keeping with traditional rhetoric concerning the post-Brown writ.
Some would argue in favor of easing doctrinal restrictions
to broaden habeas review. 472 Constitutional safeguards rightly
are viewed with great respect, and it is difficult to argue against
affording more procedure to ensure their enforcement. Nonetheless, sound reasons exist to adopt the appellate model and to
resist the temptation to create more review.
Once the amount of available review expands past the
boundaries of the appellate model, distinguishing cases in
which review is appropriate from those in which it is not becomes difficult. As the Court wound its way from Brown to the
current state of habeas doctrine, it intuitively attempted to address this problem. The Court's solution, still evident in its
most recent decisions, was to roughly balance competing inter473
ests: systemic or state interests against individual interests.
In so doing, the Court faced the difficulty that meaningfully
weighing these interests is nearly impossible. Thus, the Court
subjected the availability of habeas to sudden shifts, reflecting
the shifting composition of the Court. 474
One response might be that no line need be drawn, that
habeas should lie to review any claim in which constitutional
phasis added). But see Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 444 (condemning liberal "successive
470.
471.
472.
473.

petition" practice).
See supra notes 294-98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 2, at 425.
See supra note 441.

474. Id
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rights or liberty are at stake, without regard to defaults and the
like. Although this argument has humanitarian appeal, and
even perhaps furnishes a noteworthy ideal, its vision of habeas
is unworkable. Error-free trials do not exist. 475 Insisting that
criminal trials be, in essence, replayed until they are error-free
would create unending federal habeas review.
The perception that habeas is available too liberally has led
to serious public and scholarly dissent concerning the scope of
the writ. Habeas since Brown has been under consistent attack
476
by state judges, state officials, commentators, and legislators,
and some of their criticism is easy to understand. Habeas, as inadequately explained by old models, does not always convincingly justify its perceived costs.
Dissatisfaction with a poorly justified, broad habeas has resulted in a weakening of the protections habeas provides. Since
Fay v. Noia, shifts in habeas doctrine have made the writ increasingly less available. 477 Unless habeas review can be explained satisfactorily, this trend will continue.
The best hope for an enduring, meaningful habeas review
lies in a theory that grounds the Court's decisions in a sound
rationale. Current theory does not do this and the Court therefore engages in a balancing act that cannot be proven correct or
incorrect in particular cases. Unsurprisingly, recent balancing
by the Court has consistently provided an excuse to limit the
availability of habeas. The current doctrinal framework provides no theoretical basis for curbing this erosion. The new
model, however, provides a firm doctrinal basis for habeas review and clearly states when that review is appropriate.
Moreover, review under the new model is neither so scanty
as to displease proponents of habeas nor so broad as to raise the
475. See Bator, supra note 2, at 445-53 (discussing fallibility of tribunals).
It is useful to recall that Justice Jackson's famous comment on the Supreme
Court's infallibility is found in his Brown v. AlZen concurrence: "We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."
344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
476. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
477. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487-92 (1986) (narrowing scope of
44cause" to excuse procedural default); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454
(1986) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting habeas review of successive petitions absent "colorable showing of factual innocence"); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
514 (majority opinion) (requiring dismissal of "mixed-bag" petitions); i. at
520-22 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that successive petitions will be dismissed as "abuse of the writ"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976)
(holding habeas unavailable for fourth amendment claims). But see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) (holding habeas available to challenge attorney's failure to raise fourth amendment claim).
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ire of the writ's detractors. The new model simply assures a
federal forum for every constitutional claim adjudicated in
state court. Thus, prisoners are not subject to the changing
willingness of state courts to respect federal rights, but are assured federal review.478 On the other hand, the new model adequately respects finality by providing it after meaningful
federal review. Because the Supreme Court cannot provide adequate federal review, such review will occur-but occur only
once-in the lower courts. Thus as a pragmatic compromise,
the new habeas has much to commend it.
B.

PROCEDURAL DEFAULT AND THE QUESTION OF

ATTORNEY ERROR

The foregoing discussion analyzes the advantages of the appellate model for state prisoners' constitutional claims raised
and adjudicated in state court. What remains for consideration
is the question of claims procedurally defaulted in state court.
Under both the old and new models, claims not raised in
state court generally cannot be litigated in federal court. The
new model differs from present habeas doctrine in that under
current doctrine any number of demonstrated "causes" purportedly will excuse the default. 479 Under the new model
habeas courts will not excuse a default; but if the default was
due to the constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, the
sixth amendment will provide
an independent basis for accord40
ing the petitioner relief.
The new model is better than present doctrine because it
focuses attention on the two questions a federal court properly
should consider in examining an apparently defaulted claim:
whether the claim in fact was defaulted, and, if so, whether the
default resulted from the petitioner's attorney's failure to provide effective assistance according to sixth amendment standards. If a default occurred but was not the result of
ineffective assistance of counsel, no basis for federal review ex478. Federal review of federal rights is the key concern of many who favor
broad habeas jurisdiction. See Reitz, Postconviction Remedy, supra note 2, at
464 (arguing collateral review is "only avenue" for many prisoners' habeas
claims); Yackle, ExplainingHabeas,supra note 2, at 1049 (stating that "fundamental purpose of habeas ... is to assure access to the federal forum for state
criminal defendants raising federal claims"). But see Tague, supra note 2, at
67 (arguing that most important purpose of postconviction review is to have
some court review constitutional challenges).
479. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 420-23 and accompanying text.
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ists. The focus of habeas review is on adjudicating claims of
federal right. A default constitutes a waiver of a right; if the
petitioner received effective assistance of counsel and waived
any other federal claims, no rights remain for federal courts to
48 1
review.
The new model seems harsh in that habeas courts will not
excuse a default unless the petitioner can show ineffective
assistance of counsel. An understandable response is to ask
why a petitioner-particularly one with appointed counselmust suffer loss of a federal claim if counsel failed properly to
raise the claim. Generally, a waiver of a constitutional right
must be "knowing and intelligent" to be binding.482 Waivers by
trial counsel cannot be considered "knowing and intelligent"
waivers by the defendant, 48 3 so the defendant's resulting loss of
an opportunity to assert a federal claim requires explanation.
The primary justification for imputing waivers by counsel
to defendants is some reasonable concern for finality. A skilled
lawyer reviewing a transcript after any trial undoubtedly can
481. This statement is intended to "beg the question." That failure to assert a right at a proper time can result in waiver, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938), leaves open the question of whether reasons exist to excuse such a waiver, ef Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 3, 13-14 (1984) (surveying reasons why counsel might fail to raise constitutional claim). Quoting Williston,
Judge Friendly appears actually to understate the problem of waiver in the
habeas context: "Waiver has been well said to be a 'troublesome term in the
law."' Friendly, supra note 2, at 159 (quoting 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 678, at 237 (3d ed. 1961)). Although courts apply the "knowing and intelligent" standard to waiver of some rights, see, e.g., Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464-69
(right to counsel), other rights may be waived without knowledge, see, e.g.,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237-40 (1973) (individual can "consent" to search, and thereby waive fourth amendment right to refuse consent,
without knowing of right). Judge Friendly argues that procedural default
through failure to object to trial error does not raise "waiver" questions "since
the state has not deprived [the defendant] of anything to which he is constitutionally entitled." Friendly, supra note 2, at 160. Again, talk of waiver is in a
sense unhelpful: the question for habeas should be whether, and under what
circumstances, the client will be bound by counsel's decisions. See infra notes
482-85 and accompanying text; see generally Reitz, Abortive State Proceeding,
supra note 2, at 1332-38 (discussing different concepts of waiver).
482. See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 (applying intelligent waiver standard to relinquishment of right to counsel). But see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
504-12 (1976) (holding defendant's failure to object to being tried in prison
clothing constituted waiver of right to be tried in civilian clothing because prisoner "should have known" to object).
483. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 115-16 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (decrying system that allows attorney carelessness or ignorance to
cause forfeiture of constitutional claims); cf. Tague, supra note 2, at 67 (advocating "review by some court" of constitutional issues arising in criminal
trials).
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identify unadjudicated constitutional claims. Sometimes trial
counsel's decision not to adjudicate a claim seems unwise in retrospect. Other times trial counsel failed to perceive an adjudicable claim. If a competent attorney who provides effective
assistance of counsel cannot effectively waive a claim on behalf
of a defendant, criminal trials will have little or no finality. Attorneys necessarily make decisions for defendants, and the
criminal justice system must either accept those decisions or
not.48 4 If not, however, many trials will have two go-arounds or
4
more. 8a

The approach suggested in this Article, although seemingly
harsh, if adopted in its entirety likely will be more respectful of
petitioners' rights than existing habeas jurisprudence.
Although the Court now purports to consider a broad range of
"causes" to excuse default of a federal claim, acceptable causes
actually are few.4 86 The promising breadth of the cause doc484. See Meador, supra note 2, at 288 (stating that "realities of our representational system may lead courts, more often than not, to hold counsel's actions binding on the defendant").
485. See generally Bator, supra note 2, at 445-53 (arguing that if goal is error-free trial, no conviction ever will be final). Much of this discussion was inspired by a telephone conversation with Professor Thomas Stacy, whom I
thank for his contribution. Professor Stacy argued persuasively that it is unfair to penalize defendants for attorneys' mistakes, and that one should not be
overly concerned about finality and unending constitutional attacks on state
conviction. If this Article overstates the danger of unending attack on convictions, however, it is not because of an unwillingness of prisoners to raise
claims, but because uncounseled prisoners who do not recognize valid claims
also cannot raise them. Arguments about whether finality really is necessary
should not be premised on a relative degree of finality that exists because
habeas petitioners are uncounseled. Habeas petitioners, in their one "appeal"
to a federal court, should have counsel. See supra notes 435-36 and accompanying text. Moreover although this Article argues that courts should hold clients to their lawyers' decisions, courts also should scrutinize the performance
of trial counsel far more closely than they do under current standards. Habeas
courts have been far too willing to defer to trial counsel decisions that result
in default of a constitutional claim. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 391
n.60(a) (denouncing court's illiberal standard for ineffective assistance claims
on grounds that right to counsel is "an independently significant element of
fair and fair-seeming procedure, and should be enforced as such"); see also
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1075 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501 (1976), as example of case in which attorney and client should not be
treated as "one moral unit").
486. The Court now accepts novelty, state interference, and ineffective
assistance of counsel as cause. Only the latter two are meaningful, and the
new model incorporates them. See supra notes 274-91 and accompanying text.
Although the Court holds out promise that other causes may exist, this promise is contentless and serves only to distract from the critical questions. See
infr notes 497-98 and accompanying text.
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trine, however, distracts the Court from analyzing those few
excuses it accepts in a rigorous manner that might be more respectful of petitioners' rights.
Smith v. Murray487 presents perhaps the most glaring example of this weakness in the Court's default cases. The Smith
Court barred the petitioner's constitutional claim on the ground
of default.488 The Court was too distracted by the cause issue,
however, to analyze adequately whether a default actually had
occurred, and if so, whether counsel's conduct in causing the
default constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
A brief summary of key aspects of Smith is necessary. According to the Court, Smith's lawyer did not raise on appeal the
claim that psychiatric testimony elicited by the defense was unconstitutionally used against Smith at sentencing because the
claim lacked merit under existing state law.489 The Court ruled
that this decision did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel because winnowing out meritless claims is the essence
of effective advocacy. 490 The Court also refused to excuse this

"default" on the ground of novelty because an amicus thought
enough of the claim to raise it in a brief to the state court of
appeals, despite state law.491 After the state court upheld
Smith's conviction, a federal court in another case declared the
492
state rule at issue unconstitutional.
It seems unfair to characterize what occurred in Smith as a
default. According to the Court, effective lawyers do not waste
appellate bullets on worthless targets. 493 Because the claim
under state law lacked merit, Smith's attorney did exactly what
the Court would have him do: he "winnowed out" the claim. 494
Despite its support for the strategic decision of Smith's lawyer,
the Court denied Smith relief because failure to raise the claim
was a "default."
If a default indeed occurred, the state-not Smith or even
his lawyer-was responsible. Smith's lawyer did not raise the
claim because it was meritless under state precedent, a precedent found unconstitutional shortly thereafter. 495 Further, an
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.

477 U.S. 527 (1986).
Id at 532-33.
Id at 531-32.
Id at 536.
Id at 536-37.
Id at 534-35.
Id. at 536 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)).
Id
Id
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amicus in Smith's case drew the state supreme court's attention
to the unconstitutionality of this precedent, but that court re4
fused to address the issue because a party had not raised it. 9
The United States Supreme Court's very reason for refusing to
excuse the default was that the claim was evident to an amicus,
and subsequently, to a federal court. If the claim was not
"novel," and if Smith's lawyer acted properly in not raising the
claim, however, the "default" occurred only because the state
supreme court adhered to an evidently unconstitutional state
precedent even after the matter was brought to its attention.
The unfairness in the Court's application of the cause-andprejudice test arises in part from the Court's belief that its flexibility allows the Court to avoid a miscarriage of justice. This
assumption makes the Court too ready to find that a default
has occurred any time a claim was not raised at each level below and the state court says the claim was defaulted.497 The
Court's vague promise that numerous causes exist, some of
which have not yet been enunciated, 498 creates the false image
of a safety net, directing the Court to focus on whether to excuse the default rather than on whether a default actually oc499
curred. This approach conflicts with Henry v. Mississippi.
What Henry and the Court's other "adequate state procedural
ground" cases acknowledge, although the Sykes progeny do
not,5°° is that sometimes failure to raise a claim is the state's
fault, not the petitioner's, and thus cannot fairly be viewed as
the petitioner's "default.15 01 To term Smith's lawyer's failure
496. Id
497. Cf Hart, supra note 2, at 118 (accepting fact that "reasonable consequences" must follow failure to comply with reasonable state procedural rules
does not mean that "every last technicality of state law must be sacrosanct").
498. Cf.Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1986) (reviewing cases in
which cause is imprecisely defined).
499. See supra notes 268-71.
500. See supra notes 228-64 and accompanying text.
501.

Henry acknowledged that despite an apparent procedural default, a

federal court may reach a "defaulted" federal claim if the state's insistence on
compliance with its procedural rule serves no legitimate state interest. 379
U.S. at 447; see also NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 308-10
(1964) (holding that over-rigid or novel application of procedural rule will not
bar federal relief); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-66
(1957) (holding that application of novel state rule does not bar federal relief);
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 385 n.34 (enumerating costs of state rule or state
agent's preventing timely assertion of constitutional claim in state court proceeding). In Smith, however, the state appellate court actually knew of the
constitutional claim and declined to address it; in these circumstances, it is
hard to imagine what state interest is furthered by denying Smith relief. See
Smith, 477 U.S. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing defendant's pro-
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to raise the claim as Smith's "default," for which Smith must
forfeit an opportunity to avoid execution, glorifies form rather

than substance, in direct contravention of the adequate state
procedural ground cases.
Another weakness in the Court's cause-and-prejudice analysis is exemplified by its evaluation of whether Smith's lawyer
rendered ineffective assistance in causing whatever "default"
did occur. The Court's single comment on counsel's performance was that effective attorneys behave as Smith's lawyer did
in winnowing out less hopeful from better claims.50 2 The Court
failed to focus on Smith's lawyer's decision to raise some thirteen claims on appealS° 3 -surely a remarkable number to survive effective "winnowing"-while failing to raise the one claim
that later proved to be meritorious, a claim not "novel" because
another participant in the case raised the identical issue. Even
granting that "winnowing" is the hallmark of effective advocacy, it is questionable whether such winnowing occurred in
Smith's case. The issue of attorney performance received no serious consideration in Smith, however.
The supposed flexibility of the cause-and-prejudice test had
again distracted the Court, this time from careful analysis of
Smith's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
The cause-and-prejudice test focuses not on whether the state
violated a petitioner's rights, but on whether petitioners can
concoct acceptable excuses for failing to raise claims in state
court. The Court, seemingly open to new grounds for cause,
manages to avoid careful consideration of the one it already accepts, ineffective assistance of counsel. Current habeas jurisprudence thus camouflages the problem of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The cause-and-prejudice test therefore distracts courts
from appropriate analysis of the important questions in cases of
"default." This distraction might be fair to petitioners if a
cedural default as "exceedingly minor" error); cf Brennan, supra note 2, at
430-31 (making similar argument regarding Daniels v. Allen, decided sub nom.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)). In time the Court's decision in Smith
may come to be viewed with the same sense of universal opprobrium accorded
the Court's decision in Danielsv. Allen.
502. See supra note 493 and accompanying text.
503. The Court acknowledged that Smith's lawyer raised 13 claims, but
then applauded his decision to "winnow out" the meritorious one. Smith, 477
U.S. at 536. Most appellate lawyers suggest limiting an appeal to no more than
two or three claims. See e.g., Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty MinutesEffective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 Sw. L.J. 801, 809 (1976) (advising advocate to
select issue likely to be dispositive).
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broad number of causes actually would satisfy the Court; in reality, however, the number of foreseeably acceptable causes is
quite limited. Indeed, "cause" under present practice does not
excuse a default in any situation in which the new model would
5
not. o4

The crucial issues in a default case are whether a default
occurred, and whether counsel's performance was effective.
The new model will focus sharp attention on these questions.
This focus may lead the Court to develop standards for effective attorney performance, something it has refused to do in the
05
past.5
EPILOGUE: AN ILLUSTRATION OF DOCTRINAL
CONFUSION-CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Part I concluded with an illustration that demonstrated the
doctrinal incoherence of the old model. 506 Tom, Dick, and
Mary were tried separately for the same offense; each had an
identical constitutional claim, but received very different treatment due to rules governing ineffective assistance of counsel
and habeas review. The varying results in the three cases could
not be reconciled with rhetoric concerning the purpose of
habeas corpus.
The new model justifies some of these results, however.
Treating habeas as an appeal explains why claims resolved in
state court can be raised in federal court.5 0 7 Those not so raised
cannot be addressed in federal court.50 s If the petitioner can
show a sixth amendment violation, however, this claim will
provide an independent ground for relief.50 9 Thus, petitioners
with "mediocre" lawyers who default claims but whose performance nonetheless meets sixth amendment standards do not
receive habeas review. The petitioner represented by ineffective counsel can obtain review without reference to the causeand-prejudice test.
Although the new model explains some inconsistency in
the illustration, it cannot justify other results, such as the harsher treatment accorded the petitioner with a valid sixth
amendment claim. Instead, the new model highlights remain504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.

See supra notes 274-91, 479-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 426-29 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I(A).
See supra note 416 and accompanying text.
See supra note 418 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 420-21 and accompanying text.
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ing areas of necessary doctrinal change. Stone v. Powell should
51 0
be overruled, permitting review of fourth amendment claims.
The second prong of the Strickland v. Washington test should
be modified to parallel standards for appellate review of other
substantive claims. 511 The positions of the Kuhlmann v. Wilson and Rose v. Lundy pluralities should be adopted with regard to successive petitions and abuse of the writ. 512 Habeas
petitioners should receive the right to counsel, particularly 51to3
aid them in bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Finally, the Court should develop standards for what constitutes adequate representation and what does not.5'- 4 Habeas as
an appeal will then strike an appropriate balance between vindication of federal rights and finality of criminal proceedings.

510.
511.
512.
513.
514.

See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 432-34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 380 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 435-36 and accompanying text.
See supra note 505 and accompanying text.

